Seaton v. State
| Citation | 27 Kan. App.2d 104,998 P.2d 131 |
| Decision Date | 25 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 82,214.,82,214. |
| Parties | RONALD SEATON, Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kansas |
Karen Eager, assistant appellate defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
Before GERNON, P.J., GREEN, J., and DAVID PRAGER, Chief Justice Retired, assigned.
GREEN J.:
Ronald L. Seaton appeals the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 petition alleging (1) that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for aggravated indecent liberties and (2) that his conviction is in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto application of the law. We agree and reverse.
On March 11, 1993, Seaton allegedly fondled the breasts of M.D., a minor under 14 years of age. As a result of the incident, Seaton was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child under K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) on June 6, 1995. Seaton was convicted by a jury of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and sentenced under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines to a term of 46 months.
The Department of Corrections notified the trial court that Seaton's sentence was illegal because Seaton was sentenced under the post-July 1, 1993, sentencing guidelines. The trial court then resentenced Seaton under the pre-July 1, 1993, sentencing statutes to a term of 5 to 20 years in prison.
Seaton filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in the trial court alleging that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try, sentence, and resentence him as the crime he was charged with was not in effect at the time of the alleged offense. The State and the trial court agreed that Seaton was charged with the wrong crime.
The trial court, however, devised an interesting strategy for remedying the error. First, the trial court vacated Seaton's sentence for the aggravated indecent liberties conviction, rationalizing that the State committed inadvertent error in captioning the case as an aggravated indecent liberties case. Then, the trial court determined that the jury's finding that Seaton was guilty of aggravated indecent liberties was sufficient to support a finding of guilty under the indecent liberties statute in effect on the date of the offense. Finally, the trial court sentenced Seaton to a term of 32 months for the lesser offense of indecent liberties with a child. The trial court did not address the issues of whether it had jurisdiction to originally convict and sentence Seaton or whether Seaton's constitutional right against ex post facto application of the law was violated.
We first note the absence of a brief from the State. Given the nature of the contentions in the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, a brief by the State might have been helpful and, at the least, would have demonstrated an interest in this case. Seaton's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence him and because his conviction is in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto application of the law. The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. Taylor v. State, 252 Kan. 98, 103, 843 P.2d 682 (1992).
It is first necessary to address whether the trial court had jurisdiction to try Seaton for aggravated indecent liberties as charged in the complaint. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction is a question of law and this court applies an unlimited standard of review. See State v. Snelling, 266 Kan. 986, 988, 975 P.2d 259 (1999).
The complaint is the jurisdictional instrument on which a criminal defendant stands trial. Carmichael v. State, 255 Kan. 10, Syl. ¶ 4, 872 P.2d 240 (1994). A. trial court lacks jurisdiction to convict a defendant when the complaint omits an essential element of a crime. State v. Waterberry, 248 Kan. 169, 170, 172, 804 P.2d 1000 (1991). On the other hand, when the complaint "alleges all the essential elements of the offense charged, the district court has jurisdiction even if the criminal statute cannot be applied to the facts involved." Carmichael, 255 Kan. 10, Syl. ¶ 4.
In the present case, the complaint alleged all the essential elements of the offense of aggravated indecent liberties under K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A). The statute provides:
In addition, the complaint alleged the essential elements of the offense of indecent liberties under K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503(1)(b). The statute states:
The complaint stated that "[Seaton] engage[d] in lewd fondling or touching of the person of a child under fourteen years of age." In other words, the evidence adduced at trial not only supports the crime alleged in the complaint, aggravated indecent liberties under K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), but also supports the crime of indecent liberties under K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503(1)(b). As a result, under the precedent established by Carmichael, the trial court had jurisdiction over Seaton's criminal matter.
Although the trial court had jurisdiction, Seaton's conviction may violate the prohibition against ex post facto application of the law. The rule prohibiting retroactive application of a substantive change in a criminal statute has its genesis in the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Article 1, § 9, of the United States Constitution provides: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." In addition, Article 1, § 10, provides: "No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law."
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test to determine whether application of a penal law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. "[F]irst, the law `must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment'; and second, `it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.'" Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 96 L. Ed.2d 351, 107 S. Ct. 2446 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 67 L. Ed.2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960 [1981]). See State v. LaMunyon, 259 Kan. 54, 65, 911 P.2d 151 (1996) ().
The aggravated indecent liberties statute Seaton was convicted under became law on July 1, 1993. See L. 1992, ch. 298, § 22; L. 1993, ch. 253, § 5; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 271. The alleged offense, however, occurred on March 11, 1993. Because the alleged fondling incident occurred prior to the enactment of the aggravated indecent liberties statute, the first prong of the ex post facto test is satisfied in this case.
Moreover, the second prong of the ex post facto test is also satisfied. The aggravated indecent liberties statute disadvantaged Seaton in that it imposed a greater punishment than its predecessor. At the time of Seaton's conviction, the aggravated indecent liberties statute carried a sentence of 46 to 51 months. The trial court imposed the minimum sentence of 46 months.
The current aggravated indecent liberties statute, K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), criminalizes nearly identical behavior as was punished under the former indecent liberties statute, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503(1)(b). As a result, these statutes must be compared to determine whether the new statute carries a greater punishment than the prior statute.
Under the sentencing statute in effect on the date of the alleged offense, indecent liberties was classified as a Class C. felony, the punishment for which was "an indeterminate term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be fixed by the court at not less than three years nor more than five years and the maximum of which shall be fixed by the court at not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years." K.S.A. 21-4501(c); K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503(3). In other words, the trial court could have sentenced Seaton to as little as 36 months for a conviction under the appropriate indecent liberties statute. As a result, Seaton was disadvantaged by the ex post facto application of the new aggravated indecent liberties statute because he could have received a lesser sentence had he been convicted of the proper statutory violation. Although it is also possible Seaton could have been sentenced to a longer term under the prior statutes, this court must read the statutes strictly and literally in Seaton's favor. Thus, Seaton's conviction for aggravated indecent liberties violates his constitutional right against ex post facto application of the law.
It is next necessary to address whether the trial court remedied the constitutional violation by converting the aggravated indecent liberties conviction to a conviction under the former indecent liberties statute.
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