Seidemann v. Prof'l Staff Cong. Local 2334

• Decision Date: 03 January 2020
• Docket Number: 18 Civ. 9778 (KPF)
• Citation: 432 F.Supp.3d 367
• Parties: David SEIDEMANN and Bruce Martin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS LOCAL 2334; Faculty Association of Suffolk County Community College; United University Professions, Farmingdale State College Chapter; National Education Association of the United States ; American Federation of Teachers; American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; American Association of University Professors Collective Bargaining Congress; and New York State United Teachers, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

432 F.Supp.3d 367

David SEIDEMANN and Bruce Martin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS LOCAL 2334; Faculty Association of Suffolk County Community College; United University Professions, Farmingdale State College Chapter; National Education Association of the United States ; American Federation of Teachers; American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; American Association of University Professors Collective Bargaining Congress; and New York State United Teachers, Defendants.

18 Civ. 9778 (KPF)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed January 3, 2020

Filed January 10, 2020

Gregory N. Longworth, Clark Hill PLC, Grand Rapids, MI, Jonathan Daniel Klein, Clark Hill PLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Hanan B. Kolko, Cohen Weiss and Simon LLP, Alan Mark Klinger, Charles Gerard Moerdler, Arthur Justin Herskowitz, Dina Kolker, Stroock & Stroock & LaVan LLP, Michael James Del Piano, New York State United Teachers Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, Irwin Bluestein Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., Melville, NY, Edward J Greene, Jr, Robert T. Reilly, Latham, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:

Plaintiffs David Seidemann and Bruce Martin bring this putative class action against Defendants Professional Staff Congress Local 2334 ("PSC"), American Federation of Teachers ("AFT"), American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), American Association of University Professors Collective Bargaining Congress ("AAUPCBC"), New York State United Teachers ("NYSUT"), National Education Association of the United States ("NEA"), Faculty Association of Suffolk County Community College ("FASCCC"), and United University Professions, Farmingdale State College Chapter ("UUP"). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), Plaintiffs were required to pay agency shop fees to the unions that represented their respective places of employment, in compliance with New York Civil Service Law § 208 and as authorized by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Plaintiffs now allege that they are entitled to the return of all agency shop fees previously paid, raising constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment stating that both compulsory agency shop fees and New York State laws that authorize them are unconstitutional, as well as an injunction against the collection of those fees. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' suit in its entirety under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth in the remainder of this Opinion, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND¹

A. Legal Background

Before stating the facts of this case, it is necessary to understand the legal backdrop to Plaintiffs' claims. In 1977, the Supreme Court addressed whether unions could compel non-members that they nevertheless represented to pay service fees pursuant to an "agency shop" clause; such fees are known colloquially as agency shop fees. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. , 431 U.S. 209, 212, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that such fees were constitutional insofar as they were spent in advancement of the union's duties as collective-bargaining representative, but that they could not be spent on political or ideological causes over the objection of the represented employee. See id. at 235-36, 97 S.Ct. 1782. This remained the law of the land for decades, albeit with sporadic warnings in dicta about its potential infirmity, see, e.g. , Harris v. Quinn , 573 U.S. 616, 635-38, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 189 L.Ed.2d 620 (2014), and states such as New York enacted statutes in reliance on Abood 's holding, see N.Y. Civ. Serv. L. § 208(3) (McKinney 2019). In June 27, 2018, however, the Court expressly overruled Abood and declared all agency shop fees in the public employment setting to be violative of the First Amendment. See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459-60, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018).

B. Factual Background

At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were college professors at public educational institutions in New York. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2). David Seidemann was a professor at the City University of New York ("CUNY") (id. at ¶ 1), while Bruce Martin was a professor at both Suffolk County Community College ("SCCC") and Farmingdale State College ("FSC") (id. at ¶ 2). Both plaintiffs thus qualified as "public employees" for purposes of N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 208. As a faculty member at CUNY, Seidemann was represented by Defendant PSC and thus was required to pay agency shop fees to PSC, portions of which were then forwarded to Defendants AFT, AFL-CIO, AAUPCBC, and NYSUT. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3). Of note, however, Seidemann was never a member of PSC and never affirmatively consented to pay agency shop fees. (Id. at ¶ 1).

