Sears v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport
| Decision Date | 27 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | 97-00138 |
| Parties | BOBBY RAY SEARS, Plaintiff/Appellant, VS. METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE AIRPORT AUTHORITY and REPUBLIC PARKING SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants/Appellees. AppealIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Filed |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
Davidson Circuit No. 95C-1570
THE HONORABLE THOMAS W. BROTHERS, JUDGE
This appeal involves a motorcycle rider who was injured by the descending wooden arm of a traffic control device at an exit from the short term parking area of the Nashville International Airport. The motorcyclist filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the Metropolitan Airport Authority and the operator of the airport parking facilities, alleging that they had failed to adequately warn him of the potentially dangerous condition at the exit. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the rider appealed. We have determined that the defendants are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on this record and, therefore, vacate the summary judgment order and remand the case for further proceedings.
For Bobby Ray Sears:
Mike W. Binkley, Nashville, Tennessee
For Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority:
D. Kirk Shaffer, Nancy A. Vincent, Stokes & Bartholomew, Nashville, Tennessee
For Republic Parking Systems, Inc.:
Gerald C. Wigger, Nashville, Tennessee
VACATED AND REMANDED
Bobby Ray Sears is a sixty-year-old heating and air conditioning technician who has worked for the Metropolitan Government for thirty years.1 He lives in Nashville with his wife, his step-daughter, and his wife's mother. Mr. Sears has been riding motorcycles for pleasure since 1979 and, at the time of his injuries, owned a 1984 full size Honda motorcycle.
On May 21, 1994, Mr. Sears drove his motorcycle to the Nashville International Airport to meet his step-daughter who was returning from a visit to New Jersey. His wife drove to the airport separately in order to give her daughter a ride home. Upon arriving at the airport, Mr. Sears began looking for an appropriate place to park his motorcycle. Because he was not an habitu of the airport,2 he followed the signs stating "Passenger Pick-up Use Short Term Parking." Accordingly, Mr. Sears entered the covered short term parking garage through its designated entrance and parked his motorcycle in a space normally used by automobiles.
After greeting his step-daughter and wife in the baggage claim area, Mr. Sears returned to the short term parking garage, got on his motorcycle, and proceeded to leave the airport. He followed the posted signs as he left the parking lot.3 These signs led him to an exit controlled by a traffic control device that maintained the rate at which visitors left the short term parking area. This device consists of a bright yellow mechanical stanchion to which a wooden arm painted with diagonal black and white stripes was attached. When the wooden arm is at rest, it is parallel to the ground and blocks the exit from the short term parking area.4 As vehicles approach, the stanchion automatically raises the arm long enough for one vehicle to pass. The stanchion is on the curb to the left of the visitors leaving the short term parking lot. A sign on the side of the stanchion facing the persons leaving the parking lot states:
This sign is, however, largely obscured from the view of persons leaving the parking lot by a large, yellow cylindrical post anchored in the concrete in front of the mechanical stanchion in order to protect the stanchion from damage by passing vehicles.
Several vehicles were ahead of Mr. Sears as he approached the exit. Accordingly, he stopped and waited while they exited through the traffic control device. Mr. Sears saw the mechanical arm rise for the vehicle immediately in front of him and then descend to its original position after the vehicle left. His view of the mechanical stanchion and the sign was blocked first by the vehicle in front of him and then by the yellow protective post. Mr. Sears slowly approached the mechanical arm and paused to give it time to rise. When the arm moved up, he began to drive through the exit. Before he could drive through, the arm came back down, driving the motorcycle's windshield into his face and dragging him off his motorcycle. Mr. Sears landed in a nearby flowerbed with the motorcycle on top of him. A visitor in a vehicle behind Mr. Sears assisted in righting the motorcycle and in summoning airport security personnel who prepared a report of the incident. Even though Mr. Sears was shaken by his fall, he drove his motorcycle home. Later, he was treated at an emergency room for a cut lip and injuries to his right knee and neck.
On May 16, 1995, Mr. Sears filed a Governmental Tort Liability Act suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority ("Airport Authority") and Republic Parking System, Inc. ("Republic Parking").5 He characterized the mechanical stanchion and wooden control arm as "a hidden or concealed peril." He also alleged that both the Airport Authority and Republic Parking had failed to warn motorcyclists of the potential danger of the exit gate and that they had failed to properly maintain the existing warning signs. He also asserted that the Airport Authority's and Republic's negligence had created a "dangerous condition at the exit area."
Both the Airport Authority and Republic Parking denied liability. In July 1996, they moved for summary judgment on the grounds (1) that they were immune from suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because they did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged "dangerous condition at the exit area" and (2) that the condition and operation of the traffic control device was open and obvious and that Mr. Sears had been inattentive for failing to read the warning signs posted both at the entrance and exit of the short term parking area. The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment. It found as a matter of law (1) that the traffic control device was not a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition, (2) that the Airport Authority had no notice of the condition, (3) that the Airport Authority and Republic Parking owed no duty to Mr. Sears because the condition and operation of the traffic control device were open and obvious, and (4) that the obstruction or misplacement of the warning signs could not have caused Mr. Sears' injuries because he admitted that he did not look at the signs. Mr. Sears has appealed from the trial court's decision.
We begin with the well-settled standards governing appellate review of summary judgments. Summary judgments are proper in virtually any civil case that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Tomlinson v. Kelley, 969 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). They are not, however, appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Thus, a summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one conclusion - that the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tenn. 1998); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). A summary judgment should not be granted if any reasonable doubt exists with regard to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. See Chrisman v. Hill Home Dev., Inc., 978 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tenn. 1998).
Unlike other dispositions by a trial court without a jury, a summary judgment does not enjoy a presumption of correctness on appeal. See Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1997); City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn. 1997). Accordingly, reviewing courts must make a fresh determination concerning whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. See Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we must resolve all inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. See Terry v. Niblack, 979 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tenn. 1998); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d at 426. When reviewing the evidence, we must determine first whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute exists, we must then determine whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 214; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
Even before the enactment of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act in 1973,6 local governmental entities had a duty to use reasonable care to keep their streets, sidewalks, and other public improvements safe for their reasonably foreseeable uses by members of the public. See City of Winchester v. Finchum, 201 Tenn. 604, 609, 301 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1957); Flannagan v. Lee, 56 Tenn. App. 600, 603, 409 S.W.2d 385, 387 (1966). Because the duty to maintain streets and sidewalks in reasonably safe condition was viewed as a proprietary, as opposed to a governmental, function, see Shepherd v. City of Chattanooga, 168 Tenn. 153, 155, 76 S.W.2d 322, 323 (1934), the courts repeatedly held that local governmental entities could be held liable for the damages caused by their negligent failure to maintain their streets and sidewalks in reasonably safe condition. Thus, the liability of local governmental entities for injuries occurring on sidewalks or streets or in other public improvements was governed by the same principles that governed the liability of private individuals. See...
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