Self v. People

Decision Date25 November 1968
Docket NumberNo. 22496,22496
Citation167 Colo. 292,448 P.2d 619
PartiesCharles Rooks SELF, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Kingsley & Wolf, Albert Wolf, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., James W. Creamer, Jr., Aurel Kelly, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

HODGES, Justice.

Plaintiff in error, who will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, was convicted of the misdemeanor of being 'an accessory after the fact to murder.' Trial was to the court, the defendant having waived his right to be tried by a jury. He seeks reversal of this judgment on several grounds which are detailed after the summarization of the facts.

On March 16, 1965, defendant was with his paramour, Mrs. Brown, in Boulder. Defendant was then 18 years old and a freshman at the University of Colorado. Mrs. Brown, a divorcee, was then 29 years old and the mother of a small child. Earlier that evening, defendant and Mrs. Brown had visited several places, where they drank alcoholic beverages. When they arrived at Mrs. Brown's home after midnight, she told defendant that she was going to kill their mutual friend, James Michael Pearson, when she saw him again. It was indicated that Pearson's 'Nazi' beliefs motivated this statement and her subsequent actions against him. Defendant helped Mrs. Brown load her Luger gun, which she put in her coat pocket. Defendant then voluntarily drove her to Pearson's residence in her station wagon. When they arrived at Pearson's apartment, Mrs. Brown, for the first time, threatened defendant just prior to her entry into the building in which Pearson's apartment was located. Shortly thereafter Pearson emerged from the building followed by Mrs. Brown who ordered him into the station wagon at gunpoint. Defendant then drove Mrs. Brown and Pearson into Bluebell Canyon and stopped where ordered to by Mrs. Brown. Mrs. Brown forced Pearson out of the car. They went up the road a few feet and she shot him twice. Meanwhile, defendant remained in the car. The killing having been accomplished, Mrs. Brown got back into the car with the waiting defendant. Mrs. Brown drove the car from the scene of the slaying back to her home, and as she drove, defendant unloaded the murder weapon. He testified that he had no fear of Mrs. Brown after the killing occurred.

Defendant returned with Mrs. Brown to her apartment, where he cleaned the gun and liberally lubricated the outside of it. Defendant then wrapped up the gun and taking a shovel with him hiked more than a half-mile into the hills to bury it. He hid the gun in a rock crevice and covered it with dirt and snow. He then urinated on the hiding place 'to look more or less like melting snow, to not have disturbed the surface.'

The next day defendant attended his University classes as usual. That afternoon a telephone caller told defendant that Pearson had committed suicide the previous night, according to defendant's testimony. After this call, defendant went to the deceased's apartment, where he was met by a police officer who came there in the course of his investigation of Pearson's death. Defendant told the officer that the last time he had seen Pearson was at a campus cafe the night before, and defendant volunteered his information that Pearson was a suicide victim. He also repeated the suicide story to other investigating police officers.

Later that evening, defendant was taken to the police station. After being first fully advised of his constitutional rights, he was questioned about Pearson's death. In response to questioning, defendant admitted that he had driven the car into Bluebell Canyon; that he had witnessed the killing; and that he knew the person who did the shooting. However, defendant refused to tell the police the name of the killer, although he was asked several times, and defendant testified that he led the officers 'off on some wild tale about international intrigue of some sort.' When asked whether the killer was Mrs. Brown, defendant did not answer. Later that same evening, defendant named the slayer and took the police to the place where he had hidden the gun.

Mrs. Brown and defendant were each charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The information filed against defendant was later amended, and he was charged under C.R.S.1963, 40--1--13 with being an accessory after the fact of murder. Defendant with his counsel present waived jury trial, and after trial to the court he was found guilty as charged.

Defendant asserts six assignments of error as follows: (1) the 'accessory after the fact' statute is unconstitutional, because it is too vague; (2) defendant's confession was erroneously admitted into evidence before independent evidence of the corpus delicti had been received; (3) defendant's motion for acquittal should have been granted because there was no independent evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime charged against defendant; (4) the trial court unconstitutionally interpreted the statute under which defendant was charged so as to infringe defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination; (5) the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a bill of particulars compelled defendant to go to trial without being fairly apprised of the nature of the charge against him; and, (6) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings of guilt. All of these contentions will be covered in the course of this opinion.

The pertinent portion of C.R.S.1963, 40--1--13, under which defendant was charged is as follows:

'An accessory after the fact is a person who, after a full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime.'

We find no merit in the argument that this statute is so vague as to be unconstitutional. It gives fair warning of the conduct forbidden and men of common intelligence can readily apprehend the statute's meaning and application. This is the accepted test in this jurisdiction. People v. Heckard, Colo., 431 P.2d 1014; Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, 144 Colo. 448, 356 P.2d 884.

Defendant points to the word 'magistrate' as a fatal ambiguity in C.R.S.1963, 40--1--13, contending that no such official exists in our state. However, defendant's contention presupposes the use of the term 'magistrate' in its narrow sense only of an inferior judicial officer, whereas in a general sense the term connotes a public officer exercising a public authority. 48 C.J.S. Judges § 2, p. 951. The latter broad connotation has been long accepted in Colorado. In People ex rel. Howell v. Curley, 5 Colo. 412 at page 416 this court stated:

'The word Magistrate itself is a Generic term, including many public civil officers, executive and judicial, from the president of the United States down to justices of the peace. A police magistrate, without other legal definition, supposes some officer of the State, or some municipal division thereof, invested with authority--Executive or judicial, relating to the administration of Police or municipal laws.' (Emphasis supplied)

The facts in the instant case are strikingly analogous to those in Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 550, 51 P.2d 594 in which this court affirmed the defendant's conviction as an accessory after the fact. In the Howard case, the defendant helped the murderer hide the body and the clothing of the slain person and thereafter claimed ignorance of the crime when questioned by the police. In the case...

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14 cases
  • Kogan v. People
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 9 Mayo 1988
    ...best of the prosecution's knowledge and belief," defeated the purpose behind the bill of particulars and was error. See Self v. People, 167 Colo. 292, 448 P.2d 619 (1968) (denial of bill of particulars within the discretion of trial court); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108, 401 P.2d 259 (1......
  • People v. Romero
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 9 Noviembre 1987
    ...in the crime does not elevate the defendant to a level of participation comparable to that of a principal. See Self v. People, 167 Colo. 292, 448 P.2d 619 (1968); Martinez v. People, 166 Colo. 524, 444 P.2d 641 (1968); Miller v. People, 92 Colo. 481, 22 P.2d 626 (1933). From a common sense ......
  • People v. Pratt, 86SA401
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 5 Julio 1988
    ...a vagueness challenge to the accessory statute then in effect, controls our decision in this case. Young relied on Self v. People, 167 Colo. 292, 448 P.2d 619 (1968), which also rejected a vagueness challenge to the applicable accessory statute. Self interpreted a statute significantly diff......
  • People v. Cardwell, 24796
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 21 Mayo 1973
    ...its application violates the first essential of due process of law.' We follow the Connally test in this jurisdiction. Self v. People, 167 Colo. 292, 448 P.2d 619 (1968); People v. Heckard, 164 Colo. 19, 431 P.2d 1014 (1967); Memorial Trusts v. Berry, 144 Colo. 448, 356 P.2d 884 (1960); and......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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