Seeberger v. Castro

• Citation: 153 U.S. 32,38 L.Ed. 624,14 S.Ct. 766
• Decision Date: 16 April 1894
• Docket Number: No. 296,296
• Parties: SEEBERGER. Collector, v. CASTRO
• Court: United States Supreme Court

153 U.S. 32

14 S.Ct. 766

38 L.Ed. 624

SEEBERGER. Collector,

v CASTRO.

No. 296.

April 16, 1894.

This was an action by Daniel Castro against Anthony F. Seeberger, collector of the port of Chicago, to recover certain duties paid under protest. There was judgment for plaintiff in the court below (40 Fed. 531), and the collector sued out this writ of error.

The defendant in error (plaintiff below) sued to recover duties which he claimed had been illegally exacted on certain importations of tobacco. The case, by stipulation, was submitted without the intervention of a jury. The court found the facts to be as follows: The Rayner & Baxter Cigar Company imported the tobacco in question, which consisted of 'clippings from the ends of cigars, and pieces broken from the tobacco of which cigars are manufactured, in the process of such manufacture, the said clippings and pieces not being fit for any use in the condition in which the same are imported, and their only use being to be manufactured into cigarettes and smoking tobacco.' The collector assessed upon the tobacco a duty of 40 cents per pound, under section 2502, c. 121, of the act of 1883, which took effect on March 3, 1883, including it within the terms of the fifth paragraph of Schedule F of that act, which reads as follows: 'Tobacco, manufactured, of all descriptions, and stem tobacco, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, forty cents per pound.'

The importer seasonably protested, contending that the tobacco was not dutiable under the above paragraph of Schedule F, but was so under the seventh paragraph of the same, which reads as follows: 'Tobacco, unmanufactured, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty per centum ad valorem.'

From an adverse ruling of the collector, an appeal was duly brought to the secretary of the treasury. Pending this appeal, the importer sold the tobacco, in bond, to the plaintiff below, who, upon the affirmance of the collector's ruling by the secretary, paid the duties, and in due time brought this suit to recover.

Upon the facts thus found the defendant asked the court to rule—First, that the plaintiff, as purchaser pending the decision of the secretary, could not maintain the suit; second, that the defendant was, as a matter of law, entitled to a judgment. Reserving these questions, which were adversely decided, the defendant brings the case here.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Whitney, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice WHITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

That a stranger, suing solely on an assignment of a claim from those who did not see fit to prosecute it themselves, cannot recover duties averred to have been illegally assessed, is settled by Hager v. Swayne, 149 U. S. 242, 13 Sup. Ct. 841. That case, however, has no application to the present one, because the facts of the two are different. Indeed, in Hager v. Swayne, reference was made to this case as then reported (40 Fed. 531), and we said: 'Castro had purchased the merchandise of the importer while it was in bond, and pending an appeal, and after the decision of the appeal paid the duties assessed, in order to obtain possession of the property, and thereupon brought the suit. * * * The purchaser obtained an interest in the thing itself,'—thus plainly distinguishing between the case of an assignment of a claim, as exemplified in Hager v. Swayne, and the case of an assignment of the thing, such as is here involved.

Whether such tobacco as that with which we are here concerned is 'manufactured,' in the sense of the word as used in the tariff act of 1883, is a question which has given rise to some contrariety of opinion. Atty. Gen. Brewster, on January 25, 1884, held that it was, reaching his conclusion by a comparison of the provisions of the tariff act with those of certain internal revenue laws, holding that the two were in pari materia, and hence that the classification of tobacco scraps as manufactured tobacco in the internal revenue laws must be taken to indicate the intention of congress to include them under the head of manufactured tobacco in the tariff law. 17 Op. Attys. Gen. p. 646. On the other hand, in Cohn v. Spalding, 24 Fed. 19, decided May 26, 1885, the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois decided that scrap tobacco was not manufactured, within the meaning of the tariff act of 1883. And in a still later case, which arose under the provisions of the tariff act of 1890 (Sheldon v. U. S., 5 C. C. A. 282, 55 Fed. 818), it was held by the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit that scraps like those now in question were manufactured tobacco, within the meaning of that act, the court calling attention to the fact that these scraps had a commercial value, and were the subjects of importation in the way of business.

It seems to us, however, that both the meaning of the word 'manufactured' and the analogy of the internal revenue provisions require us to hold that these scraps are not manufactured tobacco. The court below found in this case that the scraps were 'clippings from the ends of cigars, and pieces broken from the tobacco of which cigars are manufactured, in the process of such manufacture; that said clippings and pieces are not fit for any use in the condition in which the same are imported; and that their only use is to be manufactured into cigarettes and smoking tobacco.' It is thus evident that the clippings are the mere waste resulting from a process of manufacture, and not in...