Seehus v. Bor-son Constr. Inc, No. A09-1388.

• Decision Date: 10 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. A09-1388.
• Citation: 783 N.W.2d 144
• Parties: David K. SEEHUS, Respondent,v.BOR-SON CONSTRUCTION, INC. and CNA-RSKO, Respondents,Wesley Residence, Inc. and MIGA by GAB Robins North America, Relators,andTwin Cities Spine Center, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota & Blue Plus, SMDC Health System, Minnesota DOLI/Vocational Rehab. Unit, Dr. Christine A. Audette, and Chiropractic Health Center, Intervenors.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

783 N.W.2d 144

David K. SEEHUS, Respondent,v. BOR-SON CONSTRUCTION, INC. and CNA-RSKO, Respondents,Wesley Residence, Inc. and MIGA by GAB Robins North America, Relators,andTwin Cities Spine Center, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota & Blue Plus, SMDC Health System, Minnesota DOLI/Vocational Rehab. Unit, Dr. Christine A. Audette, and Chiropractic Health Center, Intervenors.

No. A09-1388.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 10, 2010.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A solvent workers' compensation insurer does not have a claim against the Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) for contribution arising out of an employee's claim petition involving disability resulting from successive accidental injuries because the insurer's claim is not a “covered claim” under Minn.Stat. ch. 60C (2008). But when a solvent workers' compensation insurer is determined to bear some causal responsibility for an employee's claim, the solvent workers' compensation insurer is solely liable for the claim.

2. In a workers' compensation employee claim petition proceeding involving successive accidental injuries and successive insurers including MIGA, the workers' compensation court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine causal responsibility for the employee's claim under Minn.Stat. ch. 176 (2008).

3. Because the solvent workers' compensation insurer was determined by the workers' compensation court to bear some causal responsibility for the employee's claim, the solvent workers' compensation insurer is solely liable for the claim.

Russell J. LaCourse, LaCourse Law Office, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent David K. Seehus.

Larry J. Peterson, Brent Kleffman, Peterson, Logren & Kilbury, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota, for respondents Bor-Son Construction, Inc. and CNA-RSKO.

Michael D. Miller, Jeffrey R. Homuth, McCollum, Crowley, Moschet & Miller, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for relators.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

David K. Seehus filed a claim petition seeking workers' compensation benefits for work-related injuries sustained during the course of his employment at Wesley Residence, Inc. (Wesley), on March 19, 2001. Because Wesley's workers' compensation insurer was insolvent, the Minnesota Insurance Guarantee Association (MIGA) administered the claim. Subsequently, the workers' compensation judge ordered Seehus's previous employer, Bor-Son Construction, Inc. (Bor-Son), and its workers' compensation insurer, CNA-RSKO (CNA),¹ to be joined as parties. Following a hearing, the compensation judge filed an order that concluded that the workers' compensation court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order MIGA to pay Seehus's claim, and that CNA was responsible for the entire claim. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed on the ground that the compensation judge lacked jurisdiction to order the joinder of the previous employer and its insurer and ordered Wesley/MIGA to pay the claim. Wesley/MIGA petitioned for certiorari review.

Because we conclude that the compensation judge had the authority to determine causal responsibility between the injuries sustained at Bor-Son and Wesley, we reverse the decision of the WCCA and reinstate the decision of the compensation judge.

Seehus sustained a work-related lower back injury on March 8, 1989, while employed as a carpenter for Bor-Son. Seehus received physical therapy, but continued to experience back pain. Consequently, Seehus had lower back surgery in April 1989 and a second lower back surgery in October 1989 to resolve his back pain. After his medical treatment, Seehus was rated with an 11% permanent partial disability based upon his lower back injury. Seehus settled his claim against Bor-Son.

In 1990, Seehus began working for Wesley as a maintenance worker. While still employed at Wesley, Seehus suffered a new work-related lower back injury on March 19, 2001. When conservative medical treatment did not resolve his back pain, he underwent a third lower back surgery in May 2007.

Seehus filed a workers' compensation claim petition in June 2007 against Wesley and its workers' compensation insurer, Meadowbrook Insurance Group/GAB Robins (Meadowbrook). Because Meadowbrook was insolvent, MIGA ² administered the claim for the benefit of Wesley.³ In October 2007, MIGA filed a motion for joinder and for contribution/reimbursement against CNA, which was granted by the compensation judge.

