Sec. Life Ins. Co. Of Am. v. Dillard

• Decision Date: 11 March 1915
• Parties: SECURITY LIFE INS. CO. OF AMERICA. v. DILLARD.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

84 S.E. 656

117 Va. 401

SECURITY LIFE INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

v.DILLARD.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 11, 1915.)

Error to Circuit Court of City of Lynchburg.

Action by Mrs. Gertrude Dillard against the Security Life Insurance Company of America. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Coleman, Easley & Coleman and Caskie & Caskie, all of Lynchburg, and F. W. Bull, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error.

Ambrey E. Strode, of Amherst, and Harrison & Long, of Lynchburg, for defendant in error.

KELLY, J. Mrs. Gertrude Dillard brought suit against the Security Life Insurance Company of America in the circuit court of the city of Lynchburg, upon an insurance policy issued on the life of her husband, and recovered a judgment which is now before us for review.

The proceeding was by motion, and the only pleading on the part of the defendant was a statement of its grounds of defense, which will be hereinafter briefly noticed.

A number of questions are presented by the record, all of which were argued orally and in the briefs, but in our view of the case the controlling question arises out of the fact that the insured committed suicide.

It seems to be conceded, and from the record it is clear, that the insured while sane took his own life on the night of the very last day on which, without a further payment of premium, his policy could, in the most liberal interpretation of its terms, have been considered in force.

At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant requested a number of instructions, including the following:

"The court further instructs the jury that even if the policy on which this action is founded had not lapsed at the time of the death of the insured, but was then in force, nevertheless, if the jury believe from the evidence that the death of the insured was the result of suicide or self-destruction, they must find for the defendant."

The trial court refused to give this instruction, and its refusal is the basis of one of the defendant's exceptions.

We are aware that the question thus arising is one upon which the authorities are not in unison, but we are of opinion that upon the soundest considerations of publicpolicy there ought not to be, and under the principles and authorities already adopted and indorsed by this court there cannot be, any recovery upon the case as made out in the record before us.

In Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, 105 Va. 648, 55 S. E. 11, the president of the court, delivering the opinion, said:

"The case presented to us upon the pleadings is that of a sane man who takes his own life. In other words, as was said in Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 Sup. Ct. 139, 47 L. Ed. 216: Do insurance policies insure against crime? Is that a risk which enters into and becomes a part of the contract?

"In Amicable Soc. v. Bolland, 4 Bligh N. R. 194, decided by the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor said:

" 'It appears to me that this resolves itself into a very plain and simple consideration. Suppose that in the policy itself this risk had been insured against; that is, that the party insuring had agreed to pay a sum of money year by year upon condition that in the event of his committing a capital felony, and being tried, convicted, and executed for that felony, his assignees shall receive a certain sum of money—is it possible that such a contract could be sustained? Is it not void upon the plainest principles of public policy?

" 'Would not such a contract (if available) take away one of those restraints operating on the minds of men against the commission of crimes, namely, the interest we have in the welfare and prosperity of our connections? Now, if a policy of that description, with such a form of condition inserted in it in express terms, cannot, on grounds of public policy, be sustained, how is it to be contended that in a policy expressed in such terms as the present, and after the events which have happened, we can sustain such a claim?'

"In Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co., supra, it is held, upon grounds of public policy, that a policy of life insurance does not insure against the legal execution of the insured for crime, even though he may in fact have been innocent, and therefore unjustly convicted and executed.

"And in Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co.. 169 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 300, 42 L. Ed. 693, Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion, said: 'There is another consideration supporting the contention that death intentionally caused by the act of the assured when in sound mind—the policy being silent as to suicide—is not to be deemed to have been within the contemplation of the parties; that is, that a different view would attribute to them a purpose to make a contract that could not be enforced without injury to the public. A contract, the tendency of which is to endanger the public interests, or injuriously affect the public good, or which is subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court of justice, or be made the foundation of its judgment. If, therefore, a policy— taken out by the person whose life is insured, and in which the sum named is made payable to himself, his executors, administrators, or assigns—expressly provided for the payment of the sum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind, took his own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute, would be held to be against public policy, in that it tempted or encouraged the assured to commit suicide in order to make provision for those dependent upon him, or to whom he was indebted. Is the case any different in principle if such policy is silent as to suicide, and the event insured against—the death of the assured—is brought about by his willful, deliberate act when in sound mind?'"

The view approved by the opinion just referred to in the Plunkett Case, and in the authorities cited therein, has been reiterated and emphasized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the comparatively recent case of Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 246, 32...