Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. United States

Decision Date14 November 1974
Docket NumberNo. 74-23.,74-23.
Citation504 F.2d 1400
PartiesSEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Appellant, v. The UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)

Lane, Young & Fox, New York City, attys. of record, for appellant. Peter Jay Baskin and Ellsworth F. Qualey, Rode & Qualey, New York City, of counsel.

Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen., Andrew P. Vance, Chief, Customs Section, John J. Mahon, New York City, for United States.

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges.

LANE, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States Customs Court reported at 71 Cust.Ct. 168, C.D. 4492, 371 F.Supp. 1073 (1973), denying appellant's motion for summary judgment, granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, and overruling appellant's claim for classification of certain imported jewelry boxes within item 204.50, Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), as jewelry boxes of wood. We affirm.

Involved in the controversy are jewelry boxes with metal musical movements which are wound by a key. The jewelry boxes were classified in item 654.20 TSUS. The relevant statutory provisions are:

Jewelry boxes, silverware chests, cigar and cigarette boxes, microscope cases, tool or utensil cases, and similar boxes, cases, and chests, all the foregoing of wood:
* * * * * *
Other:
* * * * * *
204.50 Lined with textile fabrics * * *
* * * * * *
Articles not specially provided for of a type used for household, table or kitchen use; toilet and sanitary wares; all the foregoing and parts thereof, of metal:
* * * * * *
Articles, wares, and parts, of base metal, not coated or plated with precious metal:
* * * * * *
654.20 Other * * *

There is no dispute between the parties as to the fact that the metal musical movement is the component material of chief value. The determinative question is whether item 204.50 TSUS is limited by the definitions in TSUS General Headnote 9(f) to jewelry boxes in chief value of wood.

9. Definitions.—For the purposes of the schedules, unless the context otherwise requires—
* * * * * *
(f) the terms "of", "wholly of", "almost wholly of", "in part of" and "containing", when used between the description of an article and a material (e. g., "furniture of wood", "woven fabrics, wholly of cotton", etc.), have the following meanings:
(i) "of" means that the article is wholly or in chief value of the named material;
Emphasis added.
(ii) "wholly of" means that the article is, except for negligible or insignificant quantities of some other material or materials, composed completely of the named materials;
(iii) "almost wholly of" means that the essential character of the article is imparted by the named material, notwithstanding the fact that significant quantities of some other material or materials may be present; and
(iv) "in part of" or "containing" mean that the article contains a significant quantity of the named material.
* * * * * *

Appellant contends these definitions do not apply and that it was not the intent of Congress in enacting the Tariff Schedules of the United States to change existing definitions or rates of duty on individual products.

The Customs Simplification Act of 1954, § 101(a), Pub.L. No. 768, 68 Stat. 1136, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1332 note, directed the Tariff Commission to compile a revision and consolidation of the customs laws to accomplish to the extent practical the following purposes:

(1) Establish schedules of tariff classifications which will be logical in arrangement and terminology and adapted to the changes which have occurred since 1930 in the character and importance of articles produced in and imported into the United States and in the markets in which they are sold.
(2) Eliminate anomalies and illogical results in the classification of articles.
(3) Simplify the determination and application of tariff classifications.

Section 101(b) of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954 provided that the Tariff Commission should seek to accomplish these purposes without suggesting changes in any rate or rates of duty on individual products. However, it was also provided that where, in the judgment of the Tariff Commission, the purposes could not be accomplished without such changes, the Commission was authorized to suggest incidental changes in rates. The Commission was required to hold public hearings in connection with any proposed rate changes. In fact, however, the Tariff Commission held public hearings in connection with every proposed schedule of classification and the general headnotes and rules of interpretation. It is to be noted that the hearings held by the Tariff Commission were much broader than were actually required. Tariff Classification Study, Submitting Report (1960), page 2.1

In discussing the general headnotes the Tariff Commission said:

An important feature of the proposed tariff schedules not found in the existing schedules is a system of interpretive headnotes which specify certain special rules of interpretation, define important terms, prescribe special procedures, and, in general, clarify the realtionships between
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  • Lindstrom by Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. on Behalf of New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1994
    ...by the legislators.' " Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 556, 404 A.2d 625 (1979) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1400, 1402 (C.C.P.A.1974)); accord Griffin, supra, 253 N.J.Super. at 177, 601 A.2d 261. Section four originally protected against "injur......
  • People v. Bostick
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 1996
    ...(Barr v. United States (1945) 324 U.S. 83, 90, 65 S.Ct. 522, 525, 89 L.Ed. 765; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States (Ct. of Customs & Patent Apps.1974) 62 C.C.P.A. 10, 504 F.2d 1400, 1402.) It is similarly unimportant whether a court believes the unanticipated application is sensible or j......
  • In re Professional Ins. Management
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • April 1, 2002
    ...it is unimportant that the particular application may not have been contemplated by the legislators." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States, 62 C.C.P.A. 10, 504 F.2d 1400, 1402 (Cust. Ct. Pat App.1974); see, e.g., Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90, 65 S.Ct. 522, 89 L.Ed. 765 (1945); Vr......
  • Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Inc.
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    ...it is unimportant that the particular application may not have been contemplated by the legislators." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1400, 1402 (Cust.Ct.Pat.App.1974); See, e. g., Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90, 65 S.Ct. 522, 525, 89 L.Ed. 765, 771 (1945). There is ......
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