Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Espy, Nos. 92-36529
Decision Date | 08 July 1993 |
Docket Number | Nos. 92-36529,92-36560 and 92-36564 |
Parties | , 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,148 SEATTLE AUDUBON SOCIETY; Pilchuck Audubon Society; Washington Environmental Council; Washington Native Plants Society, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Mike ESPY, * in his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; United States Forest Service, an agency of the United States, Defendants-Appellants, and Washington Contract Loggers Ass'n, et al., Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants. SEATTLE AUDUBON SOCIETY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mike ESPY, * in his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; United States Forest Service, an agency of the United States, Defendants-Appellees, and Washington Contract Loggers Ass'n, et al., Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Todd D. True and Victor M. Sher, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Seattle, WA, for Seattle Audubon Soc., plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants.
Mark Rutzick, Preston, Thorgrimson, Shidler, Gates & Ellis, Portland, OR, for Washington Contract Loggers Ass'n defendants-intervenors-appellants-cross-appellees.
Anne S. Almy, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Forest Service defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.
Kevin Q. Davis, Stoel, Rives, Boley, Jones & Grey, Portland, OR, for The Ass'n of O & C Counties and Benton County, defendants-intervenors-appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington William L. Dwyer, District Judge, Presiding.
Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.
The United States Forest Service and Washington Contract Loggers Association, et al. (WCLA) each appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief in favor of Seattle Audubon Society (SAS). SAS challenged the Forest Service's Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision adopting the Interagency Scientific Committee's Report as the Forest Service's spotted owl management plan. The district court held that adoption of the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) Report without consideration of alternatives, and without consideration of intervening information on the status of the owl violated the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (NFMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (NEPA). In so holding, the district court rejected the defendants' contentions that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the dispute was not ripe. We affirm.
In appeal no. 92-36560, SAS cross-appeals the portion of the district court's March 28, 1992 judgment holding that the Forest Service was not obligated to promulgate independent regulations ensuring that critical owl habitat will not be destroyed or adversely modified. We grant WCLA's motion to dismiss the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no final, appealable order.
In Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.1991) (Evans ), we affirmed the district court's judgment that the Forest Service had violated the NFMA by failing to prepare a plan for managing suitable spotted owl habitat in the national forests of Washington, Oregon and northern California. We also affirmed the district court's order permanently enjoining timber sales in owl habitat pending the Forest Service's preparation of an owl management plan in accordance with the requirements of both NFMA and NEPA.
As a result of our opinion in Evans, the Forest Service published a final environmental impact statement (EIS) for its management plan for spotted owl habitat on January 31, 1992. By its March 3, 1992 record of decision (ROD), the Service adopted regional guide amendments incorporating the recommendations of the ISC as its owl management plan. The so-called ISC Strategy has two major components. First, the plan delineates "habitat conservation areas" (HCAs) where logging would be prohibited. Second, the plan regulates the rate of cutting on forest lands between HCAs so that half of this land would provide for the safe dispersal of owls at all times through the use of the "50/11/40" rule. See generally Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F.Supp. 1081, 1092-93 (W.D.Wash.1991), aff'd., 952 F.2d at 297.
The Forest Service contends that SAS lacks standing to challenge its decision to adopt regional guide amendments incorporating the ISC Strategy because no SAS member has demonstrated actual or imminent injury as required under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ---- & n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2138 & n. 2, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ("Defenders").
The Supreme Court in Defenders said that to establish standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"--an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or hypothetical." Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted). There must also be a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Finally, it must be "likely" as opposed to "speculative" that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. The Court relied on its prior standing cases going back to Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) to hold that members of environmental groups in the United States lacked standing to challenge a rule affecting funding decisions overseas.
In support of its position that SAS lacked standing to bring this action, the Forest Service relies on Defenders and Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ("National Wildlife"). It asks us to conclude that these cases materially alter the standing principles which previously applied and that these Supreme Court decisions require dismissal of plaintiffs' challenges in this case. The Forest Service's position is not well founded.
