Sease v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2023
• Docket Number: AC 44160
• Parties: ANTWAN SEASE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

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ANTWAN SEASE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

No. AC 44160

Court of Appeals of Connecticut

May 23, 2023

Submitted on briefs December 12, 2022

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment denying the petition thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court Clark and Flynn, Js., with Cradle J., dissenting, which remanded the case for further factual findings; subsequently, the court, Newson, J., made certain factual findings; thereafter, the court, Newson, J., issued an articulation of its decision. Appeal dismissed inpart; reversed in part; judgment directed.

Vishal K. Garg, assigned counsel, filed a brief for the appellant (petitioner).

SharmeseL. Hodge, state's attorney, James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, and. Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state's attorney, filed a brief for the appellee (respondent).

Cradle, Clark and Flynn, Js.

OPINION

FLYNN, J.

This habeas appeal returns to us following our decision in Sease v. Commissioner of Correction, 212 Conn.App. 99, 274 A.3d 129 (2022) (Sease I), in which we remanded the matter to the habeas court to make certain factual findings and determinations. The habeas court initially had addressed only the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and did not decide whether trial counsel's performance at sentencing was constitutionally deficient under the first prong of Strickland.^[1] In Seasel, we determined that the habeas court improperly concluded that the petitioner, Antwan Sease, had failed to prove prejudice under the second prong of Strickland with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.^[2] Sease v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 107-15. Because Strickland requires a prevailing habeas petitioner to prove both deficient performance and resulting prejudice; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 687; we remanded the matter to the habeas court for the making of underlying factual findings from the record and, based on those findings, for a determination under the first prong of Strickland, which requires a showing of constitutionally deficient performance. Sease v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 117. We left undecided in Sease I the petitioner's remaining claims, which were that the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal as to the petitioner's claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge certain uncharged misconduct testimony and that the state violated the petitioner's right to due process by the knowing presentation of false testimony.^[3] Our remand order in Sease I followed our Supreme Court's decision in Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 328 Conn. 610, 182 A.3d 78 (2018), which held that "one way a reviewing court may remand a case to the original trial judge for additional proceedings without either triggering [General Statutes] § 51-183c or a dispute over its application is by not disturbing the original judgment in any way and making clear that the remand is for the purpose of further factual findings. . . . Accordingly, should additional findings be necessary from an existing record in order to enable the expeditious resolution of a case, even subsequent to the publication of an opinion, the reviewing court may retain jurisdiction over the appeal by means of a rescript that does not disturb the underlying judgment pending the remand and subsequent appellate proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 614-15.

On September 21, 2022, the habeas court, on remand, issued a memorandum of decision in which it determined that trial counsel's failure to focus further on or to engage in further independent investigation of the petitioner's mental health background with respect to the sentencing hearing did not fall below the constitutional standard of reasonableness.

Having made no determination in Sease I as to whether the petitioner ultimately prevailed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and having left undecided the petitioner's additional appellate claims, we must now resolve, after remand, the following claims of the petitioner. The petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly (1) determined on remand that his trial counsel's failure to investigate his mental health background prior to sentencing and his failure to focus further on that background during sentencing arguments did not fall below the exercise of reasonable professional judgment under the first prong of Strickland, (2) rejected his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge uncharged misconduct testimony by a state's witness, and (3) rejected his claim that the state violated his right to due process by the knowing presentation of false testimony. The habeas court denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and he claims that the court abused its discretion in so deciding. We agree with only the petitioner's claim that the court improperly determined that his trial counsel had not rendered constitutionally deficient performance at sentencing, and we disagree with the petitioner's other claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court only with respect to the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, vacate the petitioner's sentences, and order a new sentencing hearing.

Before turning to the petitioner's claims, we briefly summarize the underlying facts, which the jury reasonably could have found and were the subject of his direct appeal to this court. See State v. Sease, 147 Conn.App. 805, 83 A.3d 1206, cert, denied, 311 Conn. 932, 87 A.3d 581 (2014). On October 3, 2009, the petitioner and his coconspirator, Quan Morgan (Quan), met at the residence of Quan's mother, Shirley Williams, and proceeded to leave on foot under the guise of getting something to eat for Courtney Morgan, who was Williams' daughter, the petitioner's girlfriend, and Quan's sister. Id., 807. At approximately 2:30 a.m., the petitioner and Quan, each armed with a .38 caliber handgun that the petitioner had provided, walked to the rear of Club Vibz in Hartford and robbed two men in the presence of several witnesses. Id., 807-808. The petitioner walked up to a car in which the victim, Haslam, was seated and, after telling Haslam to" 'empty your [f-] pockets,'" fatally shot Haslam in the chest. Id., 808. Quan, a cooperating witness for the state, was the only witness to identify the petitioner as the second perpetrator involved in the Club Vibz incident. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was acquitted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. He was convicted of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (2) and 53a-48. The petitioner was sentenced to thirty years' incarceration for felony murder, twenty years' incarceration for robbery, and ten years' incarceration for conspiracy to commit robbery, which sentences were to run consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of sixty years' incarceration. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The petitioner argues in his supplemental brief^[4] to this court that the habeas court improperly determined on remand that his trial counsel's failure to investigate his mental health background and failure to focus further on that background during his sentencing arguments did not fall below the exercise of reasonable professional judgment under the first prong of Strickland. We agree with the petitioner.

We note that, because the habeas court denied the petitioner's request for certification to appeal, our first step ordinarily would be to analyze whether the petitioner satisfied the first hurdle of demonstrating that the court abused its discretion in denying such certification. See e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 564, 941 A.2d 248 (2008). Under the unusual procedural posture of the present case, however, we already have determined in Sease I that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal with respect to his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing. Sease v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 212 Conn.App. 104. In so determining, we reasoned that "[t]he record in the present case reveals an unusually troubled, traumatic, and extensive mental health history, significant parts of which were not also in the presentence investigation report. The petitioner had both audio and visual hallucinations throughout his life, was professionally diagnosed with schizophrenia, psychotic disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, and he was prescribed a variety of psychiatric medications including Risperdal, Ritalin, Risperidone, and Trazodone. . . . His ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, are such that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner and raise questions that deserve encouragement to proceed further." Id.

We now turn to the merits of the petitioner's claim, our review of which is guided by the following standards. "Our standard of review of a habeas cour...