Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1937
• Docket Number: 5327
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: SEARCY v. INTERURBAN TRANSP. CO., Inc., et al

179 So. 93

SEARCY v. INTERURBAN TRANSP. CO., Inc., et al

No. 5327

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

June 30, 1937

Lee J Novo, of Alexandria, S. R. Holstein, of Winnsboro, and T. H McGregor, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Foster Hall, Barret & Smith, of Shreveport, and Hawthorn, Stafford &amp Pitts, of Alexandria, for appellees.

OPINION

DREW, Judge.

Plaintiff alleges upon two distinct causes of action. He sues for $ 20,000 damages for the tortious breach of a contract of carriage and for $ 7500 for slander and defamation.

Our first consideration of the case led us to the conclusion that this court was without jurisdiction ratione materiae of either cause of action. 171 So. 468. Reconsideration of the jurisdictional question has convinced us that, so far as concerns the demand for damages for breach of the contract of carriage, appeal was properly made to this court; but as to the other cause of action, we remain of the opinion that we have no jurisdiction, as more than $ 2,000 is sued for.

Before approaching this issue or the merits of the case for discussion, it is necessary that we summarize the allegations of the petition. These declare that the Interurban Transportation Company, Inc., and the Tri-State Transit Company of Louisiana, Inc., are licensed to and are doing business as common carriers and operate busses between the cities of Shreveport and Alexandria, La.; that on or about September 23, 1934, petitioner boarded a bus of the Tri-State Company, south of Colfax, La., 22 miles north of the city of Alexandria, and paid his fare to the latter city, but before reaching his destination, suffered an apoplectic stroke which rendered him practically helpless and speechless; that he informed the bus driver of his condition, but that no effort was made by him or any other employee of the carrier to give him relief or assistance, but, on the contrary, he was abused; that on arriving at the bus station in Alexandria which, he alleges, is used jointly by both companies, he was abused and treated as a drunkard; that he then and there informed the agents and employees of both companies that he was sick and desired medical aid, for which he was financially able to pay; that he was first taken from the bus and seated in a chair in the rear of the station from which he afterward fell to the floor and lay prone thereon for a considerable time; that the driver of said bus and the employees of the station rang the police of the city and had him arrested and placed in jail on a charge of drunkenness, which, he alleges, was preferred by said employees; that he was then thrown into a jail cell by said police and allowed to lie for about 26 hours, his body resting partly on an old mattress and partly on the concrete floor, during which period he suffered intensely; that at about 2:30 p. m. the following day, a physician was summoned and after examining him, his true condition was learned and announced. He further alleges:

"13. That he was not deprived of his consciousness and his suffering was intense and severe, and it is certain that medical aid could have, no doubt, alleviated his suffering had he received proper medical attention, and there is reason to believe that he would not today be totally and permanently disabled had he received medical aid at the time of the stroke or shortly thereafter.

"14. That said treatment or failure to obtain medical aid for the Rev. A. Cliff Searcy, and the act of having him arrested for drunkenness, were due to the gross carelessness and gross negligence of the employees of the said Tri-State and Interurban, namely, the bus driver of the bus on which the said Rev. A. Cliff Searcy was a passenger and the employees of the bus station, and by reason thereof your petitioner was immediately rendered totally and permanently disabled and continues in that condition at this time.

"21. That as a result of the gross carelessness and gross negligence of the employees of the Tri-State and Interurban in failing to procure medical aid to alleviate the suffering of your petitioner, and to prevent any permanent effects of the said stroke of apoplexy, your petitioner has been injured and damaged to the extent of Five Thousand and no/100 ($ 5000.00) dollars.

"22. That your petitioner immediately became totally and permanently disabled as a result of the gross negligence and gross carelessness of the employees of the Tri-State and Interurban, in failing to obtain medical aid for him at the time of his stroke of apoplexy or as soon thereafter as could have been possible, and that the said failure is the proximate cause of his present total and permanent disability

"23. That as a result of said permanent and total disability brought on by the gross carelessness and gross negligence of the employees of the Tri-State and Interurban, as above stated, your petitioner has been damaged to the extent of Fifteen Thousand and no/100 ($ 15,000.00) dollars."

He additionally alleges that said acts of omission and commission were, in their effect, a flagrant violation of his rights as a paid passenger and amount to a positive breach of duty due him by said companies, as such passenger, and of the contract of carriage superinduced by their relations. He avers that he is an ordained minister of the Gospel and has resided in Winnsboro, La., for fifteen years; that he there enjoys the confidence and good will of the people and also a splendid reputation for honesty, truthfulness, and integrity; that the charge publicly preferred against him that he was drunk is and was entirely false, and was maliciously made; that said charge defames and slanders his good name, credit, character, and reputation.

The Constitution ordains that in civil suits involving more than $ 2,000 the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, "except in suits for damages for physical injuries to, or for the death of a person, or for other damages sustained by such person or his heirs or legal representatives, arising out of the same circumstances." Const.1921, art. 7, §10. Cases falling within this exception are properly appealed to the Courts of Appeal. Art. 7, §29. We do not think the words "other damages (3)5C arising out of the same circumstances," can by any fair and reasonable interpretation be construed to embrace an action for damages growing out of public defamation, although such defamation be in a manner an incident to or closely connected with, in point of time, a cause of action based upon the right to damages for physical injuries. It is our thought that the words, "other damages," refer primarily, but not exclusively, perhaps, to property damages, such as to motor vehicles when damaged or destroyed by the same negligence that caused injury to or death of the operator or others in the vehicle at the time. This question is definitely passed on in Newsom v. Starns et al., 174 La. 955, 142 So. 138. That case involved two separate causes of action, viz. (1) for personal injury, and (2) for libel and slander alleged to have been caused by the publication of the facts and circumstances forming the basis of the personal injury action. The Supreme Court, after stating the case, held:

"Court of Appeal had jurisdiction of action for personal injuries by tarring and feathering, regardless of amount demanded.

"Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction of cause of action for $ 20,000 damages for publishing news of plaintiff's tarring and feathering and libelous matters affecting him (Const.1921, art. 7, §§10, 29)."

The court also said that that part of the suit sounding in damages for slander and defamation "should be disregarded by the Court of Appeal for want of jurisdiction."

Defendants filed separate answers. The Tri-State Company, after denying categorically practically all of the essential allegations of fact of the petition, excepting the ownership and operation of the bus on which plaintiff rode as a paid passenger, which they admit, did further answer, in substance, as follows That its bus was flagged at a point...