Seefeld v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1886
• Citation: 67 Wis. 96,29 N.W. 904
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: SEEFELD v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

67 Wis. 96

29 N.W. 904

SEEFELD

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

November 3, 1886.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee county.

This is an action brought by the appellant to condemn lot 12, block 75, in the Fourth ward of the city of Milwaukee, for railroad purposes. A large number of other condemnations were included in the same proceeding. Commissioners were duly appointed, and filed their report on the fifteenth day of August, 1885, awarding to the respondent the sum of $10,500, which amount was paid into court on the twelfth day of October, 1885, for the use and benefit of the respondent, and on the twenty-fifth day of August, he appealed to the circuit court. The cause was tried on the twenty-seventh day of October, 1885. After the jury was sworn a view of the premises was had. On the trial of the cause a verdict was returned for the respondent for the sum of $12,987.50, and the further sum of $189.37 interest from date of filing the award to date of verdict, amounting in all to the sum of $13,176.87. A motion to set aside said verdict and for a new trial was made and denied, and afterwards, and on the sixth day of January, 1886, judgment was entered upon said verdict for the amount thereof, and the additional sum of $174.21 interest thereon from the time of the trial, and the sum of $46.68 costs, amounting in all to the sum of $13,397.76. From said judgment this appeal is taken by the defendant company.Markham & Noyes, for respondent, Joachim Seefeld.

John W. Cary, for appellant, Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

LYON, J.

1. For the purpose of proving the value of the lot in question, the plaintiff offered, and the circuit court, against the objection of the defendant company, admitted in evidence the record of five deeds of as many lots in the same neighborhood, executed in 1885 by different grantors to John W. Cary; and of another deed of another lot, executed in 1884 by one Markham to one Thorson. Each of these deeds expressed a consideration, and they were received in evidence on the theory that the consideration thus expressed proved the price paid for each lot, and tended to show the value thereof, and, by inference, the value of the lot in question. On their face the railway company was a stranger to these conveyances, and was not bound by the recitals therein of the consideration paid. Such recitals are nothing more than ex parte statements of the grantors and grantees that the considerations named were paid and received for the respective lots. As between the parties thereto each of these conveyances would be evidence of the consideration paid and received, because it is an admission of the fact by all parties to it. But it is not conclusive evidence. Either party may show that the true consideration was greater or less than that named in the deed, just as a party may always deny, explain, or controvert his alleged admission against his own interest, unless they create an estoppel. As to a stranger to the deed, however, such evidence is purely hearsay. It is precisely the same in this case as it would have been had the plaintiff put a witness on the stand, and, for the purpose of proving the value of the lot in question, interrogated him as to the statements and admissions of any grantor or grantee of a lot in the same vicinity, of the sum paid and accepted therefor. No one will maintain for a moment that such evidence is admissible. We think the records of the conveyances above mentioned are equally inadmissible, and for the same reasons.

It appeared later in the trial that the deeds to Mr. Cary were made for the railway company, and that the consideration expressed in each of them was the sum at which the lot conveyed had been appraised by commissioners in condemnation proceedings. Had that fact been developed when the records of those deeds were put in evidence, they would prove only the opinion of the commissioners of the value of the several lots. It would still be hearsay evidence and incompetent. If the plaintiff desired to get the opinion of the commissioners to the jury, he should have called them as witnesses; thus giving the opposite party the opportunity and advantage of cross-examination.

What is here said of the conveyance to Mr. Cary has no reference to the conveyance by Markham and Thorson. To that conveyance the railway company is an entire stranger, and there appears to be no other...