Seelye v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 08 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-35847,91-35847 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Scott Richard SEELYE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stan STEPHENS, Governor; Chisholm Kurt; Jack MCcormick, Warden, Montana State Prison, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before FERGUSON, O'SCANNLAIN and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
Seelye, an inmate at Montana State Prison, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials violated his rights by opening certain items of his incoming mail outside his presence. The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge that the complaint be dismissed because none of the articles of mail about which Seelye complained was "privileged" according to the prison's Inmate Correspondence Policy, and thus did not need to be opened with Seelye at hand. Seelye argues, however, that since he is a Minnesota state prisoner who was transferred to the Montana State Prison under the Interstate Corrections Compact (the "Compact") he is entitled to all the protections afforded by Minnesota law. He claims that under applicable Minnesota law, prison officials may only open mail of the type in question in the presence of the prisoner to whom it is addressed.
Seelye brought this timely appeal to contest the district court's dismissal of his complaint on the grounds that he had failed to state a cognizable section 1983 claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a ruling of law that we review de novo. Oscar v. University Students Co-operative Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc). In general, a complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Buckey v. Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.1992).
Seelye relies upon Article IV(e) of the Compact, which states:
All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state [i.e., Montana] as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of the sending state [i.e., Minnesota].
MCA 46-19-401, Article IV(e). We express no view as to whether Seelye is entitled by this provision to require Montana prison officials to abide by Minnesota law in handling his mail. Compare Pryor v. Brennan, 914 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir.1990) (), with Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1991) (). Similarly, we express no view as to whether a violation of rights made applicable by the terms of the Compact would, if found, be sufficient to support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compare Cameron v. Mills, 645 F.Supp. 1119, 1125 (S.D.Iowa 1986) (), with Stewart, 924 F.2d at 140-42 (). We hold only that, having adopted the magistrate's recommendation of dismissal without considering these issues, and having suggested no other grounds for dismissal, the district court was necessarily prevented from finding "beyond doubt" that Seelye could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." The claim was therefore dismissed improperly. 1
On remand the district court may need to address the following questions, which bear on whether Seelye has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) Does the Compact, together with whatever contractual arrangements exist between Minnesota and Montana, give Seelye a protected liberty interest in having the "privileged" status of his correspondence determined under Minnesota law? 2 (2) Under the analysis of Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981), has the Compact between these two states been "transformed" into "federal" law? (3) Apart from the terms of the Compact, did the prison's handling of Seelye's mail violate his First Amendment rights to free expression, or his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as he alleges? See Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.1989).
Seelye has advised the court that all his personal property, including the documentation relevant to this action, was destroyed during a disturbance at the prison. He requests that a complete copy of the court file in this case be provided him. In view of our disposition of this appeal, we grant the request.
The order of dismissal is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this disposition. The clerk is instructed to provide Seelye with a copy of the court file.
I.
I concur that the order of dismissal must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. I write separately in order to permit the district court to focus more specifically on important issues raised in the case.
Section 1983 protects against violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). Apart from Seelye's § 1983 claims predicated on the First and Fourteenth Amendments themselves, his petition also fairly presents two § 1983 claims involving Montana's alleged violation of the ICC. 1 First, Seelye argues that the ICC itself has been transformed into a federal statute under Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981). Thus, Montana's breach of the ICC--i.e., its failure to grant Seelye the rights he would have enjoyed in Minnesota to have official mail opened in his presence--presents a violation of federal statutory law actionable under § 1983.
Second, Seelye argues that the ICC, coupled with the Minnesota statute, provides Seelye with a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Liberty interests may arise either from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law that places substantive limits on official discretion. See Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir.1992). Seelye argues that the ICC falls into the latter category and that Montana, in denying him the protections of Minnesota law, has violated § 1983 by intentionally depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
In its discussion of those two ICC-related claims, the memorandum disposition places unwarranted reliance on Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir.1991). First, Stewart's legal analysis on the issue of whether the ICC has been transformed into federal law under Cuyler is shallow and unpersuasive. Furthermore, Stewart is readily distinguishable from this case and thus is of scant assistance in resolving the two issues: (i) does the ICC require Montana prison officials to abide by Minnesota law in handling Seelye's mail? (ii) if the ICC so obligates Montana, and if Minnesota law protects Seelye, do these state laws provide Seelye with a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause? I believe that Stewart is largely irrelevant in in arriving at the answer to these two questions.
II.
Seelye argues that the ICC is a federal law, violation of which gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983. The memorandum disposition sets forth no view as to whether or not the ICC has been transformed into federal law, and refers the district court to Stewart, which holds that the ICC has not been so transformed. Because the court in Stewart does not apply the analysis set forth in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1980), 2 the district court need not consider that case persuasive. Rather, it should conduct its own analysis pursuant to the reasoning in Cuyler.
The Court in Cuyler set forth the standards by which we determine whether or not an agreement between states has been transformed into federal law. If an interstate agreement is subject to the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, congressional consent to that agreement transforms it into federal law. Id. at 438. The Court noted that only those agreements which tend to increase the political power of the states or encroach on federal matters are subject to the Compact Clause. Id. If Congress has determined that an interstate agreement is a matter for federal concern, then it may consent either "by authorizing joint state action in advance or by giving express or implied approval to an agreement the States have already joined." Id.
In Cuyler, the Court found that Congress had consented in advance to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, an interstate compact among the states and the District of Columbia which establishes procedures for transferring prisoners and ensuring them their speedy trial rights in receiving states. Id. at 435 n. 2. The Court determined that Congress' advance consent was manifest in its enactment of the Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) ("Consent Act"),...
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