Searcy v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr.
| Decision Date | 14 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | 2015 Opinion No. 3,Docket No. 41216 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BARRY SEARCY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, CAROLYN MELINE, JIM TIBBS, JAY NIELSEN, ROBIN SANDY, ANNA JANE DRESSEN, BRENT REINKE, PAM SONNEN, TONY MEATTE, SUSAN FUJINAGA, THEO LOWE and SHIRLEY AUDENS, in their official capacities and as State employees, Defendants-Respondents, and DOES 1 through 10, fictitiously named persons, Defendants. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Thomas F. Neville, District Judge.
Judgment in favor of defendants in action challenging assessment of fees by correctional institution, affirmed.
Barry Searcy, Boise, pro se appellant.
Andrew C. Brassey of Brassey Crawford, PLLC, Boise, for respondents.
Barry Searcy appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Idaho State Board of Correction, et al. in an action challenging the assessment of fees by correctional institutions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Searcy is an inmate at the Idaho State Correctional Institution in Boise. On May 18, 2011, Searcy filed a civil complaint naming as defendants the Idaho State Board of Correction (the Board) and the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), along with individual defendants Carolyn Meline; Jim Tibbs; Jay Nielsen; Robin Sandy; Anna Jane Dressen; Brent Reinke; Pam Sonnen; Tony Meatte; Susan Fujinaga; Theo Lowe; and Shirley Audens in their official capacities as prison officials (all named defendants collectively referred to as respondents).
The IDOC charges the following fees, commissions, co-pays, and surcharges (collectively fees) to inmates who use the applicable programs or services: (1) a 5 percent surcharge on hobby craft supply purchases; (2) a commission on the sale of commissary goods; (3) a photocopying service fee; (4) medical services co-pay fees; and (5) commissions from telephone calls made by IDOC inmates and their families, friends, and associates. The Idaho legislature has not enacted any statute which identifies these precise fees and provides express authority to the IDOC to impose these fees. These fees are the subject of Searcy's claims.
Each of the fees imposed by the IDOC is the subject of IDOC policies or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and operates in the following manner. The IDOC collects commissions on the use of telephone services and commissary goods and deposits those commissions into the Inmate Management Fund (IMF) which, in turn, is deposited into the state treasury pursuant to SOP 114.03.03.014. The legislature then appropriates IMF funds back to the IDOC each year as part of the budget process.
Pursuant to SOP 405.02.01.001 (Access to Courts), inmates are charged a fee of $0.10 per page for photocopies. The IDOC does not charge indigent inmates the fee for photocopying. All photocopying may be subject to page limits in accordance with court rules.
It is the policy of the Board that the IDOC and its contractors charge offenders incarcerated at IDOC facilities a co-pay for medical and pharmacy services, but do not deny access to medical, dental, and mental health services when the offender does not have the resources to pay for such services. See IDOC Policy 411. In addition, offender-initiated medical visits are assessed a $5 medical co-pay fee. See SOP 411.06.03.01 (Medical Co-Pay). Community Work Center (CWC) work-release offenders are assessed a $10 medical co-pay fee. The IDOC also assesses a $3 pharmacy service medical co-pay fee for dispensing either over-the-counter or prescription medications per treatment or per prescription. Employed CWC work-release offenders are assessed a $5 pharmacy co-pay fee. Funds generated from the medical co-pay fees are used by the IDOC to offset general fund medical expenses.
It is the policy of the IDOC that offenders have opportunities to pursue hobby craft activities. See IDOC Policy 608 (Hobby Craft Activities). Policy 608 further directs that an SOP be implemented requiring a 5 percent surcharge for hobby craft materials to defray the costs of the hobby craft program. The price of hobby craft materials includes the purchase price, shipping, sales tax, and a 5 percent surcharge. SOP 608.02.00.001. Further, this SOP states that the surcharge is used to purchase hobby craft supplies and items that are used by participating offenders, such as hobby shop tools.
Count I of Searcy's complaint alleged that the raising of revenue for use by the IDOC, through the above-described fees, exceeds and violates the scope of rulemaking authority granted under I.C. § 20-212 and causes a forfeiture of his property in violation of I.C. § 18-314. Searcy's complaint also alleged that the raising of revenue invades the province of the legislature in violation of the provisions of Article II, Section 1; Article VII, Sections 2, 5, and 16; and Article X, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. Count II alleged negligence under the Idaho Tort Claims Act and conversion. Count III alleged civil conspiracy. Searcy moved for partial summary judgment as to liability on Count I. The respondents answered and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment encompassing all of Searcy's claims.
On June 13, 2012, the district court entered an order denying in part Searcy's partial motion for summary judgment, granting in part the respondents' motion for summary judgment, and setting a schedule for further briefing. The district court concluded that I.C. § 67-3611 provided express statutory authorization for state penal institutions to impose the telephone and commissary fees.
The parties filed additional memoranda and Searcy filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 16, 2013, the district court entered an order denying Searcy's motion to reconsider, denying Searcy's motion for partial summary judgment, and granting the respondents' motion for summary judgment on all counts. In this order, the district court took judicial notice that since the June 13, 2012, order, the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) rules were promulgated setting the IDOC fee structure addressing the hobby craft surcharge, photocopy fees, and medical co-pay fees. Because of this remedial action, which was subject to legislativeoversight through the IDAPA process, the district court concluded that those fees were not a violation of the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of Idaho and any claim that the fees in question should have been promulgated pursuant to I.C. § 20-212 was moot. The district court also concluded that the medical co-pay fees and photocopy fees were user fees and not taxes, and therefore, Searcy's claims pursuant to Article VII, Sections 2 and 16 of the Idaho Constitution were dismissed. Searcy appeals, solely challenging the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Count I.1
Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994).
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156.
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citations...
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