Seegers v. Jasper Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 4:17-CV-42-TLS-JEM |
| Parties | BERNARD SEEGERS, Plaintiff, v. JASPER COUNTY, MARY SCHEURICH in her official capacity as Director of Planning and Development, and JAMES WALSTRA in his official capacity as planning commission member, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 36], seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Plaintiff filed a response [ECF No. 39], and the Defendants filed a reply [ECF No. 40]. Because the Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the Court grants the motion, dismisses the federal claims with prejudice, and relinquishes its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.
BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2017, Plaintiff Bernard Seegers filed a pro se Complaint [ECF No. 1] against Jasper County, Indiana, and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2]. On May 22, 2017, the Court denied the in forma pauperis motion, finding that the Complaint failed to demonstrate that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction and granting the Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 3. On June 16, 2017, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. See ECF No. 4. On August 10, 2017, the Plaintiff paid the filing fee and filed a pro se Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6]; however, the Court struck the Amended Complaint because the Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal had terminated the case, see ECF No. 19. Counsel subsequently entered an appearance for the Plaintiff, and the Court granted a motion to reopen the case. See ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25. On July 18, 2018, the Plaintiff, by counsel, filed a Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 26], alleging the following facts.
Defendant James Walstra has a private interest in a company named Walstra Trucking, which is in the business of hauling materials such as dirt and sand. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, ECF No. 26. Mr. Walstra is a commissioner of the Jasper County Board of Commissioners ("Commissioners"), a member of the Kankakee River Basin Commission, and a member of the Jasper County Drainage Board. Id. at ¶¶ 13-15.
Sometime in or before 2004, the Plaintiff sold a portion of his several hundred acres of land to a neighbor to raise money to develop a different 90 acres of his land. Id. at ¶ 16. In 2004, the neighbor indicated that he would not oppose the Plaintiff's proposed subdivision, and, in 2005, the Commissioners approved a re-zone from Agricultural to R1 for the property the Plaintiff intended to develop into a subdivision. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
On September 14, 2005, the Plaintiff complained to the Commissioners that Walstra Trucking was removing sand ridge from a different lot next to his property, and, on September 28, 2005, the Commissioners sent a cease and desist notice to stop the sand removal. Id. at ¶ 19. In October 2005, Mr. Walstra had personal conversations with the Commissioners to advise that the sand mining was not unlawful, and the trucking continued. Id. at ¶ 20. Walstra Trucking made hundreds of thousands of dollars from the removal of the sand. Id. at ¶ 21. On October 17, 2005, the Plaintiff asked the Commissioners for guidance regarding the sand mining he opposed, and he received a letter from then-counsel for the Commissioners advising that "there was nowrong application of the regulations of concern" to the Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 22. The sand mining continued. Id. at ¶ 23.
In January 2008, the Plaintiff's engineer sought approval for the subdivision plans from the Jasper County Planning Commission. Id. at ¶ 24. The subdivision plan was denied based on what the Commissioners believed to be poor drainage planning. Id. at ¶ 25. However, the plans were approved by the Drainage Board. Id. The Plaintiff appealed the denial to the Jasper County Circuit Court, and, in December 2008, the Plaintiff lost his appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27. The Plaintiff went bankrupt from the cost of planning the subdivision. Id. at ¶ 28. In 2011, the Plaintiff conveyed to his neighbor (the same neighbor who previously purchased property from the Plaintiff) the 90 acres he had planned to develop as a subdivision. Id. at ¶ 29.
In March 2015, the neighbor removed a ditch from the 90 acres, which the Plaintiff reported to the Planning and Development Commission Director. Id. at ¶ 30. On March 23, 2015, the Commissioners sent a cease and desist notice to stop removing sand from the 90 acres. Id. at ¶ 31. On May 2, 2015, the Plaintiff learned that he was required to obtain flood insurance because of the effect on his property of that sand mining. Id. at ¶ 32. At some point, the neighbor petitioned the Commissioners to do sand mining. Id. at ¶ 33. In January 2016, the Plaintiff communicated with the Commissioners, hoping they would deny the petition. Id. at ¶ 34. In January 2017, the neighbor "request[ed] to continue the hearing on the petition and the Commissioners den[ied] the request." Id. at ¶ 35. The Plaintiff alleges that, "[a]t this time it appears to [me] that something is amiss because this is exactly the sort of bad decision making that occurred in 2005 when Walstra Trucking was told to cease and desist." Id.
On April 24, 2017, the Plaintiff inadvertently mailed his original Complaint in this case to the United States Attorney's Office in Hammond. See Compl. 6-12, ECF No. 1; see alsoSecond Am. Compl. ¶ 36. He subsequently filed his pro se Complaint with this Court on May 18, 2017. On June 7, 2017, the Director of the Plan Commission wrote to the Plaintiff, explaining why Mr. Walstra had been allowed to mine without a permit in 2005. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 37. "[T]his is the first time that [the Plaintiff] confirm[ed] what he felt in January of 2017 i.e. that the Defendant Walstra lied to the government to achieve personal gain." Id. The Plaintiff alleges that it is the Defendants' official custom and policy to allow their members to treat the Plaintiff and the public wrongly for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to their official duties and that it is the Defendants' official custom and policy to ignore the unethical and conflicting private interests of their members that harm the Plaintiff and the public. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 39.
In Count I, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, the Plaintiff asserts equal protection and due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Commissioners knew that drainage was a problem on the property and denied the Plaintiff's subdivision plan due to concerns over drainage. Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41. However, "[o]n January 23, 2017, the Commissioners failed to deny plans by another for the . . . property, formerly owned by [the Plaintiff], despite the fact that the drainage impact would be worse than Plaintiff's plans." Id. at ¶ 42. The Plaintiff alleges that Commissioners, including Mr. Walstra, were influenced by the Plaintiff's "previous animosity toward them for making bad decisions, his complaining of their poor ethics, and his general stubbornness to have them do their jobs right." Id. at ¶ 43. And, he alleges that the Commissioners treated him differently in violation of constitutional rights because of the his "animosity, attempts to prevent personal gain of Commissioners through their private business dealings, and his other past complaints and lawsuits made against the Commissioners." Id. at ¶¶ 44-47. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that the decisions affecting his property were based on the Defendants' "informal and irrational rules" and that the rules wereapplied differently to Mr. Walstra and his neighbor. Id. at ¶ 50. The Plaintiff alleges that he has been damaged because his property is now subjected to flooding as a result of the sand mining and he now has to pay for flood insurance. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.
Count II alleges civil conspiracy to deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, alleging that Mr. Walstra and the neighbor conspired to develop sand mining and hauling near the Plaintiff's home and on his former property that he lost due to the Defendants' unconstitutional acts. Id. at ¶ 53. The Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Walstra was able to deprive him of his constitutional rights by influencing the boards and commissioners who made decisions regarding the involved properties. Id. at ¶ 54. The Plaintiff further alleges that, because of the conspiracy, he was deprived of his land, his home has been damaged due to flooding, and he has lost money due to the failed development and increased flood insurance costs. Id. at ¶ 55.
Finally, Count III asserts an equal protection violation under the Indiana Constitution, alleging that, because the Plaintiff "was politically opposed to the decisions of the Commissioners, complaining about the Commissioners openly, calling them thieves, and calling them unethical, he was not given equal protection when he appeared before these Commissioners." Id. at ¶ 57.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In considering such a motion, the "district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)). In addition,"[t]he district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Id. (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 554). The burden of proof to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction...
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