Sears v. Bradley
Docket Number | 3:20-CV-86-CAR |
Decision Date | 31 March 2023 |
Citation | 667 F.Supp.3d 1344 |
Parties | Christopher SEARS, Plaintiff, v. Jonathan BRADLEY and Stacy Jarrard, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Jordan Johnson, Catherine S. Bernard, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Susan Elizabeth Teaster, William Peters, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Jonathan Bradley.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Christopher Sears ("Sears") asserts various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Georgia State Patrol Trooper Jonathan Bradley ("Trooper Bradley") Sheriff Stacy Jarrard ("Sheriff Jarrard") violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 Currently before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.2 Having considered the record, the parties' briefs, and applicable law, Trooper Bradley's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on Sears' unlawful stop, detention, malicious prosecution, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and DENIES summary judgment on Sears' unlawful search and arrest claims. Sherriff Jarrard's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 37] is GRANTED.
On June 26, 2018, Georgia State Patrol ("GSP") Lieutenant Anthony Coleman3 ("Lt. Coleman") authorized a roadblock to occur on June 29, 2018 at 6:45 PM at the intersection of Nimblewill Church Road and US Forestry 28-1 in Lumpkin County, Georgia.4 Pursuant to GSP Policy, Lt. Coleman completed a roadblock supervisor initiation approval form and a roadblock final report.5 The roadblock initiation form states the roadblock was authorized for the primary purpose of improving driver safety and to specifically perform routine traffic checks for driver's license, insurance, and registration verification; seatbelt compliance; driver impairment; and vehicle fitness and safety compliance.6 Thirteen GSP troopers were assigned to the roadblock.7 GSP troopers met at the Lumpkin County Jail for briefings before the roadblock.8 While Sheriff Jarrard described his office as a "backup source or an assisting source," neither Sheriff Jarrard nor any Lumpkin County Sherriff's officer participated in the roadblock.9 The roadblock was planned, effectuated, and conducted by GSP. The roadblock resulted in the issuance of twenty-three citations, five non-DUI custodial arrests, and two DUI arrests—one of whom was Sears.10
On June 29, 2018, Sears attended the Rainbow Gathering, an annual "primitive camping" event in the Chattahoochee National Forest.11 While driving back to his friend's house after leaving the Rainbow Gathering, Sears was stopped by Trooper Bradley at the roadblock.12 Trooper Bradley is POST certified and has received training in Standardized Field Sobriety as well as ARIDE—a training on how to detect certain drugs and the effects those drugs have on individuals.13 Trooper Bradley participated in a DUI "refresher training" in 2017.14
During his initial interaction with Sears, Trooper Bradley contends he observed Sears "had blood shot watery eyes," "his speech was slow and slurred," and he "smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle."15 Sears denied having any marijuana.16 Trooper Bradley then ordered Sears out of the vehicle, and GSP troopers searched his vehicle based on the smell of marijuana. During the search, Trooper Bradley located a pill bottle labeled San Pedro tea, which contained capsules of San Pedro tea concentrate.17 No marijuana was found in the vehicle.18
Sears consented to a standardized field sobriety test ("SFST") which Trooper Bradley administered.19 The SFST was captured on GSP dash-cam footage included in the record.20 The SFST consisted of four tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") test, the walk and turn test, the one leg stand test, and the Romberg test.21 At the conclusion of the SFST, Trooper Bradley asked Sears what illegal substances he had taken that day.22 Sears admitted to smoking marijuana earlier in the day.23 Trooper Bradley concluded Sears was under the influence and arrested Sears for possession of a controlled substance and driving under the influence.24 Trooper Bradley read Sears the Georgia implied consent notice for suspects over the age of twenty-one.25 Sears refused a blood test and was transported to the Lumpkin County detention center.26
During the resulting criminal proceedings in state court, Sears moved to suppress the seizure of the San Pedro tea. The Superior Court of Lumpkin County granted the motion finding: (1) the State did not meet its burden of proving that the challenged stop was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances; (2) Trooper Bradley was not credible as to the odor of marijuana being present in any degree to justify a search of Sears' vehicle; and (3) there was objectively no probable cause to believe Sears was an impaired driver at the time he was arrested (the "Suppression Order").27 The court based its findings, in part, on the lack of marijuana found in the vehicle, inconsistencies in Trooper Bradley's report, testimony, and video footage, as well as statements the court concluded were "demonstrably false."28
Sears originally filed this action in the Superior Court of Franklin County, Georgia.29 Defendants timely removed to this Court pursuant to the Court's federal question jurisdiction.30 Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on Sears' remaining claims are now ripe for ruling.
Summary judgment is proper if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."31 The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" and that entitles it to a judgment as a matter of law.32 If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.33
The Court must view the facts, and any reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.34 "The inferences, however, must be supported by the record, and a genuine issue of material fact requires more than 'some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' "35 In cases where opposing parties tell different versions of the same events, and one is "blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts."36 A disputed fact will preclude summary judgment only "if the dispute might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."37 "The court may not resolve any material factual dispute, but must deny the motion and proceed to trial if it finds that such an issue exists."38
Sears brings claims under § 1983 against Sherriff Jarrard and Trooper Bradley in their individual capacities. Sears alleges Sherriff Jarrard violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights and Trooper Bradley violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against those who, under color of law, deprive a citizen of the United States of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."39 A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim against a person in his individual or official capacity, or against a governmental entity.40
Sears claims Trooper Bradley violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful stop, detention, search, arrest, and malicious prosecution, and Sherriff Jarrard violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful stop.
Sears contends he was unlawfully stopped at an unconstitutional roadblock established by Sherriff Jarrard and enforced by Trooper Bradley, and collateral estoppel prevents Defendants from challenging the findings in the Suppression Order. Sears' arguments fail, and his reliance on the Suppression Order is misplaced.
Sears argues the Suppression Order triggers collateral estoppel and precludes Defendants from challenging the findings and conclusions contained in the Order. While the Court may consider the Suppression Order as evidence, the order is neither binding nor triggers collateral estoppel. "Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so."41 Under Georgia law:
[a] judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.42
Georgia law "retains the old 'mutuality' rule . . . requiring an 'identity of parties or their privies' to bar a second lawsuit."43 Issue preclusion does not apply to Sears' claims because there is no identity of parties or their privies in the state court criminal case and this case. The criminal case, State of Georgia v. Christopher Sears, Case No. 18-CR-573-JP, was between the State of Georgia and Sears. Neither Trooper Bradley nor Sherriff Jarrard were parties to the criminal case.44 There is also no privity between the Defendants and the State of Georgia. Trooper Bradley and Sherriff Jarrard "are being sued in their individual capacity[ies] in this [case], and their personal interests, which were not at stake in the criminal proceeding, differ from [Georgia's] interests."45 Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply.
To continue reading
Request your trial