Sedlak v. Ford Motor Co., Docket No. 21788
| Decision Date | 28 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 21788 |
| Citation | 235 N.W.2d 63,64 Mich.App. 61 |
| Parties | Ronald SEDLAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Shanahan & Scheid by Clark Shanahan, Owosso, for plaintiff-appellant.
Smith & Brooker by Lawrence E. Nill, Flint, for defendant-appellee.
Before ALLEN, P.J., and WALSH and O'HARA, * JJ.
Plaintiff filed a complaint the actionable part of which was that:
'The design of the tire jack was negligently performed by defendant.' 1
Apparently, or at least it is claimed, the jack malfunctioned and plaintiff was seriously injured as a result thereof.
This incident occrred on November 21, 1969. Suit was started June 19, 1974.
Defendant filed a motion for accelerated judgment raising the defense of the three-year statute of limitations. 2
In a responsive affidavit plaintiff averred:
'1. His cause of action arose from a crushing injury to his skull occurring November 21, 1969, when a truck fell on his head.
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is no point in this Court again discussing ad nauseam the nuances of difference in a tort action and the 'amalgam of tort and contract concepts' said to make up causes of action variously designated 'product liability', 'breach of implied warranty of fitness' and similar names. 3
The fact that plaintiff in a counter affidavit made reference to discovery by his attorney of the 'possible direct relation between the design of the jack and the mechanics of the jack's collapse' does not affect his pleaded cause of action. The complaint is of a simple tort action based on negligence. That cause of action, if any, accrued on the date of his injury, November 21, 1969.
Absent certain exceptions as to disabilities, not here relevant, plaintiff had 3 years to find out or obtain adequate assistance in investigating the claimed relationship between the injury and the alleged negligent design.
It would be an extremely dangerous rule of law that the accrual date of a cause of action is held in abeyance indefinitely until a prospective plaintiff obtains professional assistance to determine the existence of a possible cause of action. Under such a theory, no limitations period would ever be binding.
The Supreme Court summed this all up as follows:
Kroll v. Vanden Berg, 336 Mich. 306, 311, 57 N.W.2d 897, 899 (1953).
Plaintiff knew on the date of his injury that the...
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...liability cases involving personal injury. We do not agree with defendant's interpretation of these cases. In Sedlak v. Ford Motor Co., 64 Mich.App. 61, 235 N.W.2d 63 (1975), the plaintiff, working under a truck, was injured when the tire jack supporting the vehicle collapsed. This Court he......
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