The plaintiffs in Defenders brought an action challenging a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as applicable only to actions to be carried out within the United States or on the high seas. The plaintiffs claimed they would be injured by the Secretary's failure to engage in ESA Section 7 consultation with respect to certain Agency for International Development (AID) funded activities abroad which plaintiffs felt would lead to "increases [in] the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species." --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. In support of this claim, plaintiffs included affidavits stating that each had been to Sri Lanka and Egypt several years earlier and "intended" to go there again "in the future." Id., at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. However, plaintiffs were unable to state precisely when (or even if) they would again visit the sites in Sri Lanka and Egypt where various building projects funded by non-party AID were proceeding in the absence of ESA § 7 consultation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the evidence failed to support either a finding of "actual or imminent injury" or redressability. Id., at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2138-42.
In National Wildlife, plaintiffs brought a challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) "land withdrawal review program." The Court concluded that this program was not even an agency action, much less a final agency action for purposes of the general standing-to-sue provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See National Wildlife, 497 U.S. at 890, 110 S.Ct. at 3189 ( ).
Here, on the other hand, SAS's challenge to the Forest Service's action that the agency itself has labeled final is supported by declarations from members describing inter alia their proximity to owl-inhabited forests, the frequency with which they visit these forests, and their aesthetic and scientific interest in the owl. It is clear that the declarants have been using and will continue to use forest lands suitable for owl habitat on a regular basis. Moreover, absent an injunction, the Forest Service intends to develop and offer for auction timber sales throughout and around the old-growth forest eco-system. There does not appear to be any dispute over whether further logging in old-growth forests will adversely affect the remaining owl population throughout its range. Thus, the asserted harm SAS members complain of will occur if logging takes place. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1513-18 (9th Cir.1992). Speculation that logging might not occur because of as yet unknown intervening circumstances, or because redrafting the EIS might not change the Secretary's decision to adopt the ISC...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Sovereign Iñupiat for a Living Arctic v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.
...(Bordoff and Houser, 2015); BLM AR 319437–439 (Erickson, 2016).130 Liberty , 982 F.3d at 738 (citing Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Espy , 998 F.2d 699, 704–05 (9th Cir. 1993) ).131 ConocoPhillips, Docket 104 at 51; the North Slope Borough, Docket 102 at 26; and the State of Alaska, Docket 101 at ......
-
Backcountry Against Dumps v. Chu
...a 2002 FWS protocol, does not include consideration of Collinsia concolor , a host plant for QCB larvae. Citing Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy , 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993), Plaintiffs maintain that not surveying specifically for Collinsia concolor means that the EIS was based on "stale s......
-
Consejo De Desarrollo Economico De Mexica. v. U.S., No. 2:05-CV-0870-PMP (LRL)
...assumptions regarding the cooperation of other agencies ..." (DCAP & CURE Mot. for Summ. J. at 25 [quoting Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 704-05 (9th Cir.1993)].) However, the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs' challenge to the 1994 FEIS because Plaintiffs failed to timely challe......
-
Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen
...32 F.3d 1346, 1351-55 (9th Cir.1994); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 707-08 (9th Cir.1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 702-03 (9th Cir.1993); Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513-18. Our review of the district court's grant of the Secretary's motio......
-
Advising Noah: A Legal Analysis of Assisted Migration
...U.S.C. §1604(g)(3)(B) (2007). 81. 36 C.F.R. §219.26 (2000). 82. 36 C.F.R. §219.19 (2000). 83. See, e.g ., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). limits of Agency authorities, the capability of the plan area,......
-
Future prospects for mining and public land management: the federal 'retention-disposal' policy enters the twenty-first century.
...access harmful to preservation values should be criticized as arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1993) (criticizing the Forest Service's incomplete decision making and analysis). Although the court discussed the "where essential" ......
-
Natural resource restoration: the interface between the Endangered Species Act and CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions.
...527 (1991). (13.) TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978). (14.) Id. at 174 (footnotes omitted). (15.) See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993). (16.) 784 F. Supp. 786 (D. Or. 1992). (17.) Id. at 792. (18.......
-
The legal status of Land and Resource Management Plans for the national forests: paying the price for statutory ambiguity.
...1529, 1531-32 (D. Mont. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993). (156) Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1397. (157) 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993). In considering whether the Seattle Audubon Society had standing to challenge the Final EIS and Record of Decision (ROD) adoptin......