Self v. Goodrich

• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CURETON
• Citation: Self v. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349, 387 S.E.2d 713 (S.C. App. 1989)
• Decision Date: 14 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 1441,1441
• Parties: Mary Louise SELF, Administratrix of the Estate of Jason Dyshon Self, deceased, Appellant, v. Albert GOODRICH, M.D. and McLeod Regional Medical Center, Respondents. . Heard

Page 713

387 S.E.2d 713

300 S.C. 349

Mary Louise SELF, Administratrix of the Estate of Jason Dyshon Self, deceased, Appellant, v. Albert GOODRICH, M.D. and McLeod Regional Medical Center, Respondents.

No. 1441.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 14, 1989.

Decided Dec. 18, 1989.

D. Kenneth Baker and Larry R. Jackson, Darlington, for appellant.

Saunders M. Bridges and Helen T. McFadden, both of Bridges & Orr, and John S. Wilkerson, III and Flo S. Lester, both of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, Florence, for respondents.

CURETON, Judge:

This is a medical negligence case arising from the death of an infant. The trial court directed a verdict for the respondents at the conclusion of the evidence. The court held the appellant failed to present any evidence of damages. The appellant appeals the order of the court.

Mary Louise Self, the appellant, was the mother of Jason Dyshon Self. The child was born prematurely in January 1984. After he came home from the hospital, Jason developed a breathing problem. His mother testified on February 10 she noticed he was breathing heavy and had a rattle in his chest. She took him to his pediatrician. Self testified the pediatrician said Jason was fine. Three days later she took Jason to another doctor who also found the child to be fine. His condition did not improve and on February 16 she took the child to McLeod Regional Medical Center where he was seen in the emergency room by Dr. Albert Goodrich, an emergency room physician, and Dr. Luke Baxley, a family practice resident on rotation in emergency. After an examination and X-rays of the child, Self was referred back to the pediatrician. The pediatrician again saw the child the following day and prescribed nose drops. Jason died on February 20, 1984. The autopsy report concluded he died of bilateral bronchopneumonia.

Self brought an action for the alleged wrongful death of her son. She was the statutory beneficiary of the action. Her complaint alleged she had been damaged by the death of her child. Specifically, the complaint stated as follows:

[H]is parent has been caused great mental shock and suffering. She has in the past and will forever be caused grief and sorrow because of herr (sic) loss of decedent's love, society and companionship. She has been deprived of decedent's services, experience and judgment as well as his monetary contributions to her.

The answer of Goodrich in response to this allegation admitted that "the death of the patient has caused mental shock and suffering to his parent and that she will be grieved and sorrowed because of her loss, but this Defendant denies the remaining allegations of said paragraph." McLeod Regional Hospital denied the allegation in its answer.

The case was tried before the court and a jury. At the conclusion of all the evidence counsel for both respondents moved for a directed verdict on the ground there had been no evidence of any element of damages including pecuniary loss, mental shock, wounded feelings, loss of companionship, or grief and sorrow. The appellant argued the jury could presume damages under South Carolina law based upon the intimacy of a parent-child relationship. The trial court granted the directed verdict motions. The court also granted a motion by Goodrich to amend his answer to comply with the proof of no showing of damages by the appellant.

PRESUMPTION OF DAMAGES

In a wrongful death case the question of damages is not directed toward the value of the human life that was lost, but rather the damages sustained by the beneficiaries as a result of the death. Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969). The general elements of damages recoverable are: (1) pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss of companionship, and (6) deprivation of the use and comfort of the intestate's society, including the loss of his experience, knowledge, and judgment in managing the affairs of himself and of his beneficiaries. Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972); Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938).

Because Self failed to present evidence of pecuniary damages, the initial inquiry is whether she is entitled to the presumption she sustained damages based solely on her relationship to Jason. The general rule is that a presumption of pecuniary loss exists in favor of those legally entitled to services or support from the deceased. 25A C.J.S. Death Section 118 (1966). The law also appears to extend this presumption of pecuniary loss to parents entitled to the services and earnings of their minor child even though the child was killed before it reached an age where it could actually render services of a pecuniary nature. 22A Am.Jur.2d Death Section 442 (1988).

The law in South Carolina, however, appears to be contrary to the general law. In Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830 (1955), an action for the wrongful death of a twelve year old boy brought for the benefit of the parents, the court stated It will be assumed that he was held in loving esteem by his parents and that they experienced the natural feelings of grief in the loss of a loving son. It cannot, however, be assumed that they suffered any pecuniary loss in his passing. The elements of damage in such a case are mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief and sorrow, loss of companionship and deprivation of the use and comfort of intestate's society as the beneficiaries may have sustained as the result of the death of the intestate.

Id. at 259, 87 S.E.2d at 836. The logic of Mock is continued in Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969). In that case the court stated that because the evidence did not show the deceased, a fifteen year old girl, had any earning capacity it could not be assumed her parents suffered any pecuniary loss from her death. The court stated the only elements of damage which could be considered were "such mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief and sorrow, loss of companionship and deprivation of the use and comfort of intestate's society as the beneficiaries may have sustained as a result of the death of the intestate." Id. at 137, 165 S.E.2d at 645...