Seeley v. Price

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Christiancy J.:
• Citation: Seeley v. Price, 14 Mich. 541 (Mich. 1866)
• Decision Date: 31 October 1866
• Parties: Sarah J. Seeley v. James Price

14 Mich. 541

Sarah J. Seeley v. James Price

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 31, 1866

Heard October 10, 1866; October 11, 1866,

Appeal from Cass circuit in chancery.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Decree of the court confirmed, with costs.

Muzzy & Knox, for complainant:

1. Under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this case, the rule of law is plain. The defendant takes the deed clouded with suspicion. He was managing the old man in his own behalf: Redfield on Wills, 131, 132, 158, 159; 25 N. Y 9, 92, 95; 14 Vesey 273; 4 Barb. 398.

2. There was a confidential relation between the parties, and a confidence actually reposed which throws the burden of proof on the defendant, and requires him to show the whole transaction: 3 Cow. 537; 5 Barb. 533; 13 Ill. 242; 6 Vesey 287; 3 Lead. Cas. in Eq., 143-5.

3. It is said to require less mind to make a will than to make a contract, yet we hold that, had this been a will, we have shown a lack of testamentary capacity: Redfield on Wills 128, 130; 25 N. Y., 9; 12 Mich. 459, 490.

The law scrutinizes contracts more closely than wills: 3 Lead. Cas. in Eq., 145.

D Blackman, for defendant:

1. The first allegation is that John Price was unfit to do business, and almost imbecile. It is enough to say that courts do not measure the capacity of parties. They are either compos or non compos mentis: 4 Cow. 207; 24 Barb. 386.

2. The allegation does not amount in law to a charge that John Price was non compos: 12 Mich. 459. And of the same opinion is the solicitor for the complainant, for he charges that the deed was obtained by acting upon the weakness and imbecility of John Price, who was subject to be controlled and influenced.

3. With respect to the last allegation, that defendant staid with John Price, furnished liquor and drank with him, etc. This charge is entirely disproved by the proofs. There are some two or three witnesses who say he was drunk when he signed. The following cases have a bearing on this point: 3 Black 51; 7 Dana 452; 10 Yerg. 121; 24 Taxas 426; 7 Clark Ia., 60; Redfield on Wills, 94, 126; 22 Wend. 526; 24 Barb. 584; 9 Conn. 102

Christiancy, J. Campbell and Cooley, JJ., Martin, Ch. J. concurred.

OPINION

Christiancy J.:

Complainant and defendant were the only children and heirs of John Price, and both resided in the state of Iowa. The defendant was a man of considerable property, and the husband of complainant a farmer in comfortable circumstances. John Price, the father, resided in Penn township, Cass county, Michigan, where he owned a farm worth about six thousand dollars, which constituted substantially all his property. His first wife having been dead for some years, he married a second wife in April, 1860; he being then about seventy-four years old, and his wife some ten or twelve years younger. Both complainant and defendant seem to have been opposed to the marriage.

The old gentleman lived in a poor, not very comfortable house, and in the most economical manner, dressing very poorly, depending mainly upon renting his farm or letting it on shares, keeping little, if any stock. His wife seems to have had more regard for comfort and for dressing and appearing respectably, but, though intrusted by him to make most of the purchases, and to do the trading, which was confined to household necessaries, she does not appear from the evidence to have been by any means extravagant.

He had sometimes found a little fault with the amount of her purchases, but this seems rather to have sprung from a nervous apprehension of coming to want, than to any real cause, and no serious difficulty seems to have arisen between them, on this or any other account; and they appear to have lived as peaceably and to have been as much attached to each other as is usual with people of their age thus connected. He had been out to Iowa soon after the death of his first wife, and remained a year and a half, staying part of the time with his son, and part of the time with complainant and her husband, and had made them two or three visits after that time.

In December, 1862, the defendant, having been written to by his friend, George Townsend, to come and see his father and assist in arranging his business, came accordingly; and on the 30th day of December a deed was executed by the father to the defendant, conveying to him the farm. This deed purports to have been made for the consideration of one thousand dollars, but it is not pretended that any such pecuniary consideration was actually paid. The bill is filed to set aside this deed, on the ground of the incapacity of the grantor, and fraud and undue influence of the grantee, in obtaining it.

