Seattle Elec. Co. v. City of Seattle

Decision Date15 August 1913
Docket Number2,046.
Citation206 F. 955
PartiesSEATTLE ELECTRIC CO. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

James B. Howe and Hugh A. Tait, both of Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff.

James E. Bradford and Ralph S. Pierce, both of Seattle, Wash., for defendants.

RUDKIN District Judge.

The present bill was filed to enjoin the city of Seattle and certain of its officers from enforcing an ordinance of the city, entitled 'An ordinance requiring the sale of street car tickets on street cars in the city of Seattle, limiting the price to be paid therefor, and providing penalties for violation, ' which became operative on the 30th day of October, 1911.

On the 31st day of March, 1900, the city, by ordinance, granted to the assignors of the plaintiff a franchise to construct and operate a street railway over certain designated streets in the city for the term ending at midnight on the 31st day of December, 1934. The ordinance granting the franchise contained the following provisions material to our present inquiry:

The grantees, their successors and assigns, may establish and take a passenger toll or fare which shall not exceed the sum of five cents for a single continuous ride one way over any line or lines owned or controlled by the grantees, their successors or assigns, between points situated within the city limits or points on either of the extensions mentioned in section 13 hereof (when constructed or acquired), although a transfer or transfers shall be necessary; but no such transfer shall be good except upon the first connecting car at the point of transfer.

The grantees, their successors and assigns, shall keep on sale for one dollar each, at their main office and power stations within the city, commutation tickets entitling the purchaser to twenty-five rides. Such tickets shall not be transferable nor entitle the owner to a transfer, and the company may make such reasonable regulations in regard to the issue and use of the same as to enforce these provisions.

Numerous other franchises granted to the plaintiff by the city contained similar provisions. The ordinance of October 30 1911, provides in its first section:

That all persons, companies or corporations owning, controlling or operating street cars in the city of Seattle be and they are hereby required to place on sale in each and every street car owned and operated by them within the city of Seattle street car tickets at a price not exceeding twenty-five (25) for one dollar or six (6) for twenty-five cents.

Section 2 provides a penalty for the violation of the preceding section, and section 4 provides when the ordinance shall take effect. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the latter ordinance impairs the obligation of the contract embodied in the earlier ordinance, in violation of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and deprives it of its property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

In view of the conclusion I have reached as to the validity of the ordinance of October 30, 1911, upon other grounds, I deem it unnecessary to consider or determine whether the earlier ordinance constituted a contract between the city and the street railway company within the meaning of the Constitution, or whether the later ordinance impairs the obligation of that contract, if one existed. I see no escape from the conclusion that the act of the Legislature of this state, approved March 18, 1911, commonly known as the 'Public Service Commission Law' (Laws of 1911, c 117), took away and superseded the power of municipalities to enact ordinances such as the one here in question. The act referred to is most comprehensive in its terms and extends the power of the Public Service Commission to nearly all the public utilities in the state.

Thus section 8 defines the terms 'street railroad,' 'street railroad company,' 'common carrier,' and 'public service companies,' and the terms 'common carrier' and 'public service companies,' as there defined, include street railroads and street railroad companies. Section 9 provides that all charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of persons or property by any common carrier shall be just, fair, reasonable, and sufficient; that every common carrier shall construct, furnish, maintain, and provide safe adequate, and sufficient service facilities, trackage, sidings, railroad connections, industrial and commercial spurs, or equipment to enable it to promptly, expeditiously, safely, and properly receive, transport, and deliver all persons or property offered to or received by it for transportation, and to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employes, and the public, and that all rules and regulations issued by any common carrier affecting or pertaining to the transportation of persons or property shall be just and reasonable. Section 14 provides that every common carrier shall file with the commission, and shall print and keep open to public inspection, schedules showing the rates, fares, charges, and classification for the transportation of persons and property within the state between each point upon its route and all other points thereon. Section 15 provides that, unless the commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made in any classification, rate, fare, charge, rule, or regulation which shall have been filed and published by a common carrier in compliance with the preceding section except after 30 days' notice to the commission and to the public: Provided, the commission for good cause shown may by order allow changes in rates without requiring such notice. Section 18 provides that no common carrier shall charge, demand, collect, or receive a greater or less or different compensation for transportation of persons or property, or for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares, and charges applicable to such transportation as specified in its schedule filed and in effect at the time. Section 25 provides that no street railroad company shall charge, demand, or collect more than five cents for one continuous ride within the corporate limits of any city or town, and shall furnish transfers entitling passengers to one continuous trip over and upon portions of its lines within the same city or town not reached by the originating car. Section 53 provides that whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing had, upon its own motion or upon complaint, that the rates, fares, or charges demanded, exacted, charged, or collected by any common carrier for the transportation of persons or property within the state or in connection therewith, or that the regulations or practices of such common carrier affecting such rates are unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential, or in any wise in violation of the provisions of law, or that such rates, fares, or charges are insufficient to yield a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, fares, or charges, regulations, or practices to be thereafter observed and enforced, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided. Section 64 provides that the commission may, on its own motion or upon complaint, order...

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    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 21 Febrero 1930
    ... ... Act. California Oregon Power Co. v. Grant's Pass, ... 203 F. 173; Seattle Electric Co. v. Seattle, 206 F ... 955; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court, 67 ... Wash ... ...
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    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 30 Enero 1939
    ... ... Keating v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 419; Butler v ... Moberly, 131 Mo.App. 172; Seattle Electric Co. v ... City of Seattle, 206 F., l. c. 959; Hershberg v ... City of Barbourville, ... ...
  • The State ex rel. United Railways Company v. Public Service Commission
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 24 Marzo 1917
    ...and void. It was not competent for the city to make such provision in its charters. State ex rel. v. Court, 120 P. 861; Elec. Co. v. Seattle, 206 F. 955; Co. v. Grant's Pass, 203 F. 173. Alex. Z. Patterson and James D. Lindsay for respondent. (1) The legislation embodied in the Public Servi......
  • Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co. v. City of Seattle
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    • 25 Agosto 1914
    ... ... 184 Mass. 566, 69 N.E. 346; Los Angeles Ry. Co. v. City ... of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. 242, 92 P. 490, 15 L.R.A ... (N.S.) 1269, 125 Am.St.Rep. 54; Peterson v. Tacoma Ry. & ... P. Co., 60 ... [216 F. 700] ... Wash. 406, 111 P. 338, 140 Am.St.Rep. 936; Com. Elec. L ... & P. Co. v. Tacoma, 17 Wash. 670, 50 P. 592; Tacoma ... v. Boutelle, 61 Wash. 434, 112 P. 661; State v. West ... End Light & Power Co. (Mo.) 152 S.W. 79; 2 Pomeroy's ... Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 805, p. 1423 ... The ... conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary ... ...
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