Sellers v. Bridges
| Decision Date | 15 October 1943 |
| Citation | 15 So.2d 293,153 Fla. 586 |
| Parties | SELLERS v. BRIDGES et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Philip D. Beall, of Pensacola, for petitioner.
J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and John C. Wynn, and Millard Conklin Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.
The petitioner James Sellers, was informed against for an alleged criminal violation of the beverage laws of this state; the charge being that he 'did remove and conceal and was concerned in the removing and concealing of one gallon more or less of moonshine whiskey, for and on which a tax was and is imposed by the Beverage Act of the State of Florida, with intent to defraud the State of Florida of such tax.' Upon arraignment the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged, and was sentenced to serve a term of three years at hard labor in the State Prison. After serving approximately one year of sentence in actual confinement, the petitioner was paroled by the Florida Parole Commission subject to certain specific conditions of parole, until January 1, 1946, 'unless otherwise released, or until other action may be taken by the Florida Parole Commission.'
While out of confinement on parole petitioner instituted this habeas corpus proceeding to secure an absolute discharge from penal supervision, grounding his plaint on the proposition that as the information under which he was charged did not state an offense against law, his detention and restraint were illegal.
This court has heretofore held that moonshine whiskey is not a liquor for and in respect whereof a tax is imposed by the Beverage Act of Florida, F.S.A. § 562.01 et seq. See Brown v. State Fla., 13 So.2d 458. The information to which petitioner entered his plea of guilty failed, therefore, to charge any offense against the laws of Florida. A judgment founded upon such void charge is without legal foundation, and is insufficient upon which to base a valid commitment for imprisonment. Brown v. State, supra.
It may be questioned whether habeas corpus is available to the petitioner to test this matter; it being conceded that at the time of his application for the writ he was not suffering actual physical incarceration, but was at large as a parolee upon certain terms and conditions imposed by the Florida Parole Commission and agreed to by him.
Under this circumstance, will habeas corpus lie? We think so.
The parolee, although at large while on parole, is a prisoner no less than a prisoner physically confined. He is enduring compulsory expiation of an offense. He is under daily personal restraint. He is at all times answerable to prison system officials for his conduct. Such officials have authority to greatly circumscribe his freedom of choice and action. Being amenable to prison system rules and authority and under immediate restraints is he not, to all practical purposes, in custody? See Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or. 128, 171 P. 577, 579, L.R.A. 1918D, 674, 677.
Parole is that procedure by which a prisoner who must in any event be returned to society at some time in the future is allowed to serve the last portion of his sentence outside prison walls and under strict supervision, as preparation for his eventual return to society.
No prisoner is placed on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison. An investigation by the Parole Commission must disclose that there is a reasonable probability that the applicant for parole will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law abiding person, and that his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society, before parole may be granted. Sec. 947.18, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A.
A prisoner must serve at least six months of his term and have a good prison record, before he is eligible for parole. Sec. 947.16, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. In every case the parole period must run for at least as long as the remainder of the sentence originally imposed, unless the parolee is sooner released by the pardoning authority. Sec. 947.24, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. The Commission, upon placing a person on parole, is given authority to specify the terms and conditions of his parole, Sec. 947.19, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. A violation of the terms of parole may render the parolee liable to arrest and a return to prison to serve out the remainder of the term for which he was sentenced; and no part of the time he may have been on parole shall, in such event, in any manner diminish the time of such sentence. Sec. 947.21, Florida Statutes 1941.
Parole, therefore is not an act of amnesty or forgiveness--as some suppose. It does not put an end to sentence legally imposed. Rather, it is a continuation of sentence. The parole plan proceeds, in theory at least, upon the salutary principle that as the prison sentence of the individual must eventually terminate, the ends of society as a whole, as well as of the...
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