Sec. Nat. Bank of Mason City v. Bagley
| Citation | 210 N.W. 947,202 Iowa 701 |
| Decision Date | 23 November 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 36700.,36700. |
| Parties | SECURITY NAT. BANK OF MASON CITY v. BAGLEY ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Cerro Gordo County; M. H. Kepler, Judge.
Suit for an injunction to restrain the operation of a system known as Thrift in the public schools of the city of Mason City, under which deposits made by pupils in said schools were deposited in the appellant, First National Bank. Decree was entered granting an injunction, and the defendants appeal. Reversed.Blythe, Markley, Rule & Smith, of Mason City, for appellant First Nat. Bank of Mason City.
Alfred W. Bays, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant Thrift, Inc.
Smith & Feeney, of Mason City, for all other appellants.
Senneff, Bliss, Witwer & Senneff, of Mason City, for appellee.
Thrift, Inc., is the owner of a copyrighted system of instruction intended to promote the teaching and inculcating of thrift in the pupils of the public schools. The board of directors of the independent school district of Mason City, on or about August 13, 1923, adopted the following resolution:
After said resolution was adopted, Thrift, Inc., entered into a contract with the First National Bank of Mason City to act as a depository for the funds saved by pupils in the schools, and to furnish without expense to the school district the necessary paraphernalia, including passbooks, posters, money bags, etc., for carrying out the system. The record discloses that under said contract the bank was to pay Thrift, Inc., for acting as said depository and was to perform all of the services required of it in carrying out said system without any expense to the school district or to any of the pupils attending said school. The money saved by the various pupils was turned over by them to the teachers and was deposited in said bank. Interest was paid thereon to the pupils. The purpose and object of the system was to inculcate thrift, the systematic saving of money, and self-denial and economy. The appellee alleges that it is a taxpayer within said school district, that it is engaged in the banking business, and that the carrying out of said system creates unfair competition in its business.
[1] I. We first direct our attention to the proposition as to whether or not injunction will lie to restrain the action of the board of directors in adopting the system in question for the purpose of teaching thrift in the public schools. Under our statutes school districts are corporate bodies and have “exclusive jurisdiction in all school matters” in the territory covered by them, and are authorized to “exercise all the powers granted by law.” Code, § 4123. Our statutes provide for the election of a board of directors to manage the affairs of school corporations. Code, § 4125. They clothe the board of directors with the power to “prescribe courses of study for the schools of the corporation.” Code, § 4250. A similar provision was in force at the time of the action by the board of directors involved in this cause. Code 1897, § 2772. The Legislature, in addition to the broad powers conferred by said statute, has definitely prescribed that certain things, namely, reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, grammar, geography, physiology, United States history, principles of American government, American citizenship, American history, civics of the state and nation, physical education, agriculture, domestic science, manual training, the effect of alcoholic stimulants, narcotics, and poisonous substances, shall be taught in all or a part of the grades in the public schools of this state. Code, c. 214. Outside of the definite and specific things which are required to be taught in the public schools, a very large discretion is vested in the board of directors with regard to prescribing what courses of study shall be taught. The Legislature has not vested such power in the courts or in any other tribunal. It is true that the board of directors may attempt to act in the administration of school affairs in such a manner as to be wholly outside of and beyond the authority vested in it by the Legislature.
[2][3][4] In the event that the board of directors exceeds its authority, the courts have the undoubted power to grant injunctive relief and restrain the illegal and unauthorized act. Such has been our uniform holding. Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa, 691, 166 N. W. 202, 5 A. L. R. 841;Hume v. Independent School District, 180 Iowa, 1233, 164 N. W. 188;Kinzer v. Independent School District, 129 Iowa, 441, 105 N. W. 686, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496;Hinkle v. Saddler, 97 Iowa, 526, 66 N. W. 765;Burkhead v. Independent School District, 107 Iowa, 29, 77 N. W. 491;Peterson v. Pratt, 183 Iowa, 462, 167 N. W. 101;Hufford v. Herrold, 189 Iowa, 853, 179 N. W. 53. On the other hand, if the action of the board is within the power conferred upon it by the Legislature and pertains to a matter in which the board is vested with authority to act, then the courts cannot review the action of the board and call in question the manner of the exercising of the discretion of the board in regard to a subject-matter over which it has jurisdiction. Templer v. School Township, 160 Iowa, 398, 141 N. W. 1054; Knowlton v. Baumhover, supra; Clay v. Independent School District, 187 Iowa, 89, 174 N. W. 47; Munn v. Independent School District, 188 Iowa, 757, 179 N. W. 811; Hufford v. Herrold, supra. See, also, Lytle Inv. Co. v. Gilman (Iowa) 206 N. W. 108. A review of a discretionary matter is by appeal to the county superintendent, and from the decision of such superintendent to the superintendent of public instruction of the state. Munn v. Independent School District, supra; Clay v. Independent School District, supra; Hufford v. Herrold, supra.
The question then arises whether the act of the board of directors of the school corporation in adopting the system in question for the teaching of thrift in the public schools was wholly beyond the power and authority vested in the board of directors under the statute. If so, then a court has jurisdiction to enjoin the act of the board. If it was not beyond such powers, then the question of whether or not the exercise of the discretion vested in the board was in an improper manner is not for the determination of the courts, but by the method of appeal as pointed out by statute.
Coming now to the particular act in question in this case, we think it cannot be denied under the record that the instruction in thrift, as outlined and taught by the system adopted by the board of directors, in this case, comes properly and legally within the contemplation of a “course of study.” The teaching of economy, self-denial, and saving is by a definite and well-defined system or plan. It is, we think, clearly within the power of the board of directors of a school corporation to determine whether or not such a course of study shall be prescribed for the public schools of the corporation and whether it shall be maintained or not. The General Assembly designated by legislative enactment that certain specified subjects shall be taught in the public schools, and has left the matter of determining and prescribing the courses of study as to all other matters within the power and discretion of the board of directors. Unless there be something in connection with the subject-matter of this prescribed course that transcends and exceeds the power vested in the board of directors, the courts have no authority to interfere by injunction and restrain the action of the board. From an examination of the copyrighted system of instruction which the board adopted in the instant case, we find nothing therein by which the board of directors exceeded its authority and discretion so that the act may be deemed to be one wholly beyond its jurisdiction. As before stated, if the act of the board in adopting the system is so unwise, ill-advised, and improper as to amount to an abuse of the vested discretion, then appellee's remedy is solely by appeal to the county superintendent to review such discretion.
It is contended in behalf of appellee that the adoption of the particular system in question was a violation of the authority and power lodged in the board of directors because of the fact that, as a part of the system, the money of the pupils which is saved was required to be deposited in a specified bank. This is really the crux of this case. It is the very gist of appellee's complaint and contention. The trial court was of the opinion that the board exceeded its powers by reason of the fact that a contract was made between Thrift, Inc., who owned the system, and the appellant bank, and that the operation of the system required that the money of the pupils should be deposited in said bank. The court suggests in its findings that the depository could be determined by the child or its parents, and that the requirement that in carrying out the adopted system the money should be deposited in a designated bank, or in any bank, was beyond any power vested in the board of directors. The record establishes beyond any question that an integral part of the designated system required that the money saved by the pupils under the system be in fact deposited in an actual bank. The underlying principle of the system is to teach saving through thrift, and, as a part of this instruction, to demonstrate that money saved and deposited in a bank accumulates interest. The record clearly discloses that the whole scheme, plan, and system would be innocuous and impossible of successful operation without the money so saved and collected was actually...
To continue reading
Request your trial