Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products

• Decision Date: 01 May 1984
• Docket Number: A,Docket Nos. 70397,70412,70417 and 70421,Nos. 10-12,s. 10-12
• Parties: Marguerite A. SELK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT PLASTIC PRODUCTS, Defendant-Appellant. Edward T. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MUSKEGON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION and Kansas City Fire & Marine, Defendants- Appellants. Ralph C. FURMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Michigan State Accident Fund, Defendants- Appellants, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellee. ug. Term 1983. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 184

345 N.W.2d 184

419 Mich. 1

Marguerite A. SELK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT PLASTIC PRODUCTS, Defendant-Appellant.

Edward T. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MUSKEGON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION and Kansas City Fire &

Marine, Defendants- Appellants.

Ralph C. FURMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Michigan State Accident Fund, Defendants- Appellants, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 70397, 70412, 70417 and 70421, Aug. Term 1983.

Calendar Nos. 10-12.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Aug. 16, 1983.

Decided March 21, 1984.

Rehearing Granted May 1, 1984.

Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson by James P. Harvey, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee Selk.

Cox, Hooth & Curley, Wilfred F. Curley, Troy, for defendant-appellant Detroit Plastics Products.

Fielstra, Flynn, Reider, Wierengo & Brown, P.C. by Michael J. Flynn, Muskegon, for plaintiff-appellee Kelly.

Baxter & Hammond by James R. Piggush, Grand Rapids, for defendants-appellants Muskegon County Road Com'n.

Nelson, Payne, Parsons & Bouwkamp, Ann Arbor, for defendants-appellants Dept. of Corrections.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Caleb B. Martin, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Detroit, for intervenor defendant-appellant Self-Insurers' Security Fund.

BOYLE, Justice.

We granted leave in these consolidated workers' compensation cases in order to determine whether 1981 P.A. 194, which amended M.C.L. Sec. 418.801; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801), requires that interest on workers' compensation awards made after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the amendment, is to be computed at a rate of 12% per annum with respect to payments which became due prior to January 1, 1982.

In each of these cases, the WCAB entered a post-January 1, 1982, award favorable to the employee and ordered the employer or carrier to pay 12% interest on the entire award. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 120 Mich.App. 135, 328 N.W.2d 15 (1982). We granted leave to appeal. 417 Mich. 934 (1983). We affirm the Court of Appeals.

I. Facts

There is no dispute as to the facts in the instant cases. Therefore, we adopt the Court of Appeals statement of facts:

"A. Furman

"Plaintiff, Ralph Furman, suffered a work-related injury in 1961. He was awarded benefits for partial incapacity at that time. In 1973, he petitioned for total and permanent disability benefits alleging industrial loss of use of both legs and incurable insanity. He presented the testimony of a psychiatrist which supported his claim. Defendants failed to present any contradictory evidence, whereupon in January, 1973, the hearing referee made a finding of total and permanent disability on the basis of plaintiff's incurable insanity. That decision was not appealed.

"In June, 1976, plaintiff's 800-week conclusive presumption period ended. MCL 418.351; MSA 17.237(351). At that time, defendants discontinued paying benefits, whereupon plaintiff petitioned for a factual determination of permanent and total disability. At the hearing, defendants presented expert testimony concerning plaintiff's mental condition. Plaintiff presented contradictory evidence. The hearing referee found that there had been no material change in plaintiff's condition since the original determination of incurable insanity was made and that plaintiff's benefits should be resumed. Defendants appealed that decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board.

"Defendants did not deny that plaintiff's condition remained unchanged after the 1973 decision. Rather, they argued that the evidence conclusively established that plaintiff had never been incurably insane, under either the definition of insanity which existed at the time the 1973 award was entered or the definition which was established thereafter.

"In a split decision, the board affirmed the hearing referee's decision by an order entered on January 14, 1982.

"B. Selk

"Plaintiff Selk filed a petition for benefits on July 27, 1978, claiming that she injured her hips in a work-related incident in January, 1978, and that thereafter her condition was aggravated by a further work-related incident. Contradictory evidence was presented at the hearing with plaintiff and her expert testifying that her injury was work-related. Defendant's expert testified that plaintiff's condition was related to her normal 'non-work related' activities of life. The hearing referee found in favor of plaintiff and entered an open award and ordered the payment of back benefits. By order entered January 8, 1982, the board affirmed the decision of the hearing referee.

