Sebelius v. Cloer

• Citation: 185 L.Ed.2d 1003,81 USLW 4322,133 S.Ct. 1886
• Decision Date: 20 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–236.,12–236.
• Parties: Kathleen SEBELIUS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Petitioner v. Melissa CLOER.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

133 S.Ct. 1886
185 L.Ed.2d 1003
81 USLW 4322

Kathleen SEBELIUS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Petitioner
v.
Melissa CLOER.

No. 12–236.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 19, 2013.
Decided May 20, 2013.

[133 S.Ct. 1888]

Syllabus^*

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act) established a no-fault compensation system to stabilize the vaccine market and expedite compensation to injured parties. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1068, 179 L.Ed.2d 1. Under the Act, “[a] proceeding for compensation” is “initiated” by “service upon the Secretary” of Health and Human Services and “the filing of a petition containing” specified documentation with the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims, who then “immediately” forwards the petition for assignment to a special master. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(a)(1). An attorney may not charge a fee for “services in connection with [such] a petition,” § 300aa–15(e)(3), but a court may award attorney's fees and costs “incurred [by a claimant] in any proceeding on” an unsuccessful “petition filed under section 300aa–11,” if that petition “was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought,” § 300aa–15(e)(1).

In 1997, shortly after receiving her third Hepatitis–B vaccine, respondent Cloer began to experience symptoms that eventually led to a multiple sclerosis (MS) diagnosis in 2003. In 2004, she learned of a link between MS and the Hepatitis–B vaccine, and in 2005, she filed a claim for compensation under the NCVIA, alleging that the vaccine caused or exacerbated her MS. After reviewing the petition and its supporting documentation, the Chief Special Master concluded that Cloer's claim was untimely because the Act's 36–month limitations period began to run when she had her first MS symptoms in 1997. The Federal Circuit ultimately agreed that Cloer's petition was untimely. Cloer then sought attorney's fees and costs (collectively, fees). The en banc Federal Circuit found that she was entitled to recover fees on her untimely petition.

Held : An untimely NCVIA petition may qualify for an award of attorney's fees

[133 S.Ct. 1889]

if it is filed in good faith and there is a reasonable basis for its claim. Pp. 1889 – 1897.

(a) As in any statutory construction case, this Court proceeds from the understanding that “[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91, 127 S.Ct. 638, 166 L.Ed.2d 494. Nothing in either the NCVIA's attorney's fees provision, which ties eligibility to “any proceeding on such petition” and refers specifically to “a petition filed under section 300aa–11,” or the referenced § 300aa–11 suggests that the reason for the subsequent dismissal of a petition, such as its untimeliness, nullifies the initial filing. As the term “filed” is commonly understood, an application is filed “when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213. Applying this ordinary meaning to the text at issue, it is clear that an NCVIA petition delivered to the court clerk, forwarded for processing, and adjudicated in a proceeding before a special master is a “petition filed under section 300aa–11.” So long as it was brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis, it is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, even if it is ultimately unsuccessful. Had Congress intended otherwise, it could have easily limited fee awards to timely petitions.

The Government's argument that the 36–month limitations period is a statutory prerequisite for filing lacks textual support. First, there is no cross-reference to the Act's limitations provision in its fees provision, § 300aa–15(e), or the referenced § 300aa–11(a)(1). Second, reading the provision to provide that “no petition may be filed for compensation” late, as the Government asks, would require the Court to conclude that a petition like Cloer's, which was “filed” under that term's ordinary meaning but was later found to be untimely, was never filed at all. This Court's “inquiry ceases [where, as here,] ‘the statutory language is unambiguous and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” ’ ” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908.

The Government's contrary position is also inconsistent with the fees provision's purpose, which was to avoid “limit[ing] petitioners' ability to obtain qualified assistance” by making awards available for “non-prevailing, good-faith claims.” H.R.Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, p. 22. Pp. 1889 – 1895.

(b) The Government's two additional lines of argument for barring the award of attorney's fees for untimely petitions are unpersuasive. First, the canon of construction favoring strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity, the presumption favoring the retention of familiar common-law principles, and the policy argument that the NCVIA should be construed so as to minimize complex and costly fees litigation must all give way when, as here, the statute's words “are unambiguous.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391. Second, even if the NCVIA's plain text requires that special masters occasionally carry out “shadow trials” to determine whether late petitions were brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis, that is not such an absurd burden as to require departure from the words of the Act. This is especially true where Congress has specifically provided for such “shadow trials” by permitting the award of attorney's fees “in any proceeding [on an unsuccessful] petition” if such petition was brought in good faith

[133 S.Ct. 1890]

and with a reasonable basis. § 300aa–15(e)(1). Pp. 1895 – 1897.

675 F.3d 1358, affirmed.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–B.

Benjamin J. Horwich, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Robert T. Fishman, Denver, CO, for Respondent.

William B. Schultz, Acting General Counsel, David Benor, Associate General Counsel for Public Health, Anna Loraine Jacobs, Attorney, Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Benjamin J. Horwich, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Michael S. Raab, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Vincent J. Matanoski, Lynn E. Ricciardella, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Mari C. Bush, Kaye and Bush, LLC, Denver, CO, Robert T. Moxley, Robert T. Moxley, PC, Cheyenne, WY, Robert T. Fishman, Counsel of Record, Ridley, McGreevy & Winocur, PC, Denver, CO, for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.^*

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act), 100 Stat. 3756, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–1 et seq., provides that a court may award attorney's fees and costs “incurred [by a claimant] in any proceeding on” an unsuccessful vaccine-injury “petition filed under section 300aa–11,” if that petition “was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” § 300aa–15(e)(1). The Act's limitations provision states that “no petition may be filed for compensation” more than 36 months after the claimant's initial symptoms occur. § 300aa–16(a)(2). The question before us is whether an untimely petition can garner an award of attorney's fees. We agree with a majority of the en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that it can.

I A

The NCVIA “establishes a no-fault compensation program ‘designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort system.’ ” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 179 L.Ed.2d 1 (2011) (quoting Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269, 115 S.Ct. 1477, 131 L.Ed.2d 374 (1995)). Congress enacted the NCVIA to stabilize the vaccine market and expedite compensation to injured parties after complaints mounted regarding the inefficiencies and costs borne by both injured consumers and vaccine manufacturers under the previous civil tort compensation regime. 562 U.S., at –––– – ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1072–1073;H.R.Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, pp. 6–7 (1986) (hereinafter H.R. Rep.).

[133 S.Ct. 1891]

The compensation program's procedures are straightforward. First, “[a] proceeding for compensation under the Program for a vaccine-related injury or death shall be initiated by service upon the Secretary [for the Department of Health and Human Services] and the filing of a petition containing the matter prescribed by subsection (c) of this section with the United States Court of Federal Claims.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(a)(1). Subsection (c) provides in relevant part that a petition must include “an affidavit, and supporting documentation, demonstrating that the person who suffered such injury” was actually vaccinated and suffered an injury. § 300aa–11(c)(1). Next, upon receipt of an NCVIA petition, “[t]he clerk of the United States Court of Federal Claims shall immediately forward the filed petition to the chief special master for assignment to a special master.” § 300aa–11(a)(1). This special master then “makes an informal adjudication of the petition.” Bruesewitz, 562 U.S., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1073 (citing § 300aa–12(d)(3)). A successful claimant may recover medical costs, lost earning capacity, and an award for pain and suffering, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(a), with compensation paid out from a federal trust fund supported by an excise tax levied on each dose of certain covered vaccines, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 4132, 9510; 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(f)(4)(A). But under the...