Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Schriber, SEATTLE-FIRST
Decision Date | 30 March 1981 |
Docket Number | SEATTLE-FIRST,No. 7604-05594,7604-05594 |
Parties | NATIONAL BANK, a national banking association, Appellant-Cross- Respondent, v. Ronald W. SCHRIBER, individually and the marital community of Ronald W. Schriber and Peggy L. Schriber, husband and wife, Respondents-Cross-Appellants. ; CA 15705. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Charles Robinowitz, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant cross-respondent.
Norman Wapnick, Portland, argued the cause for respondents cross-appellants. With him on the brief were Jeffrey R. Spere and Sussman, Shank, Wapnick, Caplan & Stiles, Portland.
Before JOSEPH, P. J., and WARDEN and WARREN, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants based on the statute of limitations. The trial court concluded that a note made by defendant Ronald W. Schriber, payable to plaintiff, was a demand note and, therefore, plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations because it accrued on December 16, 1969, one day after the date of the note and more than six years before plaintiff filed its complaint. 1 Defendants cross-appeal, contending that the trial court erred in applying Washington law and thereby denying defendants' right to recover attorney's fees as the prevailing parties.
The trial court made the following findings of fact: 2
The trial court found that the parties intended that the note be payable on demand. The court also found that the alleged "due date" was typed in by the plaintiff after the note was executed by the defendant Ronald W. Schriber. These findings preclude the conclusion that the note had a "due date," as plaintiff alleges. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding as to the parties' intent and, therefore, we will not disturb it on appeal. Lokan v. Roberts, 270 Or. 349, 353, 527 P.2d 720 (1974); Cronn v. Fisher, 245 Or. 407, 415, 422 P.2d 276 (1966).
We turn now to defendant's cross-appeal. The note provides that " * * * in case suit is instituted to collect the same or any portion thereof * * * " that defendants will pay "such additional sum as the court may adjudge reasonable, as attorney's fees in such suit * * *." According to ORS 20.096 3 attorney's fees are recoverable by the prevailing party where the contract provided that one of the parties would be entitled to attorney's fees. ORS 20.096 has been construed to apply retroactively. Dean Vincent, Inc. v. Chamberlain, 264 Or. 187, 504 P.2d 722 (1972). Under Oregon law, therefore, defendants would be allowed to recover attorney's fees even though the agreement was entered into on December 15, 1969, and ORS 20.096 became effective on September 9, 1971. Washington law, RCW 4.84.330, 4 also provides that the prevailing party may recover attorney's fees under a contract like this one. However, RCW 4.84.330 specifies that this provision applies only to contracts entered into "after September 21, 1977." 5 If Washington law applies, defendants may not recover attorney's fees.
The trial court indicated in its opinion that it applied the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 188 (1971) to this problem. 6 Before applying the Restatement analysis, the trial court concluded:
* * * that Oregon does have a reasonable connection with the transaction by reason of the defendant now having his domicile here. Thus, there is a true conflict between the interests of Oregon and Washington and it is now necessary to further analyze those interests."
After analyzing these interests, the trial court concluded that Washington had a more substantial relationship and applied RCW 4.84.330, denying defendants' attorney's fees.
Defendants argue that Oregon law should apply for two reasons. First, ORS 20.096 is merely procedural and, therefore, the law of the forum, i. e., Oregon law, should apply. Second, even if Washington were to have more and closer contacts with this transaction, public policy expressed in ORS 20.096 is so important that Oregon law should be applied.
We agree with defendants that Oregon's law would apply if the issue of attorney's fees is procedural. "Matters of remedy, (i. e.) procedure, are governed by the law of the forum." Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 6, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). This is reiterated in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 122 (1971).
"A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case."
The Restatement's Comment a. to § 122, at page 351 explains:
"Enormous burdens are avoided when a court applies its own rules, rather than the rules of another state, to issues relating to judicial administration, such as the proper form of action, service of process pleading, rules of discovery, mode of trial and execution and costs."
Defendants rely on Parks v. Smith, 95 Or. 300, 186 P. 552, 554 (1920), and Bank of Ogden v. Davidson, 18 Or. 57, 22 P. 517 (1889), in contending that awarding attorney's fees pursuant to ORS 20.096 is procedural. In Bank of Ogden, the Supreme Court declared that Oregon would not enforce an agreement to pay a fixed percentage of the debt as costs of collection as agreed to by the parties to a note, because it was against Oregon's public policy to permit parties to agree to any sum other than what "the court may adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees." In discussing the conflict of laws issue, the court went on to say:
This is echoed in Parks in which the court cited Bank of Ogden and held that an agreement to pay a fixed amount as attorney's fees contained in a note would not be enforced in Oregon as "(t)he statute of California (which would allow such an agreement to be enforced) does not change the procedure in a suit to foreclose a mortgage in this state." Parks v. Smith, supra, 95 Or. at 305, 186 P. 552.
Neither of those cases dealt with attorney's fees being awarded pursuant to ORS 20.096, the issue in the case at hand. Moreover, the outcome in each case seems to have been more a result of the court's abhorrence of predetermined attorney's fees than the result of consideration of the procedural/substantive law dichotomy. We need not blindly apply this old classification of attorney's fees as "procedural." The Restatement in Comment b., following § 122 says at 352:
(Emphasis in original)
The nature of attorney's fees to be awarded pursuant to ORS 20.096 is addressed in Gorman v. Boyer, 274 Or. 467, 547 P.2d 123 (1976). The Supreme Court, at 472, 547 P.2d 123, held that attorney's fees awarded pursuant to ORS 20.096, based upon the terms of a contract, are not properly awarded as costs. Instead, attorney's fees must be pled and proved (or a stipulation entered into allowing the court to determine them). Because attorney's fees awarded pursuant to ORS 20.096 are not merely costs incidental to judicial administration, awarding them is a matter of substantive, rather than procedural, right.
Having concluded that awarding attorney's fees in this case is not a procedural question, we turn to whether Washington or Oregon law should apply. In Lilienthal it became clear that the old lex loci contractus approach to choice of law issues arising in contract cases was being discarded for the "interest analysis" approach. The first step in...
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