Selig v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Decision Date: 22 November 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:19-cv-02889-TNM
• Parties: Charyn F. SELIG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

573 F.Supp.3d 40

Charyn F. SELIG, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-02889-TNM

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 22, 2021

Floyd R. Jenkins, Pro Hac Vice, Meridian 361 International Law Group, PLLC, Portland, ME, Noel Jason Nudelman, Richard D. Heideman, Tracy Reichman Kalik, Heideman Nudelman & Kalik, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

This civil action for compensatory and punitive damages arises under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Fourteen Plaintiffs sue the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for the wrongful death and pain and suffering of three American citizens and their estates, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress on the decedents’ family members. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants provided material support and resources to the Taliban and its military arm, the Haqqani network, which carried out the attacks that killed the Americans.

Defendants did not respond, and Plaintiffs now move for default judgment. The Court finds that Plaintiffs successfully established personal and subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and proved that Defendants are liable under wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional distress theories of liability. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to default judgment and damages.

I. BACKGROUND

The terrorist attacks at issue took place in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2015 and 2018. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that agents of the Taliban and the Haqqani network are responsible for both attacks and that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provided "material support and resources." Id. ¶ 4. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) "establishes a general rule granting foreign sovereigns immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts ... [but] that grant of immunity is subject to a number of exceptions." Mohammadi v. Islamic Repub. of Iran , 782 F.3d 9, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). One of these exceptions, known as the "terrorism exception," waives sovereign immunity for countries that provide material support to terrorist organizations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Plaintiffs bring their case under this exception. Compl. ¶ 5.

Because Iran and the IRGC did not respond, Plaintiffs move for default judgment. Entry of default judgment is "not automatic," Mwani v. bin Laden , 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), but rests with the "sound discretion" of this Court, Boland v. Yoccabel Const. Co., Inc. , 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). Plaintiffs must thus show both that default judgment is warranted and that they have met the requirements for waiver of sovereign immunity under the terrorism exception.

Before the Court can enter default judgment, Plaintiffs must establish subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See Jerez v. Repub. of Cuba , 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("A default judgment rendered in excess of a court's jurisdiction is void."); Mwani , 417 F.3d at 6 (explaining that a court must "satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent defendant"). Section 1605A provides a mechanism for Plaintiffs to show both types of jurisdiction over a non-responsive foreign sovereign.

The Court's analysis thus focuses on whether Plaintiffs have properly pled all elements of a claim under § 1605A. To do this, Plaintiffs must identify the terrorist groups responsible for the attack and show that Iran and the IRGC provided support to these groups. Plaintiffs provide extensive expert testimony to make these showings.¹ The Court assesses this evidence and makes findings of fact before proceeding to its findings of law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Taliban and the Haqqani Network

Both the Taliban and the Haqqani network claimed responsibility for the attacks. Exp. Witness Rep. of Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (Gartenstein-Ross Rep.) at 43–45, 52–56, ECF No. 27-3.² Plaintiffs provide a long history of the two terror groups showing that they operate as a single entity and that their competing claims of responsibility do not cast doubt on who is responsible for the attacks.

Mullah Omar founded the Taliban in 1994. Id. at 13. The Taliban is a Sunni militant group operating mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan that controlled Afghanistan before the United States began its military campaign there. Id. at 9, 13–15. The United States toppled the Taliban-led government within weeks, and many of its leaders fled to Pakistan. Id. at 15. Although the Taliban gradually regained ground in Afghanistan, id. at 15–16, the Taliban did not control Kabul from the time of the U.S. invasion in 2001 until America's recent exit. Id. at 18. But because one of the core pillars of Taliban ideology is "opposition to Western influence, and a willingness to use violence to realize its ideological vision," the Taliban took the fight to Kabul using terrorism. Id. at 10. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross details 32 terrorist attacks attributable to the Taliban from January 2008 to January 2018, not including the two attacks at issue. Id. at 18–22.