Martin, for his part, was represented by Defendant FASCCC in his capacity as a professor at SCCC and by Defendant UUP in his capacity as a professor at FSC, and thus was required to pay agency shop fees to both organizations. (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 2, 4-5). Portions of these agency shop fees were then forwarded to Defendants AFT, AFL-CIO, NEA, and NYSUT. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). Like Seidemann, Martin was never a member of either FASCCC or UPP, and never affirmatively consented to pay agency shop fees. (Id. at ¶ 2). All agency shop fees were paid via a direct deduction from Plaintiffs' paychecks, as authorized by N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 208(3). (Id. at ¶ 13). Neither Seidemann nor Martin alleges that he has been required to pay agency shop fees since the Supreme Court's decision in Janus .

C. Procedural Background

Seidemann filed his initial complaint in this action on October 24, 2018, several months after Janus was issued; initially, he named AAUPCBC, AFL-CIO, AFT, NYSUT, and PSC as Defendants. (Dkt. #1). On January 11, 2019, Defendants asked the Court for leave to file a motion to dismiss (Dkt. #46), to which Seidemann responded on January 16, 2019 (Dkt. #47). The parties appeared before the Court for a pre-motion conference on January 31, 2019, during which time the Court set a briefing schedule for the proposed motion to dismiss. (Minute Entry of January 31, 2019). The Court then adjourned that schedule after granting Seidemann's request of March 20, 2019, to file an amended class action complaint. (Dkt. #60, 62).

Seidemann filed an Amended Complaint, joined by Martin, on April 12, 2019, in which the pair added FASCCC, NEA, and UUP as Defendants. (Dkt. #65). Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, along with an accompanying memorandum and numerous declarations, on May 24, 2019. (Dkt. #82). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition, along with a declaration, on June 21, 2019. (Dkt. #93). Defendants filed their reply brief on July 12, 2019. (Dkt. #94).

DISCUSSION²

A. Applicable Law

1. Motions to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' request for an injunction and a declaratory judgment as non-justiciable for reasons of mootness. (See Def. Br. 1). The Court analyzes these claims for equitable relief under the rubric of Rule 12(b)(1). See Platinum-Montaur Life Scis. LLC v. Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. , No. 17 Civ. 9591 (VEC), 2018 WL 5650006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2018) (citing All. For Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co. , 436 F.3d 82, 89 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) ) ("As the Second Circuit has explained ... standing challenges are jurisdictional questions that are properly resolved under Rule 12(b)(1)."), vacated and remanded on other grounds , 943 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 2019).

Rule 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Lyons v. Litton Loan Servicing LP , 158 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) ).

The Second Circuit has drawn a distinction between two types of Rule 12(b)(1) motions: (i) facial motions and (ii) fact-based motions. See Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2016) ; see also Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C. , 872 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2017). A facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion is one "based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it." Carter , 822 F.3d at 56. A plaintiff opposing such a motion bears "no evidentiary burden." Id. Instead, to resolve a facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a district court must "determine whether [the complaint and its exhibits] allege[ ] facts that" establish subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL , 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). And to make that determination, a court must accept the complaint's allegations as true "and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

"Alternatively, a defendant is permitted to make a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion, proffering evidence beyond the complaint and its exhibits." Carter , 822 F.3d at 57. "In opposition to such a motion, [plaintiffs] must come forward with evidence of their own to controvert that presented by the defendant, or may instead rely on the allegations in the[ir p]leading if the evidence proffered by the defendant is immaterial because it does not contradict plausible allegations that are themselves sufficient to show standing." Katz...