Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: SPENCE; GIBSON; McCOMB
• Citation: 51 Cal.2d 640,335 P.2d 672
• Parties: SELECT BASE MATERIALS, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the State of California, Respondent. L.A. 24742.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1959

Page 672

335 P.2d 672 51 Cal.2d 640 SELECT BASE MATERIALS, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the State of California, Respondent. L.A. 24742. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Feb. 20, 1959.
Rehearing Denied March 18, 1959.

Page 674

[51 Cal.2d 642] William J. Clark, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Charles C. Stratton, Sterling S. Clayton, Trippet, Yoakum, Stearns & Ballantyne, Oscar A. Trippet and David Freeman, Los Angeles, amici curiae on behalf of appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., James E. Sabine, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Kaufmann, Jay L. Shavelson and James C. Maupin, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

SPENCE, Justice.

Plaintiff sought to recover certain sales taxes paid under protest. The disputed taxes were based upon transportation charges made by plaintiff for materials delivered to its customers during the period from May 1, 1951, through September 30, 1953. Plaintiff claimed that by virtue of its method of doing business, the transportation costs were [51 Cal.2d 643] incurred after the sale and therefore should have been excluded from the computation of its gross receipts. The court ruled otherwise and accordingly entered judgment denying plaintiff any relief. We have concluded that such judgment must be affirmed.

During the period involved plaintiff was in the business of mining and selling decomposed granite from its lands. It did not stockpile any material but upon receiving an order, it mined the granite and placed it directly on trucks to be hauled to the place designated by the buyer. Plaintiff did not own any trucks but contracted with independent truckers. The hauling charges, which plaintiff paid, were those fixed by the Public Utilities Commission according to the delivery zone.

Practically all orders received by plaintiff were made by telephone. When a new customer called, he would ask the price and then after he gave the address for delivery of the materials, he would be quoted the 'price of the granite plus the haul.' With an old customer, there would be no discussion as to price but the order would be taken with notation of the place for delivery. No statement was made to any customer concerning who would do the hauling. The trucker's delivery ticket, a form prepared by plaintiff, contained the following notation: 'Our drivers will make every effort to place materials where customer designates, but the shipper assumes no responsibility for damages inside the curb line.'

On its books plaintiff always segregated the charges so as to state separately the price for the material, the sales tax thereon, and the transportation cost. However, the invoices sent to the customers varied: some set forth the transportation cost as a separate item while others lumped the material price and hauling charge together, with the 'tax on material only' shown separately. The transportation cost would be a matter of computation on the latter form. Plaintiff's office manager testified that the customers' sole concern was the cost of the load at the place designated for delivery, not 'the cost of the freight (separate) from the cost of the granite.' Defendant called several of plaintiff's customers as witnesses, all of whom agreed that the 'delivered price' was the basis of their orders of plaintiff's materials.

The court found that all transportation charges made by plaintiff to its customers during the period involved were for transportation

Page 675

of materials prior to sale; that no sale took place until delivery to the customers; and that plaintiff's bills to its customers included a charge for both the materials [51 Cal.2d 644] and transportation. From these findings the court concluded that the transportation charges were part of the sales price of the property sold by plaintiff(Rev. & Tax.Code, § 6011) and were properly includable within plaintiff's gross receipts for sales tax purposes. Rev. & Tax.Code, § 6012. Plaintiff contends that the evidence does not support the findings.

Section 6051 of the Revenue and Taxation Code imposes a tax upon retailers for the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail. The tax is measured by the retailer's gross receipts from sales. Section 6012 defines 'gross receipts' as the total amount for which tangible personal property is sold, including the cost of transportation of property prior to its sale to the purchaser but excluding 'transportation charges separately stated' if the transportation occurs after the sale of the property is made to the purchaser. Section 6011 similary defines 'sales price' as the total amount for which tangible personal property is sold, with like distinction for inclusion and exclusion of the transportation charges as part of the sale. Accordingly, the principal question here is whether the transportation occurred before or after the sale.

Under the Uniform Sales Act (Civ.Code, §§ 1721-1800), a sale is 'an agreement whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.' Civ.Code, § 1721. Defendant maintains that since plaintiff's agreements with its customers cast upon it the obligation to deliver the granite to the points designated by the customers, the intent of the parties as to the time and place where title should pass is...