Seay v. State

Citation167 Ind.App. 22,340 N.E.2d 369
Decision Date20 January 1976
Docket NumberNo. 1--475A68,1--475A68
PartiesGarry Tyrome SEAY, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

The State's petition in this matter raises several issues for our consideration and we deem it necessary to briefly discuss one of the State's contentions.

The State argues that our original opinion, by requiring that a 'request that Seay be found delinquent' be in the record, places a defendant such as Seay in double jeopardy. Specifically, the State contends that our opinion is contrary to the recent United States Supreme Court opinion in Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.

Initially, we feel that perhaps the problem is merely one of semantics. Our statement in the original opinion regarding a 'request that Seay be found delinquent' is nothing more than a determination that juvenile jurisdiction be obtained and that a further investigation be made. Our language does not, and in light of applicable statutes cannot, direct a finding of delinquency at such a stage of juvenile proceedings. The request or petition and the attendant preliminary investigation are completely separate from a hearing on the merits of the charges. See, IC 1971, 31--5--7--7, 31--5--7--8, 31--5--7--15 (Burns Code Ed.).

In Breed, the Supreme Court stated that

'. . . What concerns us here is the dilemma that the possibility of transfer after an adjudicatory hearing presents for a juvenile, a dilemma to which the Court of Appeals alluded.' 95 S.Ct. at 1791.

'Respondent was subjected to the burden of two trials for the same offense; he was twice put to the task of marshaling his resources against those of the State, twice subjected to the 'heavy personal strain' which such an experience represents. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S., (470) at 479, 91 S.Ct. (547) at 554 (27 L.Ed.2d 543).' 95 S.Ct. at 1787.

In the case at bar, Seay faced no such burden inasmuch as waiver from juvenile court was sought and granted prior to any findings in juvenile court on the merits of the delinquency petitions. In terms of Breed, there was no 'adjudicatory' proceeding prior to waiver which would have presented the issue of double jeopardy once trial was begun in adult court.

Perhaps one further quotation from Breed will highlight the nature of the petition which we found necessary for juvenile jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court, at 95 S.Ct. 1785, characterized the proceeding which was challenged as one

'. . . whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years. . . .'

Clearly, Seay was not subjected to a hearing in juvenile court to determine whether he had in fact committed certain alleged acts. The finding that certain acts would be crimes if committed by an adult should not be confused with a finding that such acts were actually committed by the accused.

Finally, to foreclose other questions which may arise with regard to the nature of the waiver hearing and double jeopardy we note the following statements from Breed:

'. ....

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9 cases
  • Bey v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 16, 1979
    ...of the forum, and that there is no finding that certain acts have or have not been committed in fact. See also: Seay v. State (1976), Ind.App., 340 N.E.2d 369 (on As pointed out in Murphy v. State (1977), Ind.App., 364 N.E.2d 770, when a waiver petition is filed a hearing must be held on th......
  • Walker v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1976
    ...U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346. This proposition was thoroughly explored and refuted by the Court of Appeals in Seay v. State, (1976) Ind.App., 340 N.E.2d 369 (petition for rehearing). As noted by that Court, the investigation required under our statute, is not an adjudication of d......
  • Harris v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 15, 1980
    ...See Ingram v. State (1974), 160 Ind.App. 188, 310 N.E.2d 903; Seay v. State (1975), Ind.App., 337 N.E.2d 489, Reh. denied Ind.App. 340 N.E.2d 369. The record before us does not contain a transcript of this preliminary investigation. The court's order authorizing the filing of a juvenile pet......
  • Collins v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 26, 1989
    ...schooling is "precisely what the statute requires." Seay v. State (1975) 167 Ind.App. 22, 337 N.E.2d 489, 498, reh. denied (1976) 167 Ind.App. 22, 340 N.E.2d 369. More recent cases also under the prior statute distinguish proceedings concerning delinquent children from those concerning depe......
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