Seidel v. Merkle

• Decision Date: 20 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-15786,97-15786
• Citation: 146 F.3d 750
• Parties: 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5648, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7858 Clyde Edwin SEIDEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. W.A. MERKLE, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 750

146 F.3d 750

98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5648, 98 Daily Journal

D.A.R. 7858

Clyde Edwin SEIDEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. W.A. MERKLE, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 97-15786.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 9, 1998.

Decided July 20, 1998.

Rene A. Chacon, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellant.

Arthur Pirelli, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-01621-SI-FSL.

Before: D.W. NELSON, REINHARDT, and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Clyde Edwin Seidel, a California state prisoner, is serving a sentence of sixteen years to life for his second-degree murder conviction. Seidel petitioned the District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On reviewing the record from the state court proceedings in connection with the petition, the district court found that Seidel had stated a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and issued an Order to Show Cause why a writ should not issue. The district court then sua sponte ordered an evidentiary hearing on Seidel's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, referring the matter to a federal magistrate judge. The district court later adopted the magistrate judge's finding of constitutionally deficient representation and granted Seidel's federal habeas petition.

The State of California now appeals, arguing (1) that the district court erred in holding an evidentiary hearing without first requiring Seidel to demonstrate cause and prejudice; and (2) that even if the evidentiary hearing was properly held, the district court erred in concluding that Seidel received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm the district court's order granting Seidel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding the underlying second-degree murder conviction are not in dispute. On June 1, 1990, early in the evening, Seidel went to visit his girlfriend, Angela Davis, at the trailer park where she lived. Approximately thirty minutes after Seidel arrived, Davis's neighbor, Dorina Canfield, appeared at Davis's trailer and explained that she and her husband, Jade Bucholz, had just had an argument. Canfield believed that she was in danger of harm from Bucholz, so Davis and Seidel encouraged her to stay with them in Davis's trailer for the evening.

Later that evening, Seidel decided to drive to the grocery store in his pick-up truck, accompanied by Canfield and by Davis's two daughters. As Seidel started his truck, Bucholz approached the truck's window on the passenger side, where Canfield was sitting, and husband and wife began screaming and fighting.

Seeing that Bucholz was "jerking" at the passenger door, Seidel got out of his truck and approached Bucholz. Bucholz kicked Seidel, who was holding a knife in his hand, and took a few swings in his direction. Seidel then attacked Bucholz, and the two fell to the ground in a struggle. During the fight, Bucholz received a mortal wound in the chest. Seidel fled the scene in his truck, and was apprehended by local law enforcement later that night. He was arrested and eventually charged with one count of murder in violation of California Penal Code § 187.

The day after the murder, Seidel gave a statement to the police explaining that he had removed his knife from its sheath only after Bucholz punched him in the head. Seidel reported that he was "scared for his life," and "never meant to hurt him ... never meant to cut him at all." In Seidel's words, Bucholz "fell on the knife" during their struggle.

At trial in Humboldt County Superior Court, Seidel did not take the stand. His counsel relied solely on a theory of self-defense. On November 22, 1991, a jury convicted Seidel of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of sixteen years to life in prison.

Seidel's trial counsel petitioned the court for a new trial or, in the alternative, a modification of his conviction to a lesser crime. The trial court denied both motions. Seidel then requested and was assigned new counsel based on his claim of ineffective representation at trial. On the advice of new counsel, Seidel filed a writ of habeas corpus in state court, alleging that he had been deprived of a meritorious defense due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The state habeas petition referenced the fact that the record contained evidence that Seidel suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD").

The state trial court subsequently granted Seidel's motion for the appointment of an expert psychologist to examine him. After a three-hour clinical interview during which multiple tests were administered, Dr. Paul Koller concluded that Seidel "manifests several clear symptoms" of PTSD. Dr. Koller also found that Seidel shows "some residual brain damage and long-term memory impairment."

After reviewing Dr. Koller's report, the state trial court nevertheless denied Seidel's habeas petition. On April 19, 1993, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Seidel's conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied Seidel's petition for review a few months later.

On March 10, 1994, Seidel filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court for the Northern District of California. In an order dated February 2, 1995, Judge Eugene F. Lynch found that Seidel had stated a cognizable ineffective assistance claim and issued an Order to Show Cause why a writ should not issue. On October 11, 1995, Judge Lynch sua sponte ordered an evidentiary hearing on Seidel's allegations of ineffective assistance of state trial counsel. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that under the Supreme Court's decision in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), Seidel was required to demonstrate both cause for his failure to develop the facts in state court and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. Judge Lynch denied the State's motion for reconsideration.

On November 15, 1996, United States Magistrate Judge F. Steele Langford conducted an evidentiary hearing at which four witnesses testified, including Seidel's trial counsel and Seidel himself. Magistrate Judge Langford concluded that trial counsel had "conducted no investigation whatsoever of Petitioner's mental state and PTSD .... despite the fact he was put on notice." Judge Langford further found that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the standards established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as "[t]here is no evidence that trial counsel's failure to present a potentially meritorious defense was strategy, rather than neglect."

On February 11, 1997, United States District Court Judge Susan Illston issued an order adopting Magistrate Judge Langford's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On March 26, 1997, Judge Illston granted Seidel's habeas petition on the basis of trial counsel's ineffective assistance. Judge Illston concluded, "Counsel's failure to pursue any investigation into Seidel's psychiatric background and subsequent failure to present any evidence to the jury regarding his mental health in support of a finding of manslaughter denied petitioner effective assistance of counsel." The State filed a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's decision to grant a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo. Dyer v. Calderon, 122 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir.1997). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law and also receives de novo review. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir.1994). Of course, a federal district court's factual findings and its adoption of the findings of a federal magistrate judge are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1452.

ANALYSIS

I. Evidentiary Hearing

The State maintains that the district court erred in granting Seidel an evidentiary hearing without first requiring him to demonstrate cause for his failure to develop the facts in state court and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). For the reasons stated below, we reject the State's argument.

In our view, it is well-established that a federal district judge has "the power, constrained only by his sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the [habeas] applicant's constitutional claim." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Having considered the history, development, and purpose of the writ, the Townsend Court determined that the Supreme Court "has consistently upheld the power of the federal courts on habeas corpus to take evidence relevant to claims of such detention." Id. at 311, 83 S.Ct. 745. The Court in Townsend explained:

[A] narrow view of the hearing power would totally subvert Congress' specific aim ... of affording state prisoners a forum in the federal trial courts for the determination of claims of detention in violation of the Constitution. The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary. Therefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court to which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew.

Id. at 312, 83 S.Ct. 745.

After describing the district court's "plenary" power to hear evidence relevant to a habeas claim, the Townsend Court turned "to the considerations which in certain cases may make exercise of...