Secor v. Singleton

• Decision Date: 24 May 1888
• Parties: SECOR et al. v. SINGLETON et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

35 F. 376

SECOR et al. v. SINGLETON et al.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

May 24, 1888

F. T Hughes, H. S. Priest, and Geo, S. Grover, for complainants.

Anderson & Davis, for respondents.

THAYER J.

1. The motion to adjudge respondents guilty of contempt notwithstanding the return to the citation, like a demurrer admits all the facts stated in the return. Complainants, as non-resident stockholders of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company, on May 10, 1882, obtained a final decree against the then county judges of Scotland county and the county collector, enjoining them and their successors in office 'from levying or attempting to levy, collecting or in any manner attempting to collect, from or of the Missouri Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company, any taxes whatever, state county, school, or municipal, * * * until the expiration of the period of exemption from taxation limited in the charter of said railway company, to-wit, until December 1, 1882. ' The interest which complainants had in the property that had been exempted from taxation was that of stockholders in the railroad company that then owned the exempt property and it was on the strength of such interest that they were allowed to maintain the bill for an injunction, and eventually secured the decree above mentioned. The respondents' return alleges, among other things, that all the property of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company to which the exemption from taxation applies, was sold under a decree of foreclosure on August 18, 1886, and that on December 3, 1886, it was delivered to and became vested in a corporation known as the 'Keokuk & Western Railroad Company,' 'and that the complainants have no longer any interest whatsoever in said * * * property, or in the question of the taxation thereof, or in the matter of collecting taxes thereon. ' That clause of the return which I have placed in quotation, if standing alone, might be treated as a conclusion of law, and he ignored for that reason. Taken, however, in connection with the averments which precede it, (showing in what manner the complainants have been dispossessed of their interest,) the clause in question is well pleaded, and cannot be disregarded. For the purposes of the motion the foregoing averments must be taken as confessed. The question accordingly arises whether, in the face of the admission that the complainant had lost all interest whatsoever in the maintenance of the injunction when the information herein was filed, the court ought to entertain their application to punish the respondents for a contempt. This question must be answered in the negative. When an injunction has been granted, as in this instance, in a suit between individuals to protect one of the parties in the enjoyment of some private right, immunity, or franchise, it seems to be the rule that no one can complain of a violation of the same, unless it be some one who has a present interest in maintaining the injunction, nor unless he was a party to the suit in which the order was obtained, or for some reason stands in privity with one who was a party to the litigation. In cases where an injunction has been granted to enforce or maintain a merely private right, a proceeding instituted to punish a party for violating the order is very generally regarded as a proceeding to redress a private injury in which the public have no concern, and for that reason the prosecutor or person filing the information must have an interest in the proceeding differing from that of the general public; otherwise the courts will not entertain the information. Hawley v. Bennett, 4 Paige, 163; Rap.Contempt, 127; 2 High, Inj. (2d Ed.) 1449. The cases show that a party in whose favor an injunction has been awarded may by express agreement, or by his conduct, release the injunction, or at least waive his right to have particular acts done in violation of the restraining order adjudged to be a contempt. Mills v. Cobby, 1 Mer. 3; Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Law J.Ch. 90; Hull v. Harris, 45 Conn. 544; 2 High, Inj(2d Ed.) 1450. It would seem to follow that an injunction obtained to protect a merely private right, is so far within the control of the party obtaining it, and is so far a matter of individual concern, that only those persons who have a present interest in the right to be protected, can be heard to complain of its violation. If a person in whose favor an injunction has been granted complains of its violation, a presumption should no doubt be indulged that he still has an interest in the subject-matter to which the injunction relates, without any averment to that effect; and if such interest is called in question by the respondent, the court ought not to inquire very particularly as to the extent of the prosecutor's interest, further than to assure itself that the prosecutor is not a mere intermeddler. If the present complainants are now stockholders of the Keokuk & Western Railroad, which has become the owner of the exempt property, I am inclined to the view that that gives them a sufficient interest to maintain this prosecution, assuming for the purposes of the case that the property in the hands of the Keokuk & Western Railroad is still exempt from taxation. Nevertheless it is essential that the person who sets on foot a prosecution for contempt should have some present interest in enforcing obedience to the order which has been violated. When it is admitted, as in the present case, that no such interest exists, the court cannot properly entertain...