Sears v. Scranton Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 02 May 1910 |
| Docket Number | 63 |
| Citation | 228 Pa. 126,77 A. 423 |
| Parties | Sears, Appellant, v. Scranton Trust Company |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 21, 1910
Appeal, No. 63, Jan. T., 1909, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Lackawanna Co., Sept. T., 1908, No. 30, dismissing bill in equity and sustaining cross bill in case of Grover C Sears v. The Scranton Trust Company, administrator c.t.a. of Charles H. Sears, deceased. Affirmed.
Bill in equity for an accounting of partnership assets and for the appointment of a receiver. Before NEWCOMB, J.
A cross bill was filed by the defendant praying for an injunction and for cancellation of certain deeds and a partnership agreement.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Errors assigned were (1) in dismissing the bill; (2) in entering a decree in accordance with the prayer of the cross bill.
The assignments of error are all overruled, and the decree is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.
A. A Vosburg, with him Fred W. Lidstone, for appellants. -- A suit in equity cannot be maintained by an administrator or executor to impeach a conveyance of his decedent: Fowler's App., 87 Pa. 449.
The cross bill must be confined to the subject-matter of the original bill: Andrews v. Kibbee, 12 Mich. 94; Gallatain v. Cunningham, 8 Cow. 361; Datz v. Phillips, 137 Pa. 203.
There was no evidence in the case which would warrant the learned court below in entering a decree annulling the deeds by which real estate was passed from Charles H. Sears to his son Grover C. Sears: Carney v. Carney, 196 Pa. 34; Worrall's App., 110 Pa. 349.
We contend that the Scranton Trust Company did not produce sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of the bona fides of the conveyances and agreements between Charles H. Sears and Grover C. Sears, nor the presumption of the delivery of the papers arising from the fact that they were produced by Grover C. Sears and were acknowledged and recorded: Kern v. Howell, 180 Pa. 315.
We further contend that there were no circumstances in the case which would warrant the learned trial judge in finding that the conveyances from Charles H. Sears to his son were not carried into effect: Clark v. Clark, 174 Pa. 309.
George D. Taylor, for appellee. -- The confidential relation between the father and the son, Charles H. Sears and Grover C. Sears, which existed in this case from January 24, 1908, to the day of the father's death is abundantly proved and is not disputed: Darlington's Est., 147 Pa. 624; Knee v. McDowell, 25 Pa.Super. 641.
The fact of relationship of parent and child between Charles H. Sears and Grover C. Sears is a mere incident in this case and in no way alleviates or modifies the other relationship of principal and agent or constituent and attorney in fact: Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 537; Martin v. Martin, 48 Tenn. 644; Jacox v. Jacox, 40 Mich. 473.
Delivery to Lidstone was not a delivery in law: Arrison v. Harmstead, 2 Pa. 191; Thompson v. Lloyd, 49 Pa. 127; Unruh v. Lukens, 166 Pa. 324.
Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
Charles H. Sears purchased a steam grist mill in 1898, and another in 1902, and in 1907 he acquired certain buildings adjoining the first property. He operated the mills under his own name until his death, July 2, 1908. His son, Grover C. Sears, was in his service from 1902 until the last-mentioned date. On January 24, 1908, the father gave the son a letter of attorney granting him general power to carry on this milling business. Fred W. Lidstone, a practicing attorney, prepared a voluntary deed conveying these several pieces of real estate from Charles H. Sears and wife to himself as trustee. The deed was dated January 28, 1908, and signed and acknowledged by the grantors on January 30, 1908; but it was not recorded until July 14, 1908, when there was also placed upon record another deed dated and acknowledged February 11, 1908, conveying the same properties from Fred W. Lidstone, trustee, to Charles H. Sears and Grover C. Sears, partners under the name of C. H. Sears & Son. About the time when the deeds were recorded Grover C. Sears produced a writing signed by himself and by his father, dated February 3, 1908, providing for a partnership between the two for thirty years, under the name of C. H. Sears & Son, and in substance giving to Grover C. Sears an undivided one-half interest in the real estate in question; the only consideration moving from the son was an agreement to contribute his entire services to the business.
