Searcy v. Manganhas

• Decision Date: 28 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 3-580A156,3-580A156
• Citation: 415 N.E.2d 142
• Parties: David Webb SEARCY, Appellant, v. J. P. MANGANHAS, M.D. and Donald Vandertoll, M.D., Appellee(s). (sic)
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 142

415 N.E.2d 142

David Webb SEARCY, Appellant, v. J. P. MANGANHAS, M.D. and Donald Vandertoll, M.D., Appellee(s). (sic)

No. 3-580A156.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

Jan. 28, 1981.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1981.

Frank J. Galvin, Jr., Richard L. Kieser, Galvin & Galvin, Hammond, for appellant.

Jon F. Schmoll, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, Merrillville, for appellee J. P. Mangahas, M.D.

David C. Jensen and Paul A. Rake, Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, for appellee Donald Vandertoll, M.D.

STATON, Judge.

David Webb Searcy brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. J. P. Manganhas and Dr. Donald Vandertoll. At the completion of Searcy's presentation of evidence, the trial court removed the case from the jury's consideration by granting the physicians' joint motion for judgment on the evidence.

On appeal, Searcy raises three issues for our consideration:

(1) Did the trial court err in its granting of the motion for judgment on the evidence?

(2) Was the trial court's refusal to admit Searcy's testimony as to informed consent reversible error?

(3) Did the trial court err in its admission of evidence concerning Searcy's receipt of Social Security disability benefit payments?

We affirm.

I. Disclosure Standard

In considering a motion for judgment on the evidence, the trial court must look only to the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom most favorable to the nonmoving party. To sustain a TR. 50(A) judgment for a defendant, the evidence must be susceptible of but one inference in favor of the moving party and without conflict. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 50(A); Stockberger v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. (1979), Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 1272.

If reasonable persons might differ or if there is any evidence or legitimate inference to support the plaintiff's allegations, a judgment on the evidence is improper. Stockberger, supra; Huff v. Travelers Indemnity Company (1977), 266 Ind. 414, 363 N.E.2d 985. Such a motion "may properly be granted only if there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference derived therefrom supporting an essential element of the claim: a complete failure of proof." Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v Chapman (1979), Ind.App., 388 N.E.2d 541, 544.

With this standard in mind, we must examine Searcy's contentions as related to the disclosure requirements for informed consent. In the Pre-Trial Order, ¹ Searcy contended that Dr. Mangahas and Dr. Vandertoll had negligently failed to disclose material facts relevant to his treatment and that they thereby had failed to obtain his informed consent. ² On appeal, he urges that a doctor's disclosure of information to the patient should contain all those facts which a reasonable person in a similar situation to the patient's would need in order to give an informed consent.

The crux of Searcy's argument focuses upon whether expert medical testimony is required to establish the extent of this disclosure. In explaining its granting of the judgment on the evidence, the trial court said:

"As I had indicated to you, you must have in my opinion expert testimony. I think that Doctor Blackstone's testimony, which is the only testimony of a medical nature before this Court, is insufficient. It's not there. I think that it would be error on behalf of this Court to allow this case to go to the jury. In my opinion the standard must be adequately presented and then as defense counsel indicated yesterday, that there must be someone that says, 'This is what the standard is, and this is how Doctors Mangahas and Vandertoll departed from that standard.' ..."

The Court in Revord v. Russell (1980), Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 763, recently addressed this precise question in a strikingly similar situation. It said:

"The general rule is that expert medical testimony is required to establish the content of such 'reasonable disclosure' unless the situation is clearly within the realm of laymen's comprehension as where the disclosure is so obvious that laymen could recognize the necessity of such disclosure. Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973).

'There are obviously important roles for medical testimony in such cases, and some roles which only medical evidence can fill. Experts are ordinarily indispensable to identify and elucidate for the fact finder the risks of therapy and the consequences of leaving existing maladies untreated.... Save for relative infrequent instances where questions of this type are resolvable wholly within the realm of ordinary human knowledge and experience, the need for the expert is clear.' " (Citation omitted.).

Revord, supra, at 766, 767.

Searcy presented three medical witnesses, only one of whom was not a defendant, Dr. Blackstone. While Dr. Blackstone was a physician, he was neither a surgeon practicing in Munster, Indiana, as was Dr. Vandertoll, nor a family practitioner working in East Chicago, Indiana, as was Dr. Mangahas. ³ He was the Director of the Gastrointestinal Endoscopy Service at the University of Chicago. As such, he was not qualified to testify as to the standard practice of either a surgeon in Munster or a family practitioner in East Chicago in 1973. Even if he had been able to so testify, he did not present any testimony as to disclosure standards in these regions at that time.

The only testimony of this sort was given by Dr. Mangahas and Dr. Vandertoll. Both explained their disclosure procedures and stated that their professional practices in this regard conformed to the standard of care exercised by those in their profession similarly situated. ⁴

There was no expert medical testimony, other than that of Dr. Blackstone, offered by Searcy to establish what risks Dr. Mangahas and Dr. Vandertoll had a duty to disclose. We agree with the trial court's assessment of the insufficiency of Dr. Blackstone's testimony for this purpose. As such, Searcy's evidence lacked at least one essential element necessary to establish a prima facie case. The trial court, therefore, properly granted the motion for judgment on the evidence in the physicians' favor.

II. Admission of Evidence

During the course of Searcy's testimony, he was not allowed to answer a question concerning whether or not he would have undertaken the operation had he been adequately informed of the risks. On appeal, he appears to argue, without any substantiation, that the trial court...