Seligman v. Meilach (In re Meilach)
| Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37201,A-1-CA-37201 |
| Parties | SUSAN E. SELIGMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ALLEN MEILACH, Respondent-Appellant, IN THE MATTER OF DONA Z. MEILACH AND MELVIN M. MEILACH TRUST. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
L. Helen Bennett
Albuquerque, NM
Laflin, Pick & Heer P.A.
Daniel Pick
Joseph Wiseman
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Allen Meilach
Los Angeles, CA
Pro Se Appellant
{1} Allen Meilach appeals two district court orders entered following Susan Seligman's petition (the Petition) to approve the distribution of trust property and otherwise allow her to take measures toward terminating the trust: (1) the order affirming the district court's jurisdiction to hear the case; and (2) the final order substantially granting Seligman's request. We affirm.
{2} Throughout the proceedings below, the parties put forth little competent evidence for the district court to consider; nevertheless, the court was able to recognize sufficient, apparently agreed-on facts to make the two challenged rulings. The court relied on much of the following.
{3} The trust at issue is the Dona Z. Meilach and Melvin M. Meilach Trust, created in California by Meilach and Seligman's parents, Dona and Melvin, who were the original co-trustees. The trust appears to consist of movables, including equities, annuities, and bonds. The trust instrument names no place where the trust is to be administered, but does include a choice-of-state-law provision: "All questions concerning the validity, interpretation, and administration of [the] instrument . . . shall be governed by the laws of the State of California, regardless of the domicile of any trustee or beneficiary."
{4} Upon Dona's death, Melvin became the sole trustee in accordance with the trust instrument. Melvin then moved to New Mexico, his final residence. When he died, Meilach and Seligman became co-successor trustees, as provided by the instrument. They also became the trust's only beneficiaries, entitled to an equal distribution of trust assets remaining at Melvin's death.
{5} Some years after Melvin died, Seligman, a New Mexico resident, filed the Petition; in it she asked the district court to (1) approve the equal distribution of trust assets in excess of $5,000; (2) approve the establishment of a reserve in that amount to be used for the payment of final trust debts, taxes, and administrative expenses; and (3) grant her sole authority as trustee to make the distribution and establish the reserve. She indicated that she and Meilach "do not get along, . . . cannot communicate with each other and cannot co-exist as [c]o-[t]rustees of the [t]rust."
{6} Meilach, a California resident, filed a pro-se response opposing the Petition. In part, he challenged the district court's jurisdiction, taking the position that only a California court had jurisdiction to address issues related to the administration of the trust. He did not specify the type of jurisdiction (e.g., subject matter or personal) he claimed was lacking. Meilach also stated that he was preparing a petition to a California court outlining his proposal for trust distribution.1 Additionally, Meilach requested that the district court reprimand Seligman's attorney "for filing a frivolous petition." He made further requests of the court: that it (1) award him attorney fees for having been the "subject of a frivolous petition" and for having suffered financial loss due to Seligman's"failure to perform" with respect to the trust; (2) "decide the size of the damage award" to compensate him for such injuries; (3) "apprise [him] of any other legal motions or actions that need to be taken in [New Mexico], if any, pursuant to his filing an analogous petition in California"; and (4) order "[a]ny other remedies the court finds appropriate."
{7} The district court scheduled a hearing on the Petition. Meilach filed a motion requesting that the hearing be conducted telephonically, citing as reasons the inconvenience and expense of having to attend in person. Seligman initially opposed the motion. In his reply in support of his request for a telephonic hearing, Meilach challenged the proposed reserve amount, saying it should be $300,000, but otherwise agreed it was proper for the parties to receive an equal distribution of the balance of trust assets. Seligman later withdrew her objection to Meilach's motion.
{8} The district court then held a hearing on the Petition at which Meilach appeared by telephone. Meilach argued that a California court was the proper forum for the proceedings but acknowledged that "reasonable arguments" could support New Mexico courts' exercise of jurisdiction. He then made arguments on the Petition's merits, reiterating that he agreed with Seligman that the majority of the trust's assets should be distributed, stating, "We just disagree on the amount of the reserve." Meilach explained that a larger reserve than that proposed by Seligman should be ordered until such time as certain "outstanding issues" were resolved, including his ability to review certain paper bonds and bills in Seligman's possession.
{9} Before ending the hearing, the district court told the parties they could file supplemental pleadings addressing their respective positions. Each party did so. In Meilach's case, he argued against Seligman's request for sole authority as a trustee, adding that, "[i]f one [co-]trustee should be given total control of the trust, only [he] is qualified."
{10} The district court then entered the orders from which Meilach appeals. In the first, the court concluded it had jurisdiction and denied Meilach's request to dismiss the case. The second, final order was on the merits of the Petition. In it, the court substantially granted Seligman's requests, though not as to the reserve amount. Instead of $5,000, as she requested, or $300,000, as Meilach requested, the court ordered that $100,000 be set aside: $50,000 each "for the payment of final debts, taxes, expenses of administration and as might otherwise be appropriate[.]" The court further ordered Seligman to establish the reserve and distribute the balance of trust assets equally, with the exception of the reserve. Lastly, the order provided that "petitioner Meilach"2 was to file monthly reports delineating payments from the reserve "until this case is closed."
{11} According to Seligman, Meilach did not file a supersedeas bond under NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-22(A) (2007) to stay execution on the final order, but he did file a motion in the district court for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the motion. Also according to Seligman, and as conceded by Meilach, the distribution was made, and the reserve was established, in compliance with the final order.
{12} Meilach does not contest the distribution of the assets nor the establishment of the $100,000 reserve. Instead, he claims the district court erred in determining it had jurisdiction. He additionally contends Seligman has engaged in malfeasance in the distribution of trust assets, pursuant to the district court's final order. We address each of Meilach's contentions in turn.
{13} Meilach first argues that the trust-related contacts and relationships give only California courts jurisdiction.3 We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. See Giddings v. SRT-Mountain Vista, LLC, 2019-NMCA-025, ¶ 10, 458 P.3d 596. As an initial matter, Meilach is mistaken to presume that only one of the two states' courts has jurisdiction; rather, "[t]he spheres of state court authority overlap, so that a specific controversy may be within the judicial authority of more than one state." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 4 cmt. b (1982). Because this proceeding was brought in a New Mexico court, the compelling question is whether New Mexico's district court is a proper forum for it.
{14} Whether the district court is a proper forum implicates federal constitutional law. This is because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment limits the states' power to exercise jurisdiction over actions and parties: they may do so only if the exercise is reasonable. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Such a reasonable basis is found where the courts of a state have the necessary "affiliating circumstances" to "enter a judgment imposing obligations on persons (jurisdiction in personam) or affecting interests in property (jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem)." Hanson v. Denkcla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
{15} Both types of jurisdiction are relevant here. The final order purports to obligate Meilach to "file a monthly report . . . delineating payments made from the reserve," thereby necessitating the district court's personal jurisdiction over him for that aspect of the order to be effective. In addition, the final order includes the court's determination of the parties' interests in the trust property, providing "it is clear that the parties are eachentitled to 50% of the assets of the Trust." We therefore consider whether the court has (1) personal jurisdiction over Meilach; and (2) in rem jurisdiction over the trust.
{16} Concerning the district court's personal jurisdiction over Meilach, Seligman argues that, to the extent that Meilach's jurisdictional challenge represents an objection to the district court's lack of personal jurisdiction over him, Meilach's conduct evinced a waiver of that objection. We agree.
{17} "The defense of...
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