When Charles H. Sears died he left him surviving a widow, the son, Grover C., and another son, David. By his will, proved July 8, 1908, he made the Title, Guarantee & Trust Company of Scranton executor. No corporation of that name could be found and thereupon the widow and two sons renounced their right to administer in favor of the Scranton Trust Company. When the trust company, as administrator c.t.a., attempted to take possession of the real estate, Grover C. Sears set up a claim to the property, and filed the bill in the present case, in which he averred the execution and delivery of the two deeds and the articles of copartnership; that upon the signing of the latter he and his father took possession of the property and conducted the business thereunder; and that no settlement of the partnership accounts had taken place. He tendered an accounting, and prayed that the defendant be ordered to account and to pay over to him such sums as might be found to be due; and that a receiver might be appointed in the meantime.
The defendant filed an answer denying the validity of the deed to Lidstone; averring that such deed was without consideration and was procured through undue influence and fraud at a time when Charles H. Sears was in such a physical and mental condition resulting from the excessive use of alcoholic liquors as rendered him unable to understand and realize the nature of his act; that a strong confidential relation existed between Charles H. Sears and his son, Grover C. Sears, under the power of attorney possessed by the son; that advantage had been taken of these circumstances by the plaintiff to procure the deed in question, and also the subsequent deed and partnership agreement; that none of these papers was ever delivered; that Charles H. Sears had continued in the sole and exclusive possession and enjoyment of all of the properties and the business until the time of his death, when a wrongful possession was taken by Grover C. Sears. The defendant also filed a cross bill joining Fred W. Lidstone as a party defendant, reciting the bill and answer, practically averring the same facts as those contained in the latter, and further averring that all the writings in question were made in pursuance of a fraudulent combination between Grover C. Sears and Lidstone at a time when the latter occupied a confidential relationship to Charles H. Sears as his attorney at law. The cross bill prayed for the cancellation of the writings; that Grover C. Sears be required to account for the moneys in his hands, be restrained from exercising any act of dominion or control over the property belonging to his father's estate, and be ordered to deliver up all books and writings in his possession belonging to the estate. The answer to the cross bill denied all of the allegations of fraud and averred that the deeds and partnership agreement were voluntarily executed and delivered by Charles H. Sears.
The chancellor who heard the case states the facts as we have narrated them. He further finds that the decedent died at fifty-seven in impaired health from continued excessive drinking; that the alleged partnership assets were valued at $17,979.87, and the decedent had no other property excepting a house and lot worth about $3,500; that the decedent was in possession of the real estate in question from the time he acquired title until the date of his death, carrying on the milling business in his own name, and that there was no apparent change in the ownership of either the properties or the business at any time; that the son Grover C. Sears was the confidential attorney in fact for his father under the written power from January 24, 1908, until the time of the latter's death, and the evidence showed that during the last month of his father's life the son was still actively exercising this agency and had signed bank checks in the father's name in the conduct of the milling business; that after the date of the alleged agreement no partnership business was ever done or undertaken thereunder, but from that time on the business continued to be conducted as theretofore, the son acting only as his father's agent and attorney in fact; that at the father's death the son asserted no right as surviving partner; that at the time of his renunciation of his right to administer, the question arose as to the temporary management of the mills, and the son then asserted no such claim, but solicited a continuance of his agency under the administrator; that the existence of the partnership was not suggested to the administrator until some days thereafter, about the time the deeds were placed upon record; that Grover C. Sears had assumed personal charge of one of the mills some time after the grant of the letters of administration, and had done some business there since that time, but that there was no evidence that he did any business as the surviving member of the alleged copartnership.
The chancellor then finds that the decedent devised all of his estate to his wife, Mary E. Sears, "to have and to hold and to enjoy the same for her own use and benefit forever," and by his will provided: "and to the end that my said wife may not be burdened with the care and...
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