Secrest v. Galloway Co.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1948
• Docket Number: 47146.
• Citation: 30 N.W.2d 793,239 Iowa 168
• Parties: SECREST v. GALLOWAY CO. et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

30 N.W.2d 793

239 Iowa 168

SECREST v. GALLOWAY CO. et al.

No. 47146.

Supreme Court of Iowa

February 10, 1948

Jordan & Jordan, of Cedar Rapids, and Ralph U Woodcock, of Des Moines, for claimant-appellant.

Miller Huebner & Miller, of Des Moines, for defendants-appellees.

HAYS Justice.

The sole question presented on this appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 1457,Code 1939, Section 86.34, Code of 1946 being a part of what is known as the Workmen's Compensation Act.The facts are not in dispute.

On July 2 1941claimant sustained injuries compensable under said Act.Under a memorandum of agreement, entered into on October 31, 1940, compensation in the amount of $25.70 was agreed upon, and on said date full and final payment was made.On December 7, 1945, claimant applied for a review under Section 1457.Upon a review the Industrial Commissioner found a change of condition and awarded additional compensation.Upon appeal to the District Court, the Commissioner's ruling was reversed upon the basis that under said Section the application had not been made in time.From judgment in accordance therewith, claimant appeals.

As originally enacted this Section provided that at any time the Commissioner, on application of either party, might review the award.This was amended in 1933, c. 26, by providing 'at any time within five years from the date of the last payment of compensation.'This was again changed in 1945 and said section(1457, Code 1939), 86.34, Code 1946, now reads as follows: '86.34 Review of award or settlement.Any award for payments or agreement for settlement made under this chapter where the amount has not been commuted, may be reviewed by the industrial commissioner at the request of the employer or of the employee at any time within three years from the date of the last payment of compensation made under such award or agreement, and if on such review the commissioner finds the condition of the employee warrants such action, he may end, diminish, or increase the compensation so awarded or agreed upon.'

The last payment, as agreed upon, was made on October 31, 1941.At that time, the above Section provided for a review within five years from date of last payment.In 1945 the five year period was reduced to three.On December 7, 1945claimant applied for a review as provided for in said Section.It will be noted that the application was made within five years from date of the last payment.It was also made within three years from the effective date of the 1945amendment, which was July 4, 1945.It was not made within three years from the date of the last payment, October 31, 1941.This takes us to the principal question raised on this appeal which is, whether the amendment of 1945 reducing the time from five to three years, applies to injuries that had taken place, and an award made thereon, prior to such amendment.

Workmen's Compensation Acts are statutory and are, in various forms, in effect in many jurisdictions.However such acts are not uniform and vary in the several states, both as to content and rules of construction adopted by the courts.Appellees cite many authorities from various states as bearing upon their theory.Appellant could likewise cite authorities, equally strong, tending toward his theory.See Annotation in 165 A.L.R. 9.However, none of them are of particular benefit in determining this appeal as it is the Iowa Act with which we are concerned, examined in the light of its own wording, historical background and judicial interpretations of this court.

The authorities agree that such acts are in derogation of the common law.Under their provisions, the employer on the one hand relinquishes certain defenses available to him at common law and the employee on the other hand relinquishes all right of action based upon the principles of common law.In some of the states the Act is compulsory while in others, it is elective.The Iowa Act falls in the latter group.Under our Act the duties and liabilities, where the Act is accepted by employer and employee, are held to be of a contractual, rather than a statutory, nature.In Pierce v. Bekins V. & S. Co., 185 Iowa 1346, 1355, 172 N.W. 191, 194, we say: 'Our statute is confessedly elective.* * * Where the statute is elective as to both employer and employé, payment of compensation is not the performance of a statute duty, but the performance of conditions in the contract of hiring which conditions are in the contract by means of reading the compensation statute into the contract.* * * We know of no reason why parties may not by contract fix standards of settlement, to be any definitely contracted for method, unless there be some statutory or constitutional objection to such an agreement.The entire structure of the Iowa act, not only fails to prohibit such a contract, but by being elective creates a contractual relation under a contract providing for settlement on a standard fixed by the Iowa act.'See alsoHaverly v. Union Construction Co., 236 Iowa 278, 18 N.W.2d 629.

Under the Iowa Act, there is created a system for arriving at a just settlement for injuries sustained by an employee.In place of the matter being brought in the district court, an Industrial Commissioner is created with exclusive authority, in the first instance, to determine the questions involved.Under our original Acthe was vested with authority not only to make an award, but having made such award, to later review the same with power to increase, diminish or annul, as conditions might warrant.The rights to these privileges, among others, are given in exchange for the release of common law rights.These rights are, under our elective system, a part of the contract of hire.This fact, together with the purpose of the Act, has brought about a policy of liberal construction.As stated in the Piercecase, supra, at page 1350 of 185 Iowa, at page 192 of 172 N.W.'The statute is highly remedial, and is to be construed as such statutes are.Howsoever the cases may differ, there is no difference as to the rule that such statutes as this shall have a broad and liberal construction in aid of accomplishing the object of the enactment.'

As originally enacted, there was no time limit, after the happening of the injury, within which original proceedings should be commenced before the Commissioner.By amendment, Section 1386, Code of 1939,Section 85.26, Code of 1946, was enacted.By this amendment the original proceedings must be brought within two years after the injury.In the case of Hinrichs v. Davenport Locomotive Works, 203 Iowa 1395, 214 N.W. 585, this court had before it, as applicable to section 1386, the same question now before us, as applicable to Section 1457.There, speaking through Justice Stevens, we said, 203 Iowa page 1398, 214 N.W. page 586: 'Prior to the enactment of section 1386, * * *, there was no statute of limitations applicable to claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law.The present statute limits the time within which original proceedings may be commenced to two years after date of the injury causing the disability.More than two years elapsed thereafter before this action was commenced.The question therefore, is as to the applicability of section 1386 thereto.There is nothing in the specific language of the statute to indicate that it was the intention of the Legislature that it should be given retroactive effect, nor do we find anything therein from which such intention may be implied. * * *. The rule, apparently, of almost universal application, is, however, that a statute of limitations will be given retroactive effect only when it appears by express provision or necessary implication that such was the legislative intent.(Citing cases.)Section 1386 is not therefore applicable * * *.'In Otis v. Parrott, 233 Iowa 1039, at page 1044, 8 N.W.2d 708, at page 712, while the same question was not involved, the holding in the Hinrichscase, supra, was recognized as follows: 'The court then went on to conclude that section 1386 had no retroactive effect * * *.'At page 1045, 1046 of 233 Iowa, at page 712 of 8 N.W.2d, we say: 'The Workmen's Compensation Law creates a right of action but by section 1386 it conditioned the enforcement of the right to the institution of proceedings within the prescribed period of two years.The legislature, having the power to create the right, may affix the conditions under which it is to be enforced, and a compliance with those conditions is essential.* * * It is the right to claim benefits under the act that is lost after a lapse of two years (citingTischer v. City of Council Bluffs, 231 Iowa 1134, 3 N.W.2d 166).'

Strictly speaking, a statute of limitation affects the remedy not the right.A general limitation statute is defined in 34 Am.Jur.Limitation of Action, Sec. 3, to be '* * * the action of the state in determining that after a lapse of a specified time a claim shall...