Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.
| Citation | 45 V.I. 712 |
| Decision Date | 24 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03–1146,03–1147.,03–1146 |
| Parties | Margarita SELKRIDGE, Appellant v. UNITED OF OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lee J. Rohn, K. Glenda Cameron (Argued), Christiansted, St. Croix, and Terry M. Halpern, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, for Appellant.
Charles E. Engeman, Simone R.D. Francis (Argued), Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, for Appellee.
Before NYGAARD, BECKER and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
Margarita Selkridge (“Selkridge”) filed a lawsuit against United of Omaha Life Insurance Company (“Omaha”) on several state-law theories alleging that she had been wrongfully denied benefits under her disability plan. ( “Selkridge I.” ) After the District Court granted summary judgment on all of those theories in favor of the sole defendant, Selkridge chose not to appeal that decision. Instead, she filed a new lawsuit that asserted a claim “arising under” the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) for the wrongful denial of benefits. ( “Selkridge II.” ) The District Court granted summary judgment on res judicata grounds. Selkridge also eventually filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion seeking to amend the judgment in Selkridge I to indicate that the grant of summary judgment was without prejudice to filing a new lawsuit. The District Court denied the Rule 60(b) motion because it sought to utilize that Rule as a substitute for an appeal.
Selkridge appeals the grant of summary judgment and the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion in Selkridge I and the grant of summary judgment in Selkridge II. We determine that we are without jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the grant of summary judgment in Selkridge I because an appeal was not timely taken. While we conclude that Judge Moore should have recused himself before entering the order granting summary judgment in Selkridge II and the order denying Selkridge's Rule 60(b) motion in Selkridge I, we hold that our recognition of his failure to do so as plain error and our independent, plenary review of those orders make further remedial action unnecessary. Accordingly, given that our independent plenary review convinces us that the results reached were required as a matter of law, we will affirm both December 23, 2002, orders.
Selkridge was enrolled in a group insurance plan with Omaha during the period in which she was employed by the Virgin Islands Telephone Company and its successors. In December 1996, Selkridge filed an application for long-term disability benefits with Omaha. Omaha denied the claim initially and, following an appeal, Selkridge then filed Selkridge I, a diversity action in the District Court of the Virgin Islands against Omaha alleging breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Omaha moved for summary judgment on all claims Selkridge had alleged against it. The motion contended that all of Selkridge's claims arose “under the common law of the Territory” and were therefore “expressly preempted by ERISA.” JA at 61.
In her opposition to Omaha's motion, Selkridge argued that summary judgment should be denied but went on to make the following request: “[i]f this Court were to find that the claims are preempted and must be converted to federal claims, Plaintiff respectfully requests that she be given the opportunity to amend her Complaint accordingly to more clearly state her claims as federal violation of ERISA claims.” JA at 156–57.
The District Court held that all of Selkridge's claims were preempted by ERISA and that Omaha was entitled to summary judgment on all counts. See Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 221 F.Supp.2d 579 (D.Vi.2002). It did not mention the application for leave to amend found only in Selkridge's brief. The Court's February 22, 2002, order read: “it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment ... is GRANTED....” JA at 364. The order did not expressly reserve to Selkridge a right to pursue ERISA-based claims in a new action.
On April 23, 2002, Selkridge filed a new action, Selkridge II, in the District Court. The complaint asserted that Selkridge's claim “arises under ERISA.” JA at 390.
Omaha moved for summary judgment in Selkridge II on September 23, 2002, arguing that Selkridge's claim “under ERISA” was barred by res judicata because it arose out of the same set of circumstances at issue in Selkridge I and could have been litigated in Selkridge I. On October 30, 2002, eight months after the order granting summary judgment in Selkridge I, Selkridge filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion in Selkridge I. That motion requested that the District Court “clarify” its February 22, 2002, order to state that Selkridge's claims in Selkridge I were “converted to federal claims” and to grant Selkridge “leave to amend to plead claims under ERISA” with respect to Selkridge I. JA at 719, 726.
On December 23, 2002, the District Court granted summary judgment in Selkridge II on res judicata grounds and denied the Rule 60(b) motion in Selkridge I on the ground that it was an impermissible attempt to utilize that Rule as a substitute for an appeal. See Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 237 F.Supp.2d 600 (D.Vi.2002).
Just before the summary judgment motion in Selkridge II and the Rule 60(b) motion in Selkridge I were filed, one of Selkridge's attorneys wrote a letter-to-the-editor of an on-line publication critical of the District Judge presiding over the Selkridge matters. The content of the letter was not directly related to either Selkridge matter, but the letter prompted a series of events that will be discussed in Part III of this opinion relating to the propriety of the District Judge's continuing to preside over the Selkridge matters.
On January 9, 2003, Selkridge filed a notice of appeal in Selkridge I seeking to appeal the February 22, 2002, grant of summary judgment in Selkridge I, the December 23, 2002, denial of her Rule 60(b) motion, and “the Court's recusal of itself from this case and its subsequent reinstatement, sua sponte.” SA. On the same day, Selkridge filed a notice of appeal seeking to appeal the December 23, 2002, grant of summary judgment in Selkridge II.1
Selkridge insists that we have jurisdiction to review the summary judgment order entered in Selkridge I under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which authorizes appeals from final decisions of the District Court. We cannot agree.
“A final order is one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (internal quotations omitted)). For purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “A summary judgment that fully disposes of all claims among all parties is final.” 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Juris.2d § 3914.28 (2d ed.1992), at 202; see Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dept., 98 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir.1996) ( ). The District Court's February 22, 2002, order granted summary judgment in favor of Omaha on all of Selkridge's claims on the grounds that the claims were expressly preempted by ERISA. Because it disposed of all claims with respect to all parties,2 that order was a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) requires that a notice of appeal be filed “with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered,” id., unless certain exceptions inapplicable here apply. Selkridge filed her notice of appeal in Selkridge I on January 9, 2003–over ten months after summary judgment had been granted in that matter. It is a well-established rule that “[t]he time limits for filing a notice of appeal are ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ” In re Rashid, 210 F.3d 201, 204 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Krebs Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir.1998)); see, e.g., Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (same); U.S. v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1321 (3d Cir.1993) (same). We thus lack jurisdiction to review the summary judgment in Selkridge I.
Selkridge first argues that she “did not seek reconsideration or appeal the district court's decision because she reasonably believed that the district court had overlooked her request for automatic conversion of [plaintiff's] claims and leave to amend....” Appellant's Reply Brief at 8–9 (footnote omitted). We are unpersuaded. If Selkridge's counsel thought that the District Court had “overlooked” her request for automatic conversion of her state law claims into ERISA claims, and had also “overlooked” Selkridge's request for leave to amend, we fail to understand how this would excuse counsel from seeking reconsideration by the District Court or appealing the District Court's decision.
Alternatively, Selkridge argues that her counsel reasonably viewed the February 22, 2002, order as a partial summary judgment and, accordingly, not as a final order. While it is true that a grant of “partial summary judgment” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) is not a “final” judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it is an adjudication of less than the entire action, see 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil 3d § 2737 (1998), at 322–25,...
To continue reading
Request your trial