Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products, Docket Nos. 62553
| Decision Date | 06 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | 62449,Docket Nos. 62553,62542 and 62653 |
| Citation | 328 N.W.2d 15,120 Mich.App. 135 |
| Parties | Marguerite A. SELK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT PLASTIC PRODUCTS, Defendant-Appellant. Ralph FURMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Michigan State Accident Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defendants-Appellants. Edward T. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MUSKEGON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION and Kansas City Fire & Marine, Defendants- Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson by James P. Harvey, Detroit, for Selk.
White, Spaniola, Stariha, Potuznik, Reider, Brown, Wierengo, Fielstra & Flynn, P.C. by J. Christopher Wilson, Muskegon, for Kelly.
Cox, Hooth & Curley by Wilfred F. Curley, Troy, for Detroit Plastic Products.
Nelson, Payne, Parsons & Bouwkamp by Michael A. Reynolds, Ann Arbor, for Dept. of Corrections and Michigan State Acc. Fund.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Caleb B. Martin, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Second Injury Fund.
Baxter & Hammond by James R. Piggush, Grand Rapids, for Muskegon Road Com'n and Kansas City Fire & Marine.
Before DANHOF, C.J., and GILLIS and KNOBLOCK, * JJ.
In these consolidated appeals, we are called upon to determine, inter alia, whether a recent amendment to M.C.L. Sec. 418.801; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801), requires a finding that interest on workers' compensation awards made after January 1, 1982, be computed at a rate of 12% per annum with respect to payments which became due prior to the effective date of the amendment.
Plaintiff, Ralph Furman, suffered a work-related injury in 1961. He was awarded benefits for partial incapacity at that time. In 1973, he petitioned for total and permanent disability benefits alleging industrial loss of use of both legs and incurable insanity. He presented the testimony of a psychiatrist which supported his claim. Defendants failed to present any contradictory evidence, whereupon in January, 1973, the hearing referee made a finding of total and permanent disability on the basis of plaintiff's incurable insanity. That decision was not appealed.
In June, 1976, plaintiff's 800-week conclusive presumption period ended. M.C.L. Sec. 418.351; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(351). At that time, defendants discontinued paying benefits whereupon plaintiff petitioned for a factual determination of permanent and total disability. At the hearing, defendants presented expert testimony concerning plaintiff's mental condition. Plaintiff presented contradictory evidence. The hearing referee found that there had been no material change in plaintiff's condition since the original determination of incurable insanity was made and that plaintiff's benefits should be resumed. Defendants appealed that decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board.
Defendants did not deny that plaintiff's condition remained unchanged after the 1973 decision. Rather, they argued that the evidence conclusively established that plaintiff had never been incurably insane, under either the definition of insanity which existed at the time the 1973 award was entered or the definition which was established thereafter.
In a split decision, the Board affirmed the hearing referee's decision by an order entered on January 14, 1982.
Plaintiff Selk filed a petition for benefits on July 27, 1978, claiming that she injured her hips in a work-related incident in January, 1978, and that thereafter her condition was aggravated by a further work-related incident. Contradictory evidence was presented at the hearing with plaintiff and her expert testifying that her injury was work-related. Defendant's expert testified that plaintiff's condition was related to her normal "non-work related" activities of life. The hearing referee found in favor of plaintiff and entered an open award and ordered the payment of back-benefits. By order entered January 8, 1982, the Board affirmed the decision of the hearing referee.
Plaintiff Kelly suffered a work-related back injury in January, 1974. Thereafter, defendants voluntarily paid benefits until plaintiff returned to work in November, 1975. Plaintiff quit his job in April, 1976, and filed a petition for benefits on November 11, 1976. Following a hearing held on April 26, 1978, the hearing referee found that plaintiff suffered a work-related injury in 1974. However, he refused to award benefits because he found that plaintiff did not have a compensable injury on April 21, 1976, the last day that he worked.
By an order entered on January 15, 1982, the Board reversed the hearing referee's decision. It found that plaintiff aggravated his pre-existing back injury while performing work for defendants after returning to work in 1975. It further found that plaintiff suffered disabling neck pain and headaches which resulted from the back injury. Therefore, it entered a retroactive award of compensation benefits from April 21, 1976, and thereafter until further order of the Board.
