Sears v. Capitol Hill Management Corp., 93-7089

• Decision Date: 09 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-7089,93-7089
• Citation: 44 F.3d 1031
• Parties: NOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant. Frank SEARS, Appellant, v. CAPITOL HILL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1031

44 F.3d 1031

310 U.S.App.D.C. 142

NOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant.

Frank SEARS, Appellant, v. CAPITOL HILL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, et al., Appellees.

No. 93-7089.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Dec. 9, 1994.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This cause came to be heard on the appeal from the judgment of the District Court granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, and was briefed and argued by counsel. The issues have been accorded full consideration by the Court and occasion no need for a published opinion. See D.C.Cir.Rule 36(b). For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir.Rule 41.

ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

Appellant Frank Sears ("Sears") appeals the District Court's order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of appellees Capitol Hill Management Corporation ("CHMC"), the District of Columbia, and a Metropolitan police officer. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on the night of December 30, 1988, Sears arrived at the Hawk 'n Dove Restaurant ("Restaurant") in the District of Columbia. Already intoxicated, Sears "charged" past the hostess as he entered the Restaurant. Trial Tr. III at 4, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 254. Approximately twenty minutes after he arrived, Sears approached the service area of the bar, just outside the kitchen. The only people in the area besides Sears were Restaurant employees. After he refused to leave the area, an altercation ensued between Sears and Restaurant employees, during which Sears briefly entered the kitchen, where three employees were working. Shortly thereafter, an off-duty Metropolitan police officer who had been dining in the Restaurant came to the service area, where he found Sears on his hands and knees near the entrance to the kitchen. As the police officer walked him to the door of the Restaurant, Sears briefly struggled and then appeared to lose consciousness. Later that night, Sears was treated at a local hospital for a skull fracture and an epidural hematoma (a blood clot between the skull and brain membrane), which was surgically removed. As a result of his injuries, Sears suffered permanent brain damage and does not remember the incident at the Restaurant.

Sears brought this diversity action in District Court against CHMC, the owner of the Restaurant, seeking damages for the injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the excessive force used by Restaurant employees in handling him. Specifically, Sears alleged that a Restaurant kitchen employee caused his injury by striking him on the head with a blunt instrument--probably a kitchen utensil--during the brief period he was in the kitchen on the night of the incident. CHMC impleaded the District of Columbia and its off-duty officer as third-party defendants, claiming that the actions of the off-duty officer had caused or contributed to Sears' injury. At trial, expert medical testimony established that Sears' skull fracture and blood clot were caused by a blow to the head with a blunt object, although no testimony established the exact nature of the object. The medical testimony indicated that a blood clot such as Sears' would typically produce semiconsciousness or unconsciousness not immediately, but some time, or "a while," after the blow that caused the blood clot. Trial Tr. II at 54, 94, reprinted in J.A. 179-80, 220. Expert testimony also established that Sears' blood alcohol level did not cause his unconsciousness upon being removed from the Restaurant. All of the Restaurant employees who testified denied striking or seeing any other employee strike Sears with a blunt instrument. None of the employees explained how Sears ended up on his hands and knees near the kitchen. Finally, there was no testimony as to what Sears did in the approximately twenty minutes he was in the Restaurant prior to the altercation. At the conclusion of Sears' case-in-chief, the District Court granted appellees' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Sears had presented insufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find that a Restaurant...