Selectmen of Town of Milton v. Judge of Dist. Court of East Norfolk

• Citation: 189 N.E. 607,286 Mass. 1
• Parties: SELECTMEN OF TOWN OF MILTON v. JUDGE OF DISTRICT COURT OF EAST NORFOLK (two cases).
• Decision Date: 30 March 1934
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

286 Mass. 1

189 N.E. 607

SELECTMEN OF TOWN OF MILTON

v.JUDGE OF DISTRICT COURT OF EAST NORFOLK (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

March 30, 1934.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court; Norfolk County.

Proceedings on two petitions for certiorari by Selectmen of the Town of Milton against the Judge of the District Court of East Norfolk. Each case is reported by a single justice on the petition and return without decision.

Writ in each case ordered issued, quashing the record of decision of respondent.G. A. McLaughlin and W. H. McLaughlin, both of Boston, for respondent.

J. W. Bartlett, of Boston, and W. F. Coles, of Boston, for petitioners.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

These are petitions for writs of certiorari respectively brought by the selectment of the town of Milton and by the selectmen and the chief of the fire department of that town to quash the proceedings before the respondent and to set aside his decision upon petitions for review of the action of the selectmen and chief of the fire department in lowering the compensation of a police officer and member of the fire department of Milton, respectively. Each case was reported upon the petition and return without decision, there being agreement as to all material facts. Thus it appears that on January 6, 1933, by action of the selectmen of Milton, the compensation of all town employees, including police officers and firemen, was fixed for the year 1933 at an amount equal to 87 1/2 per cent. of the amount prevailing during 1932. Prior to this, due notice of a lowering in compensation had been sent to the employees, and within three days of such notice a police officer and a member of the fire department each requested in writing that a public hearing be held. Hearings were held on December 21, 1932, and on January 3, 1933. The chairman of the board of selectmen presided. He excluded evidence offered by the employees relating to the financial condition of the town although the reasons for the lowering of compensation were stated in the notice to the employees to be the economic condition of the town and its added expenditures. The only evidence in support of the reduction of compensation was the reading of the vote of the selectmen for this lowering of compensation. No charges of misconduct or unfitness for office were presented at these hearings. The sole reason relied on for the lowering of compensationwas that it was part of a general downward revision of salaries due to the depressed financial condition of the town. On January 6, 1933, the employees were formally notified of the salary reduction. Within thirty days after the hearing, petitions for review of these acts of the petitioners were brought before the respondent under the statutes relating to civil service. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 31, §§ 42A, 42B, 43, 45. After hearing, motions to dismiss the petitions were denied, and on April 26, 1933, after review, the respondent reversed the decisions of the selectmen, holding that their action was not justified and was taken without proper cause.

Findings of the respondent were that careful consideration of all the evidence introduced at the public hearings held on December 21, 1932, and January 3, 1933, failed to establish with any degree of conclusiveness that when the petitioners issued their notices of December 15, 1932, they actually believed that it was necessary in order to relieve the town of Milton of necessary financial burdens to lower in compensation the members of the police department or the members of the fire department. If it was the duty of the selectmen at the public hearings to assume the burden of proof with reference to all the reasons set forth in their notices to the members of the police department and the members of the fire department and at the public hearing to establish conclusively that the financial condition of the town of Milton absolutely required a lowering in compensation of members of the police department and of the fire department, then he was forced to find the conclusion that such burden was not sustained. If, on the other hand, all the evidence introduced at the public hearing is to be considered without reference to the burden of proof, then he was obliged to find that there was no necessity with reference to the financial affairs of the town of Milton which would require that such drastic action on the ground of economy be taken by the board of selectmen or by the chief of the fire department. A false or uncalled for economy should not be permitted to affect the morale of such classified public servants as members of the police department or members of the fire department, nor should any action be taken which might unnecessarily effect the efficiency of the department. When in 1900 the town of Milton adopted the provisions of a statute placing the members of the police department under the provisions of the civil service law, it accepted the provisions of that act as an additional assurance to the members of the police department that they should not be lowered in compensation unless such lowering in compensation was justified.

It has not been contended by any party to these proceedings that the selectmen did not have authority to make a general and uniform reduction in the compensation paid to all policemen, all firemen, and all other employees of the town. The controversy relates to the justification for such reduction in the cases at bar and the appropriate procedure respecting such reduction under the civil service law. Definite duties with respect to town expenses are laid upon selectmen. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 41, §§ 59, 60. They have a wide and undefined field in the management of the prudential affairs and in the general superintendence of the business of towns. Since no question as to the power of the selectmen in this particular has been raised by the parties or alluded to by the respondent in his findings, the assumption is made that this power falls within the sphere of general or implied authority of selectmen and was possessed by the petitioners. Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318, 319;Clark v. Russell, 116 Mass. 455, 457;Adams v. Selectmen of Northbridge, 253 Mass. 408, 410, 149 N. E. 152;Meader v. West Newbury, 256 Mass. 37, 40, 152 N. E. 315. Compare Goff v. Rehoboth, 12 Metc. 26;Amerige v. Saugus, 208 Mass. 51, 94 N. E. 297;Ducey v. Brunell, 250 Mass. 114, 116, 145 N. E. 37;McGovern v. Southbridge, 264 Mass. 578, 583, 163 N. E. 175. The cases are treated on this point as they have been argued.

No legislative or executive power can be constitutionally conferred upon the courts. That is strictly...