Searcy v. Strange
| Decision Date | 23 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14–0208–CG–N. |
| Citation | 81 F.Supp.3d 1285 |
| Parties | Cari D. SEARCY and Kimberly McKeand, individually and as parent and next friend of K.S., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. Luther STRANGE, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Christine Cassie Hernandez, David Graham Kennedy, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiffs.
James W. Davis, Office of the Attorney General, Laura Elizabeth Howell, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, District Judge.
This case challenges the constitutionality of the State of Alabama's “Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment” and the “Alabama Marriage Protection Act.” It is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment (Docs. 21, 22, 47 & 48). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds the challenged laws to be unconstitutional on Equal Protection and Due Process Grounds.
This case is brought by a same-sex couple, Cari Searcy and Kimberly McKeand, who were legally married in California under that state's laws. The Plaintiffs want Searcy to be able to adopt McKeand's 8–year–old biological son, K.S., under a provision of Alabama's adoption code that allows a person to adopt her “spouse's child.” Ala.Code § 26–10A–27. Searcy filed a petition in the Probate Court of Mobile County seeking to adopt K.S. on December 29, 2011, but that petition was denied based on the “Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment” and the “Alabama Marriage Protection Act.” (Doc. 22–6). The Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment to the Alabama Constitution provides the following:
Ala. Const. Art. I, § 36.03 (2006).
The Alabama Marriage Protection Act provides:
Ala.Code § 30–1–19. Because Alabama does not recognize Plaintiffs' marriage, Searcy does not qualify as a “spouse” for adoption purposes. Searcy appealed the denial of her adoption petition and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court. (Doc. 22–7).
There is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction over the issues raised herein, which are clearly constitutional federal claims. This court has jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state laws because such challenges are federal questions. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Because the parties do not dispute the pertinent facts or that they present purely legal issues, the court turns to the merits.
Plaintiffs contend that the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act violate the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit clause and the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alabama's Attorney General, Luther Strange, contends that Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972), is controlling in this case. In Baker, the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed “for want of substantial federal question” an appeal from the Minnesota Supreme Court, which upheld a ban on same-sex marriage. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a state statute defining marriage as a union between persons of the opposite sex did not violate the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185–86. However, Supreme Court decisions since Baker reflect significant “doctrinal developments” concerning the constitutionality of prohibiting same-sex relationships. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1204–05 (10th Cir.2014). As the Tenth Circuit noted in Kitchen, “[t]wo landmark decisions by the Supreme Court”, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), and United States v. Windsor, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013), “have undermined the notion that the question presented in Baker is insubstantial.” 755 F.3d at 1205. Lawrence held that the government could not lawfully “demean [homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 123 S.Ct. 2472. In Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down the federal definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman because, when applied to legally married same-sex couples, it “demean[ed] the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects.” Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694. In doing so, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which expressly held that Baker did not foreclose review of the federal marriage definition. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 178–80 (2d Cir.2012) ().
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet determined the issue, several federal courts of appeals that have considered Baker's impact in the wake of Lawrence and Windsor have concluded that Baker does not bar a federal court from considering the constitutionality of a state's ban on same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.2014) ; Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.2014) ; Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.2014) ; Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.2014) ; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.2014). Numerous lower federal courts also have questioned whether Baker serves as binding precedent following the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor. This Court has the benefit of reviewing the decisions of all of these other courts. “[A] significant majority of courts have found that Baker is no longer controlling in light of the doctrinal developments of the last 40 years.” Jernigan v. Crane, 64 F.Supp.3d 1260, 1276, 2014 WL 6685391, *13 (E.D.Ark.2014) (). The Court notes that the Sixth Circuit recently concluded that Baker is still binding precedent in DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.2014), but finds the reasoning of the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits to be more persuasive on the question and concludes that Baker does not preclude consideration of the questions presented herein.1 Thus, the Court first addresses the merits of Plaintiffs' Due Process and Equal Protection claims, as those claims provide the most appropriate analytical framework. And if equal protection analysis decides this case, there is no need to address the Full Faith and Credit claim.
Rational basis review applies to an equal protection analysis unless Alabama's laws affect a suspect class of individuals or significantly interfere with a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). Although a strong argument can be made that classification based on sexual orientation is suspect, Eleventh Circuit precedence holds that such classification is not suspect. Lofton v. Secretary of Dep't. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir.2004). The post-Windsor landscape may ultimately change the view expressed in Lofton, however no clear majority of Justices in Windsor stated that sexual orientation...
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