In all three of these consolidated cases, the Board entered its awards after January 1, 1982, the effective date of M.C.L. Sec. 418.801(5); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801)(5), which provides:
"(5) When weekly compensation is paid pursuant to an award of a hearing referee, the board, or a court, interest on the compensation shall be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date each payment was due, until paid."
The Board held that the amendment requires the payment of 12% interest on the entire awards, despite the fact that the bulk of the awards involved payments which became due prior to the effective date of the amendment.
We are of the opinion that the Board's application of the amendment is correct. As noted above, the amendment provides, in part, that interest on a compensation award "shall be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date each payment was due". M.C.L. Sec. 418.801(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801)(1), provides that compensation becomes due and payable 14 days after the employer is notified of the disability. These two provisions read together compel a finding that the amendment clearly and unambiguously requires that for all awards made after January 1, 1982, the 12% interest rate be computed by referring to the date payment became due without regard to the fact that payment may have become due prior to January 1, 1982. Since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, further interpretation is unnecessary. Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 413 Mich. 1, 8, 317 N.W.2d 529 (1982).
Defendants claim that to apply the statute in this manner violates the rule that statutes are to be applied prospectively only. We agree with defendants that, as a general rule, statutory enactments are to be applied only prospectively unless the Legislature indicates its intent that they be given retrospective effect. Hughes v. Judges' Retirement Bd., 407 Mich. 75, 85, 282 N.W.2d 160 (1979). However, as discussed above, the language used by the Legislature in this legislation convinces us that the Legislature intended that the 12% interest rate be applied to awards made after the effective date of the amendment to payments which became due prior thereto.
Even if the language used did not constitute such a clear expression of the Legislature's intent, we would still be compelled to conclude that the Board's application of the amendment was correct. In Ballog v. Knight Newspapers Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W.2d 19 (1969), plaintiff filed his complaint in a personal injury action before July 21, 1965, the effective date of the amendment to M.C.L. Sec. 600.6013; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6013. Prior to the amendment, the statute provided that interest on a money judgment was to be calculated from the date of judgment. Thereafter, it provided that interest should be calculated from the date the complaint was filed. The trial court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to interest from the date his complaint was filed because to permit such an award would involve retrospective application of the amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. It ruled that the amendment was remedial in nature and quoted from Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corp., 371 Mich. 480, 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963), in holding the following:
"[S]tatutes related to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already existing will, in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention, be held to operate retrospectively and apply to all actions accrued, pending or future, there being no vested right to keep a statutory procedural law unchanged and free from amendment.' " 381 Mich. 533-534, 164 N.W.2d 19.
The Court ruled that because the Legislature failed to express an intent that the statute apply only prospectively, the trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff interest on his judgment computed from the date that his complaint was filed.
In our opinion, the amendment relating to the payment of 12% interest on workers' compensation awards is also remedial in nature. See, e.g., McAvoy v. H.B. Sherman Co., 401 Mich. 419, 457, 258 N.W.2d 414 (1977); Lahti v. Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.2d 490 (1959). When the Florida Legislature amended its Workers' Compensation Act to provide for a change from 6% to 12% in the rate of interest payable, it expressly provided that the 12% rate was limited to "claims arising out of injuries which occur on or after" the effective date of the amendment. Section 440.20, Fla. Statutes (1978 Supp); Myers v. Carr Construction Co., 387 So.2d 417 (Fla.App., 1980); E & A Concrete v. Perry, 379 So.2d 1015 (Fla.App., 1980). If the Michigan Legislature intended that this amendment be applied prospectively...
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Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products
...to the employee and ordered the employer or carrier to pay 12% interest on the entire award. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 120 Mich.App. 135, 328 N.W.2d 15 (1982). We granted leave to appeal. 417 Mich. 934 (1983). We affirm the Court of I. Facts There is no dispute as to the facts in the i......
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...not "of the substance of the right of action," but incident thereto. Id. at 535, 164 N.W.2d 19. See also Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products, 120 Mich.App. 135, 328 N.W.2d 15 (1982), aff'd 419 Mich. 1, 345 N.W.2d 184 (1984), adhered to, clarified 419 Mich. 32, 348 N.W.2d 652 In contrast is Gor......
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Ratliff v. General Motors Corp.
...shall be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date each payment was due, until paid." In Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products, 120 Mich.App. 135, 143, 328 N.W.2d 15 (1982), lv. gtd. 417 Mich. 934 (1983), this Court held that although the effective date of the above statute was January 1, ......
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