Segars v. Fulton County, Ga., Civ. A. No. C85-4426A.

Citation644 F. Supp. 682
Decision Date09 September 1986
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. C85-4426A.
PartiesJohn E. SEGARS, Jr., and Gilla W. Byers, Plaintiffs, v. FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia

Jeffrey O. Bramlett, George W. Fryhofer, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs.

Lewis C. Horne, Jr., Franklin Biggins, Dorothy W. Famb, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER

ROBERT H. HALL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging certain Fulton County personnel regulations as applied to plaintiff Segars' candidacy for and service as mayor of Ball Ground, Georgia. Plaintiffs contend these regulations, as applied, unreasonably abridge their constitutionally protected rights of political speech and association in violation of the First and Fourteenth amendments. Currently before this court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

FACTS

On November 12, 1985, plaintiffs brought this action and moved for a temporary restraining order prohibiting defendant Fulton County from compelling plaintiff: (1) to take leave without pay from his employment with Fulton County in order to file as a candidate or to conduct his campaign; and (2) to forfeit his employment with Fulton County in order to serve as mayor of Ball Ground. The court granted the temporary restraining order on November 18, 1985, under which plaintiff Segars successfully ran for mayor of Ball Ground. Plaintiff Segars was sworn into office on January 11, 1986. He has served in that capacity while remaining in the employ of Fulton County.

On December 11, 1985, plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings following the expiration of the court's earlier order. The court denied plaintiffs' motion on January 9, 1986. The parties indicated a willingness for the case to receive speedy adjudication by filing a Joint Stipulation of Facts as to which there is no dispute on April 15, 1986. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April 28, 1986. In addition to the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties filed the affidavits of plaintiff Segars, plaintiff Byers and Solicitor General Webb for this court's consideration.1 The court, therefore, incorporates the stipulated facts as follows, and will disclose as necessary any other undisputed facts on which the court relies.

Plaintiff John E. Segars, Jr. is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Ball Ground, Cherokee County, Georgia.

Since March 1967, Mr. Segars has been continuously employed as a law enforcement officer in the classified service of Fulton County. Mr. Segars currently holds the position of chief investigator for the Solicitor General of the State Court of Fulton County. As chief investigator, Mr. Segars has supervisory responsibility for six investigators and, in turn, is directly supervised by the State Court Solicitor General and such Assistant Solicitor Generals as the Solicitor may designate.

Gilla W. Byers is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Ball Ground, Cherokee County, Georgia. Ms. Byers is registered to vote in Ball Ground municipal elections. Ms. Byers advocated Mr. Segars' candidacy in the December 7, 1985 mayor's race and voted for him.

Ball Ground is a town of approximately 700 residents located in the northeast quadrant of Cherokee County approximately 50 miles from the Fulton County Court-house in Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia. Ball Ground lies within the Atlanta Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the 1980 Report of the United States Bureau of the Census.

The Ball Ground Town Charter, as modified by ordinance and practice, governs the operation of Ball Ground municipal government.

In Ball Ground municipal elections, including those held on December 7, 1985, neither ballots nor campaign literature formally identify candidates as belonging to or supported by any political party or organization. Candidates in these elections are not formally nominated by any party caucus or primary election. Under Section 14 of the Ball Ground Town Charter, any qualified citizen can stand for election to municipal office in Ball Ground by submitting a written request to the town clerk.

Mr. Segars stood as a candidate and won election as mayor of Ball Ground in the December 7, 1985 municipal election. Mr. Segars was sworn in as mayor of Ball Ground on January 11, 1986 and has since that time continuously performed his duties as mayor.

The duties of the mayor are defined in Section 5 of the Ball Ground Town Charter. These duties have been customarily performed by previous mayors on a less than forty hour a week basis. As part of his platform for election as mayor of Ball Ground, Mr. Segars pledged to improve city services. Since taking office on January 11, Mr. Segars has devoted approximately five hours per week to his mayoral duties.

Section 20 of the Ball Ground Town Charter provides authority, exercisable at the joint discretion of the mayor and city council, to pay the mayor a salary of up to $100.00 per year. Notwithstanding this express authority, Ball Ground has traditionally not paid its mayor a salary. Mr. Segars is not receiving a salary for his service as mayor.

Mayors of Ball Ground have traditionally received free city water service as a form of compensation for their duties. Mr. Segars, whose monthly city water bill averages approximately $7.50, has discontinued this tradition. He has declined free city water service and still pays his city water bill.

