Sedlack v. Sedlack

• Decision Date: 07 March 1887
• Citation: 14 Or. 540,13 P. 452
• Parties: SEDLACK v. SEDLACK.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

13 P. 452

14 Or. 540

SEDLACK v. SEDLACK.

Supreme Court of Oregon

March 7, 1887

E.O Dowd, for appellant.

H.Y Thompson and Geo. H. Durham, for respondent.

LORD, C.J.

This is a suit to impeach a decree for fraud. The final decree was entered nearly 30 years ago, granting to the plaintiff a divorce and the custody of her children, and an interest in the defendant's estate. The benefits of that decree she has accepted, taking the divorce, receiving the children, and the money awarded her under it. As such party to the record after re-receiving all the advantages of the decree, and acquiescing in it for so many years, can she be now heard to impeach it on the ground that the decree was entered without notice, or her knowledge or consent? During all this period it is not disputed but that the decree has been spread upon the proper record for the information of all concerned. And now, after the former husband has married, raised other children; and recently died, and by his will (so it was said at the argument) providing for the children of both marriages, ought this suit, under the circumstances, to be entertained? Is not the claim made against his estate, and sought to be enforced, such as is denominated "stale," and regarded with disfavor in equity? The general rule, without doubt, is that no lapse of time or delay in bringing the suit will be a bar to the remedy in equity, provided the injured party during the interval was ignorant of the fraud. But the ignorance of such party must not have been negligent; for if by reasonable diligence the fraud could have been discovered, or ought to have been known, he will be deemed guilty of laches, or of acquiescence, and equity will refuse to interfere. In many cases courts of equity act upon the analogy of the statute of limitations. But, independent of this, it is a favorite doctrine of equity to allow a defense to be based on a mere lapse of time, and the staleness of the claim, denominated "laches," where the delay has been passive, and acquiesced in for a great length of time. Story, Eq.Jur. § 1520 et seq.; Pom.Eq.Jur. §§ 418, 419; Badger v. Badger 2 Wall. 94. In Sullivan v. Railway Co., 94 U.S 807, Mr. Justice SWAYNE said: "To let in the defense that the claim is stale, and the bill cannot, therefore, be supported it is not necessary that a foundation be laid by any averment in the answer of the defendants. If the case, as it appears at the...