"C. Kelly

"Plaintiff Kelly suffered a work-related back injury in January, 1974. Thereafter, defendants voluntarily paid benefits until plaintiff returned to work in November, 1975. Plaintiff quit his job in April, 1976, and filed a petition for benefits on November 11, 1976. Following a hearing held on April 26, 1978, the hearing referee found that plaintiff suffered a work-related injury in 1974. However, he refused to award benefits because he found that plaintiff did not have a compensable injury on April 21, 1976, the last day that he worked.

"By an order entered on January 15, 1982, the board reversed the hearing referee's decision. It found that plaintiff aggravated his pre-existing back injury while performing work for defendants after returning to work in 1975. It further found that plaintiff suffered disabling neck pain and headaches which resulted from the back injury. Therefore, it entered a retroactive award of compensation benefits from April 21, 1976, and thereafter until further order of the board." 120 Mich.App. 140-142, 328 N.W.2d 15.

II. The Statutory Amendment

A

While these appeals were pending before the WCAB, the Legislature enacted 1981 P.A. 194, which amended M.C.L. Sec. 418.801; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801) to provide a new fifth paragraph:

"(5) When weekly compensation is paid pursuant to an award of a hearing referee, the board, or a court, interest on the compensation shall be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date each payment was due, until paid."

The Legislature directed that the amendment "shall take effect January 1, 1982". Until December 31, 1981, the effective interest rate was 5%. Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Co., 358 Mich. 510, 100 N.W.2d 226 (1960).

The issue is whether 1981 P.A. 194 was intended by the Legislature to operate prospectively or retrospectively. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that this case "does not even involve retrospective application". 120 Mich.App. 146, 328 N.W.2d 15. We find that the statute is plain, certain and unambiguous, Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 189 N.W. 221 (1922), and requires application, not interpretation.

The amendment provides that interest shall be paid from the date each payment was due. M.C.L. Sec. 418.801(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801)(1) provided prior to 1977 that compensation shall "become payable on the fourteenth day after the employer has notice or knowledge of the disability or death".

In 1977, the Legislature amended Sec. 801 to further clarify when compensation is "due". As of the time the amendment in issue was enacted the statute provided:

"Compensation * * * shall become due and payable on the fourteenth day after the employer has notice or knowledge of the disability or death". (Emphasis added.)

Against this backdrop the conclusion is compelling that 1981 P.A. 194 was unambiguously intended to award interest from the date payment "was due".

We find further support for our conclusion from the fact that legislative recognition of inflationary interest rates was not confined to the area of compensation awards.

In 1980, the Legislature provided for a change in the interest rate on money judgments which clearly provided for 6% interest to the effective date of the act (June 1, 1980) and 12% thereafter. M.C.L. Sec. 600.6013; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6013. In the instant case, the Legislature failed to limit the increase in interest to the effective date of the statute and instead employed language unequivocally stating that the triggering event "was" an occurrence antedating the effective date of the legislation.

Defendants correctly detail the history of the reform efforts which led to the adoption of 12 acts pertaining to workers' compensation approved on December 30, 1981, and note that the Legislature fixed an effective date of January 1, 1982, for 11 of the 12 acts. However, in our view neither the existence of a legislative concern for the financial burdens on employers or reference to the effective date of the act squarely meet the issue in this case. The Legislature used the language "was due". Unless this language is unclear, these observations are irrelevant to our task which is to give effect to the plain meaning of the language used. Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 413 Mich. 1, 317 N.W.2d 529 (1982).

B

Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the language used required construction, we would nonetheless conclude that the board's application of the legislation was correct.

As a matter of statutory construction, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the contrary intent is clearly manifested. In re Davis Estate 330 Mich. 647, 651-653, 48 N.W.2d 151 (1951). Moreover, the fact that the statute relates to antecedent events does not, in itself, require a finding that the statute operates retrospectively. Hughes v. Judges' Retirement Bd., 407 Mich. 75, 85, 282 N.W.2d 160 (1979).

An exception to the general rule is recognized where a statute is remedial or procedural in nature. Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corp., 371 Mich. 480, 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963). Statutes which operate in furtherance of a remedy already existing and which neither create new rights nor destroy existing rights are held to operate retrospectively, unless a contrary legislative intention is manifested. Defendant...