Segal v. City of Miami

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WARREN; TERRELL
• Citation: Segal v. City of Miami, 63 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1953)
• Decision Date: 06 February 1953
• Parties: SEGAL v. CITY OF MIAMI.

Page 496

63 So.2d 496

SEGAL v. CITY OF MIAMI.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

Feb. 6, 1953.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1953.

Helliwell, Clark & Guilmartin, Miami, for appellant.

John E. Cicero and Olavi M. Hendrick son, Miami, for appellee.

WARREN, Associate Justice.

The appellant is the owner of nine contiguous lots lying along and on the east side of Northwest 27th Avenue in the city of Miami, and of four contiguous lots lying along and on the west side of Northwest 26th Avenue; all of the lots are in the same block and the rear of the four lots adjoins the rear of a portion of the nine lots. Appellant operates, mainly on the 27th Avenue lots, and has since 1945, a zoological and botanical garden which includes the keeping of animals, birds and fish upon said premises. The 27th Avenue lots are in a B-3 or liberal business zone which permits appellant's operations, while the four 26th Avenue lots are in a R-1 or single-family residence zone. If the zoning ordinance were enforced appellant's business would be prohibited on these latter four lots and he, therefore, filed his bill for injunction and other relief.

At the time of taking testimony it was stipulated that the issues would be limited to (1) whether or not the zoning of the four lots as R-1 was unreasonable by virtue of changed conditions since the original zoning of the property; (2) whether or not an alleged non-conforming use of two of the four lots existed prior to August 8, 1934 (the effective date of the R-1 zoning of these lots) such as to cause them to be exempt from the restrictions of the R-1 classification; and (3) whether or not the city was estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinance as to the other two of the four lots by virtue of the issuance of certain building permits on said lots, however, this last question was not urged by appellant before the court. It was also stipulated that prior to suit appellant had applied for administrative relief to the city planning board and to the city commission but such relief had been denied.

The lower court found the equities of the cause with the defendant city, stating in its final decree that 'The plaintiff seeks to have this Court force the City to liberalize the zoning on the 26th Avenue lots because of the effect upon them of the liberalized B-3 classification given to his adjoining lots which face on 27th Avenue. This Court cannot substitute its judgment for administrative zoning policy for the area, nor has there been any showing made here to support a decision that it is not proper zoning practice to have property zoned R-1 adjacent to property zoned B-3 without some buffer zoning between. The plaintiff's application does not appear to be made on any such general basis, but with reference to the actual conditions caused by his own operations on his lots which are zoned B-3. Plaintiff is seeking to obtain relief for a portion of his property from a condition which he himself has created and is maintaining on the balance of his property. Moreover, it was argued, not without some convincing force, in view of the history and duration of plaintiff's operations on his R-1 lots in violation of zoning limitations, that any order by this Court directing an administrative revision of the zoning of the R-1 lots would furnish an opportunity to plaintiff for further litigation and delay while continuing to use the lots in...