On Saturday, January 18, 1986 and Sunday, January 19, 1986, Mr. Segars attended a workshop for newly elected officials sponsored by the University of Georgia and the Georgia Municipal Association. Ball Ground reimbursed Mr. Segars for the $75.00 registration fee he paid to attend this workshop.

The City of Ball Ground customarily reimburses its elected officials, including the mayor, for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of their official duties. Requests for reimbursement must be submitted to and approved by the Ball Ground City Council. To date, the only reimbursement Mr. Segars has asked for or received has been the $75.00 registration fee relating to his attendance at the January 18-19, 1986 workshop for newly-elected officials.

In the course of his employment as chief investigator, Mr. Segars has investigated or supervised investigations of matters outside of Fulton County, Georgia. However, during his tenure with the office of the State Court Solicitor General, Mr. Segars has not yet been called upon to investigate any matter involving the town of Ball Ground or Cherokee County.

Since he took office on January 11, 1986, Mr. Segars has received one written complaint from Solicitor Webb and no verbal complaints from Solicitor Webb regarding his performance as Fulton County employee.

Fulton County has promulgated certain regulations limiting political activities by employees in the classified service of Fulton County. These Regulations, as amended and promulgated by the Board of Commissioners of Fulton County on January 30, 1985, provide in pertinent part:

PR-1600-1 — Political Activity
No employee shall use or seek to use, directly or indirectly, his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of a political election, nomination or referendum, provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be interpreted or construed so as to abrogate or abridge the right of any such employee to express his political opinions, vote, seek elective office or otherwise participate in political undertakings in accordance with applicable law and Personnel Regulations, provided, however, that any non-elected employee (Classified or Unclassified) who runs for any public office shall be placed on LWOP under the provisions of PR-1200-11 —Leave Without Pay (LWOP).
PR-1200-11 — Leave Without Pay (LWOP)
(1) Upon approval by an Appointing Authority, an employee may be granted leave without pay (LWOP) for cogent reasons, not to exceed six (6) consecutive months, provided, however, that the Personnel Board may approve a one-time extension of up to an additional six (6) months, for a total absence of one (1) consecutive year, which shall constitute the maximum allowable amount of such leave. Examples of cogent reasons are illness, convalescence, emergencies, personal reasons, educational pursuits, or to run for public office, provided, however, that any non-elected employee (Classified or Unclassified) who runs for any public office shall be placed on LWOP, and provided further that if such employee is elected, he/she shall be separated from Fulton County employment effective as of the date of being sworn into such office.
* * * * * *
(3) Leave without pay (LWOP), except to run for public office, shall not be granted until after all of the employee's accumulated vacation leave has been exhausted; and if the leave without pay is due to health reasons, until all of the employee's accumulated sick leave has been exhausted. LWOP is mandatory to run for public office.

On October 4, 1985, Mr. Segars requested an interpretation from the Personnel Director for Fulton County of the Regulations as applied to his plans to run for mayor of Ball Ground. Specifically, Mr. Segars requested administrative relief from the requirement that he take leave without pay during the part-time, two-week campaign and relief from the requirement that he forfeit his position with the classified service if elected.

On October 14, 1985, the Assistant County Attorney, responding on behalf of Fulton County, denied the requested administrative relief and affirmed that the Regulations, as applied to Mr. Segars, would compel him to take leave without pay in order to run and to forfeit his job with the County in order to serve as mayor of Ball Ground.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff John E. Segars, the Chief...

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4 cases
  • Loftus v. Bobzien
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • February 8, 2017
    ...to 848 F.3d 288support her position, both of which are factually inapposite and of no precedential value. See Segars v. Fulton Cty. , 644 F.Supp. 682 (N.D. Ga. 1986) ; Hickman v. City of Dallas , 475 F.Supp. 137 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Neither case involves an attorney representing one municipali......
  • MacKenzie v. Snow, Civ. A. No. C87-1315A.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia
    • November 19, 1987
    ...(2) that the "means" are reasonably necessary in order to justify impairing plaintiff's First Amendment rights. Segars v. Fulton County, 644 F.Supp. 682, 685 (N.D.Ga.1986) (Hall Defendants identify the goals of the statute and rules as (1) to protect the integrity of the public employment s......
  • Segars v. Fulton County, Ga., Civ. A. No. C85-4426A.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia
    • December 10, 1986
  • Loftus v. Bobzien, 15-2164
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • February 8, 2017
    ...court cases to support her position, both of which are factually inapposite and of no precedential value. See Segars v. Fulton Cty., 644 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Hickman v. City of Dallas, 475 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Neither case involves an attorney representing one municipalit......

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