The Haqqani network was instrumental to the Taliban's ability to carry out these attacks. The network dates to the 1970s when Jalaluddin Haqqani, head of a madrassa, led an unsuccessful uprising against the pro-Soviet, ruling regime in Afghanistan. Id. at 23. Despite its initial failure, the network became a "potent" military force during the fight against the Soviets and in the Afghan Civil War following Soviet withdrawal. Id. at 24.

Notwithstanding initial mutual "suspicion and hostility" between the network and the Taliban, by 1995 "Jalaluddin Haqqani had been persuaded to lend his military expertise to the group." Id. at 25. They grew even closer during the U.S. invasion. See id. at 26–30. For example, in a 2008 interview, Haqqani confirmed his loyalty to Mullah Omar, the Taliban's founder. Id. at 27. In 2010 and again in 2012, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin's son who took over the network's day-to-day operations in the mid-2000s, claimed the network and the Taliban were united. See id. at 26–27. The United States has also recognized the close alliance between the two groups. In 2016, Gen. Charles Cleveland, USA, stated: "Sirajuddin increasingly runs the day-to-day military operations for the Taliban." Id. at 29. And Dr. Gartenstein-Ross concludes that "Sirajuddin Haqqani, demonstrating his political and military savviness, in large part took over the Taliban's day-to-day operations." Id.

Based on Dr. Gartenstein-Ross's careful recounting of the history between the Taliban and the Haqqani network, the Court finds that the original distinctions between these two groups have collapsed. Their competing claims of responsibility do not cast doubt on who is responsible for the attacks. They are both to blame.

B. Iranian Support for the Taliban

Plaintiffs next seek to implicate Iran and the IRGC by establishing the support they have provided to the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross identifies six ways that Iran provided this support. First, high-level coordination with the Taliban. In 2001, a Taliban delegation "met with the Deputy Commander of the Iranian Foreign Intelligence Service and the Head of the Afghan Department of the Iranian Foreign Intelligence Service." Id. at 32 (cleaned up). Dr. Gartenstein-Ross contends that such high-ranking Iranian intelligence officials likely would have met with Taliban officials and offered support only with the sanction of Iran's Supreme Leader. In 2011 and 2012, the Taliban opened offices in Iran. One of the offices "included two representatives from the Haqqani network to liaise with the Revolutionary Guards." Id. In 2016, Iran's ambassador to Afghanistan said that Iran was in contact with the Taliban for "control and intelligence." Id. at 33.

Second , providing a safe haven for the Taliban. In 2011, Afghan police and a Taliban commander stated that "Iran has allowed the Taliban to recruit, train, and house fighters in Iran." Id. In 2017, the governor of one of Afghanistan's provinces said the Taliban "have hideouts [in Iran] and are being aided with a lot of material resources." Id. "In 2018, a Taliban commander admitted to a Western newspaper that hundreds of Taliban fighters are in Iran at a time." Id.

Third , the IRGC's provision of training. The U.S. State Department produces annual country reports on terrorism. For each of the years 2008 through 2012, the report on Iran stated: "[T]he Qods Force provided training to the Taliban in Afghanistan on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons, such as mortars, artillery, and rockets."³ Id. A Defense Intelligence Agency assessment concluded that Iran trained the Taliban through at least 2019. Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power (Aug. 2019), https://man.fas.org/eprint/iran-dia-2019.pdf.⁴ And the Taliban confirmed this. One Taliban commander stated that in the summer of 2018, there were "between 500 and 600 of us in different stages of training in Iran." Gartenstein-Ross Report at 34 (cleaned up).

Fourth , financing the Taliban. In 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Quds Force's Gen. Hossein Musavi and Col. Hasan Mortezavi for providing financial and material support to the Taliban. U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran's Support for Terrorism (Aug. 3, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg810.aspx. In 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo concluded that "Iran's support to the Taliban in the form of weapons and funding leads to further violence and hinders peace and stability for the Afghan people." Gartenstein-Ross Rep. at 35. Iran has placed a bounty on U.S. service members, "incentivizing the Taliban to kill Americans." Id. And Iran has worked with drug...