Secretary, Dept. of Human Resources v. Wilson
Decision Date | 27 December 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 88,88 |
Citation | 286 Md. 639,409 A.2d 713 |
Parties | SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al. v. Luther WILSON et al. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Carolyn I. Polowy, Asst. Atty., Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen. and Joel J. Rabin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief), for appellants.
Bernard G. Link, Regional Atty., Baltimore, on brief, for amicus curiae Intern. Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, U.A.W.
J. Cookman Boyd, Jr. and Rob Ross Hendrickson, Baltimore, on brief for amicus curiae Maryland Chamber of Commerce, Inc.
Benjamin L. Brown, City Sol., William Hughes, Associate City Sol., Glenn M. Grossman and William R. Phelan, Jr., Asst. City Sols., Baltimore, on brief, for amicus curiae Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
Gordon S. Berman, Baltimore (Dennis W. Carroll, Jr., Baltimore, on brief), for appellees.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ.
Maryland's Unemployment Insurance Law, Md. Code , Art. 95A, effective 10 December 1936, was designed to protect the health, morals and welfare of the citizens of Maryland by preventing economic insecurity and easing the burdens of involuntary unemployment and economic distress. 1 To accomplish this purpose, benefits are paid to individuals who have become unemployed through no fault of their own, and who are otherwise eligible.
The amount of the benefits is determined by a procedure contained in Art. 95A, § 3.
Section 3(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Section 3(d) provides in pertinent part:
In order to receive benefits, claimants file an "initial claim" 3 and each week thereafter file a "continued claim." 4
Before 1 July 1978, the maximum weekly benefit amount provided in § 3(b)(1) was $89 per week. Effective 1 July 1978, § 3(b)(1) was repealed and reenacted "for the purpose of increasing the weekly benefits of unemployment insurance . . . ." 1978 Md.Laws, ch. 806 at 2350. The only change, insofar as here relevant, was to increase the maximum weekly benefit amount to $106.
On 17 April 1978, before the amendment became effective, the Executive Director of the Employment Security Administration (ESA) told Mr. Gordon S. Berman, an attorney from Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., that all claimants who filed claims for weekly benefits after 1 July 1978 would be eligible to receive the increased weekly benefit amount provided by § 3(b)(1) as amended. He indicated that not only would any claimant who filed an initial claim after 1 July 1978 be eligible to receive the increased weekly benefit amount provided by § 3(b) (1) as amended, but also that any claimant who had filed an initial claim before 1 July 1978 but who, because his benefit year extended beyond that date, filed continued claims for weekly benefits after 1 July 1978, would be eligible to receive the increased weekly benefit amount.
Appellants Wilson, Brown, Downey and Montague (claimants) filed initial and continued claims for benefits before 1 July 1978. 5 They were each determined to be eligible for a maximum $89 weekly benefit amount. After 1 July 1978, they filed continued claims, yet still were determined to be eligible for no more than $89 a week. Claimants did not appeal from any determination upon any continued claim made after 1 July 1978.
On 7 August, 1978, Mr. Berman, in a letter to the Executive Director of ESA, asked whether he had reversed his previous position that claimants whose initial claims were filed before 1 July 1978, but who filed continued claims after that date, would be eligible for the increased weekly benefit amount provided by § 3(b)(1) as amended. In a letter dated 11 August 1978, the Executive Director acknowledged that he had indeed reversed his position because his previous opinion "was counter to the legal opinion and administrative practice of preceding Executive Directors." He stated that only claimants who filed initial claims after 1 July 1978 would be eligible for the increased weekly benefit amount.
On 30 August 1978, in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, claimants filed a bill of complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that the ESA had unlawfully refused to pay proper weekly benefits for continued claims filed after 1 July 1978, as well as an order requiring the ESA to pay claimants any money wrongfully withheld since that date. On 9 January 1979, the trial court granted claimants' motion for summary judgment. The ESA appealed. We issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals before consideration by that Court.
On 7 June 1979, after oral argument, this Court dismissed the appeal because it was not taken from a final, appealable order. Md.Rule 835(a)(1). See Md.Code (1974) § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. On 9 July 1979, the trial court issued a declaration and decree. It declared that the increased weekly benefit amount provided in § 3(b)(1) as amended was equally applicable to initial and continued claims filed after 1 July 1978. It ordered that the claimants be compensated in accordance with the increased weekly benefit amount provided in § 3(b)(1) as amended for all claims filed after 1 July 1978. Again, the ESA appealed. On 17 October 1979, we issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals before consideration by that Court. Because the claimants did not exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking declaratory relief from the trial court, we shall direct the trial court to dismiss.
Ordinarily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed to be exclusive. White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1950). More particularly, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Md.Code (1974) § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly provides:
"If a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle."
This Court has consistently held that because, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, statutory administrative remedies are exclusive, the administrative procedures established must be exhausted before a litigant may seek declaratory relief from a trial court. Soley v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526-27, 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976); Tawes v. Williams, 179 Md. 224, 228, 17 A.2d 137, 139 (1940).
In Soley, 277 Md. at 526, 356 A.2d at 257, this Court articulated the underlying rationale for this requirement. There, Judge Levine said for the Court:
Thus, this Court recognized that when the Legislature enacts a comprehensive remedial scheme in which a claim is to be determined by an administrative agency and reviewed in an administrative appeal before judicial review is available, it establishes, as public policy, that such a procedure produces the most efficient and effective results. In order to effectuate this public policy, trial courts generally should not act until there has been compliance with the statutory comprehensive remedial scheme. For the same reasons, an appellate court, on its own motion, ordinarily will raise the issue of exhaustion of statutory administrative remedies, even though not raised by the parties. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 594, 386 A.2d 1216, 1222 (1978); Commission on Medical Discipline v. Bendler, 280 Md. 326, 327, 329-30, 373 A.2d 1232, 1232-34 (1977). See also Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 701, 350 A.2d 661, 663 (1976); Harford Sands, Inc. v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 27 Md.App. 702, 706, 343 A.2d 544, 546 (1975). Indeed, because the parties cannot, by agreement, cause an appellate court to act contrary to public policy, such a court will consider this question even though all of the parties desire judicial intervention. See Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper, 276 Md. at 700, 350 A.2d at 663; Price v. Hobbs, 47 Md. 359, 378 (1877); Harford Sands, Inc. v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 27 Md.App. at 706, 343 A.2d at 546. Accordingly, we have, on our own motion, raised the issue of exhaustion of statutory remedies here.
Article 95A, § 7, Claims for Benefits, provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for the orderly processing of unemployment compensation claims. Section 7(b) provides the mechanism for filing claims. 6 Section 7(c) requires an examiner to determine promptly "whether and in what amount claimant is entitled to benefits for the week with respect to which the determination is made." Section 7(c)(ii) establishes...
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