Before the hearing, Seehus entered into a partial stipulation for settlement with MIGA that closed out all of his claims for benefits against MIGA except non-chiropractic medical expenses. The case proceeded to hearing on the question of the medical causation responsibility between the two compensable work injuries.

At the hearing, MIGA submitted a deposition from a doctor who had examined Seehus and concluded that the Wesley injury was not a significant contributing factor to Seehus's need for medical treatment. CNA submitted a deposition from a doctor who had also examined Seehus and concluded that both injuries were substantial contributing factors to Seehus's present lower back symptoms and apportioned 50% of the responsibility to the Bor-Son injury and 50% to the Wesley injury.

The compensation judge issued findings and an order, which, among other things, apportioned liability at 50% for the Bor-Son injury and 50% for the Wesley injury. But the compensation judge concluded that the workers' compensation court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to direct MIGA to make payments in a case where an alternative workers' compensation insurer is present. Therefore, the compensation judge ordered CNA to pay 100% of Seehus's claim.

CNA appealed to the WCCA. CNA argued that the compensation judge erred in finding that (1) the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order MIGA to pay an employee's claims where a solvent workers' compensation insurer is present, (2) CNA was responsible for 100% of Seehus's claim, and (3) CNA's reimbursement remedy is under Minn.Stat. ch. 60C (2008). Neither party appealed the finding that equally apportioned liability between MIGA and CNA. The WCCA reversed the findings and order of the compensation judge. Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 2009 WL 2199679, at *5 (Minn. WCCA July 9, 2009). The WCCA concluded that the compensation judge lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order the joinder of CNA, and ordered MIGA to pay Seehus's claim. Id. MIGA appealed the WCCA's decision to this court by petitioning for a writ of certiorari.

I.

MIGA argues that the WCCA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order MIGA to pay Seehus's claim on the ground that the WCCA lacked the authority to determine whether Seehus's claim was a “covered claim” under chapter 60C. CNA argues that MIGA waived the subject-matter jurisdiction defense by failing to assert it and that the compensation judge had the authority to determine Seehus's claim, particularly because MIGA was the only named party to the proceeding. CNA contends that the compensation judge lacked the authority to order the joinder of CNA on the ground that joinder is merely a method for MIGA to pursue its contribution/reimbursement claim against CNA, which this court has previously determined MIGA cannot do.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court's authority to hear the type of dispute at issue and to grant the type of relief sought. See Robinette v. Price, 214 Minn. 521, 526, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1943). The question of whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law for the court. Hale v. Viking Trucking Co., 654 N.W.2d 119, 123 (Minn.2002). Defects in subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and cannot be waived by the parties. In re Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn.2007); see also Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (discussing the distinction between jurisdictional rules and “claim-processing” rules); Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421-22 (Minn.2006) (discussing the distinction between jurisdictional rules and procedural rules). Additionally, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be “conferred by consent of the parties.” Hemmesch v. Molitor, 328 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn.1983).

To determine whether the workers' compensation courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over Seehus's claim requires an examination of the authority of those courts, the applicable provisions of Minn.Stat. ch. 60C, and relevant case law. Thereafter, we must apply chapter 60C and relevant case law to resolve the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The workers' compensation adjudication system is “based to a significant extent on the judicial model of decisionmaking.” Kline v. Berg Drywall, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Minn.2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The workers' compensation judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings determines all contested issues of fact and law. Minn.Stat. § 176.371 (2008) (“The compensation judge's decision shall include a determination of all contested issues of fact and law....”); see also Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 7a (2008) (defining “compensation judge”). Although not “constitutionally protected,” compensation judges “do have a certain degree of independence from the agency in which they adjudicate disputes as they are the people who have been charged with the responsibility of ascertaining the substantial rights of the parties in a fair and objective manner.” Kline, 685 N.W.2d at 18 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The WCCA was established by the legislature as “an independent agency in the executive branch.” Minn.Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 1 (2008). The compensation judge's findings and order may be appealed to the WCCA. Minn.Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2008). The WCCA has “final authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under workers' compensation laws of the state in those cases that have been appealed to the [WCCA] and in any case that has...