The bill alleges that the grantor had been for some time in the habit of drinking spirituous liquors to an injurious extent; that he was for several months, prior to the execution of the deed, afflicted with dropsy, "nearly imbecile," subject to be controlled and influenced by any person who could obtain his confidence, and incapable of doing business; that defendant furnished him with spirituous liquors, drank with him, and prevailed on him to deed and convey the land; that he paid nothing for it, and procured the deed by fraud, and prays that it may be set' aside.

An objection is made, that the bill does not state a sufficient ground for the relief asked. The defendant having taken issue on the facts and gone to a hearing upon the evidence, we are not disposed to look upon this objection with the same critical nicety, as if taken by demurrer. In cases of this kind, where the validity of a deed is brought in question, on the ground of mental weakness, combined with fraud and undue influence, it is very difficult to set forth specially, or to describe all the particular facts, and the various means used for obtaining the deed, even when all the facts and means are known. A somewhat general form of pleading must be allowed; and the objection being made in this stage of the case, we are disposed to look upon the general allegations of the bill as sufficient to admit any evidence tending to show any degree of mental weakness or incapacity, and that the deed was procured by means of undue influence and fraud.

Upon the question of capacity there is, as usual in such cases, much conflict in the testimony, and considerable discrepancy as to the circumstances which led to and accompanied the execution of the deed. And without attempting here to set forth a full review of the evidence, we shall, as a general rule, state only the facts which we think fairly established by the evidence, so far as essential to the decision of the cause.

The evidence fails to establish insanity, idiocy, or that degree of mental imbecility which would, of itself, render the grantor entirely incapable at the time of executing a valid deed. He had been, till a few years before, a man of strong mind; but he had been failing for a few years, and for some months had failed rapidly, both in body and mind. He was afflicted with dropsy and a disease of the lungs (of which he died a few weeks after). His feet were sometimes much swollen; he was subject to spells of violent coughing and choking; barely able at the time of this transaction, a part of the time, to walk or totter about; not confined to his bed, but compelled most of the time, and especially on the day of the execution of the deed, to recline upon a lounge.

His senses were blunted; he was hard of hearing; his mind enfeebled by age and disease to an extent proportioned at least to his physical decay. He was absent-minded, somewhat listless and inattentive; his memory uncertain, fitful and capricious--in one word (to use the language of most of the witnesses) he had become "childish." He had not generally been an intemperate man in the use of intoxicating liquor, but for a little time previous to this had resorted somewhat to its use, probably to relieve his sufferings and to keep up his failing strength; and on some recent occasions had taken too much. On the day when this deed was executed there is very strong reason for believing he was under its influence, to an extent which rendered his mind somewhat less clear, and his judgment less reliable than it otherwise would have been. But we are not satisfied that he had been furnished with the liquor or induced to drink by the defendant, or through his procurement.

Though we think he was capable at the time of understanding the nature of a business transaction, like that in question here, when properly explained to him, and the necessary effort made to impress it upon his mind, yet he was liable to fail in a fair appreciation of all its bearings, and to overlook many considerations which would properly influence men of a sounder judgment. He was, therefore, in our opinion peculiarly liable to be imposed upon by those in whom he confided. This condition imposed upon all those who should deal with him the clear moral duty--if not to call to his attention all the considerations and details which would naturally operate upon the mind of a prudent man in deciding upon the propriety of the transaction--at least of avoiding any effort to prevent such considerations from occurring to, or having their due weight upon his mind.

But whatever may be the nature or extent of this duty on the part of others, we think it a clear legal duty resting upon one standing in a confidential relation to a person in this condition, and taking a benefit under a deed prepared by himself, and executed in reliance upon his fidelity. And the duty of courts is equally clear to refuse judicial sanction to such an instrument, until fully satisfied of the fairness of the transaction, and that the instrument is the intelligent act of the person executing it: ...