Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons

• Citation: 294 U.S. App. D.C. 361,959 F.2d 307
• Decision Date: 27 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-5197,90-5197
• Parties: W. Foster SELLERS, Appellant, v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 307

959 F.2d 307

294 U.S.App.D.C. 361

W. Foster SELLERS, Appellant, v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Appellees.

No. 90-5197.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 21, 1991.

Decided March 27, 1992.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Civ. No. 87-2048.

Julie M. Carpenter (appointed by the Court) with whom David W. DeBruin was on the brief, for amicus curiae urging that the judgment of the District Court be reversed. W. Foster Sellers, pro se, also entered an appearance for appellant.

William J. Dempster, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellees.

Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, WALD and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge MIKVA.

MIKVA, Chief Judge:

Appellant, W. Foster Sellers, filed an action under the Privacy Act against the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission claiming that the agencies maintained incorrect information in his inmate files. Mr. Sellers sought amendment of his records and money damages, contending that the agencies violated sections (e)(5), (g)(1)(C), and (g)(4) of the Act by using the incorrect information in determinations adverse to him. Relying on this Court's decision in Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C.Cir.1987), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that the agencies satisfied the requirements of the Privacy Act simply by noting in Mr. Sellers's prison records that he disputed the information contained in the records. We reverse the district court and remand for further consideration of Mr. Sellers's claims. The agencies do not meet the Act's requirements by indicating that the appellant disputes the information in his prison files.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1986, while an inmate in federal prison, Mr. Sellers asked to see two presentence reports held in his files at the Parole Commission and the Bureau of Prisons. Mr. Sellers alleged that the presentence reports contained inaccuracies; specifically, one of the reports, prepared in 1979, contained a reference to an alleged bank robbery in North Carolina. Appellant claimed that the bank robbery charge had subsequently been dismissed.

After he contacted the probation office that prepared the 1979 presentence report, Mr. Sellers was told that the office erroneously submitted the report and had asked the Parole Commission and the Bureau of Prisons to return it without considering it. But neither agency returned the report. Instead, the Parole Commission used the report when it denied Mr. Sellers's parole in October of 1986. Furthermore, Mr. Sellers claims that the Bureau of Prisons used the 1979 presentence report in making decisions adverse to him.

In 1987, Mr. Sellers filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia claiming, inter alia, that the Bureau of Prisons, the Parole Commission, and two individual defendants violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) and (g)(1)(C), by failing to maintain accurate records, and § 552a(d) and (g)(1)(A) by failing to amend inaccurate files. His complaint alleged that the Parole Commission used the 1979 presentence report in its decision denying him parole in 1986. The complaint also claimed that the allegedly erroneous presentence report adversely affected determinations by the Bureau of Prisons regarding custody and security classifications, job and quarters assignments, and the opportunity to earn money and good time. In addition to the claims surrounding the 1979 presentence report, the complaint further alleged that other inaccuracies in Mr. Sellers's prison records resulted in decisions adverse to him. Mr. Sellers sought both amendment of his records and money damages.

The district court dismissed Mr. Sellers's complaint, holding that appellees' systems of records were exempt from the amendment provisions of the Privacy Act. Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 87-2048, slip op. at 1, 1988 WL 105007 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 1988). The district court also dismissed the claims against the two individual defendants and transferred Mr. Sellers's habeas claims to the Illinois judicial district in which he was incarcerated at the time. Id.

This Court summarily affirmed the district court's order dismissing the two individual defendants and the Privacy Act claim under section 552a(d). Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 88-5369, slip op. at 1 (D.C.Cir. June 13, 1989). The Court remanded Mr. Sellers's Privacy Act claim under section 552a(e)(5), however, holding that regulations governing the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission do not exempt those agencies' records from section (e)(5) of the Act. Accordingly, this Court remanded the section (e)(5) claims to the district court "to determine whether Sellers presented a cause of action by claiming that the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission violated the Section 552a(e)(5) requirement to maintain accurate records." Id.

Seeing its task on remand as that of deciding the "very narrow question ... whether the file defendants compiled on plaintiff when they determined his parole eligibility in October, 1986 was in compliance with the Privacy Act's requirement[s]," the district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 87-2048, slip op. at 1, 3 (D.D.C. May 14, 1990). Citing this Court's decision in Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C.Cir.1987) (en banc), the court held that since it could not require appellees to amend their records, it was sufficient that the Parole Commission noted in Mr. Sellers's file that he disputed the information contained in his records. The district court did not, however, address Mr. Sellers's claim against the Bureau of Prisons for using the allegedly erroneous presentence report in its decisions. Nor did the court determine the viability of the claims surrounding the allegedly inaccurate information other than the 1979 presentence report.

Mr. Sellers again appeals the district court's decision. This Court denied the agencies' motion for summary affirmance. See Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 90-5197, slip. op. at 1, 1991 WL 56314 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 15, 1991).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Mootness

On June 29, 1989, the Parole Commission reviewed Mr. Sellers's file and his claim that the incorrect presentence report was improperly considered in his parole decision. Agreeing that the North Carolina bank robbery should not have been considered, the Commission modified Mr. Sellers's offense severity and guideline range. The Commission determined, however, that the changes in severity and guideline range did not warrant modification of its decision to deny parole. Appellees now argue that because the presence of the bank robbery in the presentence report did not ultimately affect the Commission's parole decision, this case is moot. An intervening event renders a case moot if: (1) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation; and (2) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). Here we cannot say that the Parole Commission's later decision that it would have denied Mr. Sellers's parole absent consideration of the 1979 presentence report "completely and irrevocably eradicated" the effects of both agencies' alleged violations.

We pause here to point out that there are actually four different claims at issue in this lawsuit. In addition to his claim against the Parole Commission for using the allegedly erroneous presentence report in denying him parole, Mr. Sellers also claims that the Bureau of Prisons used that report in making decisions adverse to him concerning custody and security classifications, job and quarters assignments, and the opportunity to earn money and good time. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that there were other pieces of incorrect information in his prison files that both the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission used in making determinations adverse to him.

Appellees contend that this case is moot because the Parole Commission later decided that it would have denied Mr. Sellers's parole absent consideration of the North Carolina bank robbery. Apparently, appellees misconstrue the nature and extent of Mr. Sellers's complaint. As we explained above, Mr. Sellers's Privacy Act claims challenge more than just the Parole Commission's use of the North Carolina bank robbery in denying him parole; Mr. Sellers claims that the entire 1979 presentence report was improperly used in that decision. Furthermore, Mr. Sellers contends that both the Parole Commission and the Bureau of Prisons used the 1979 report, as well as other erroneous information maintained in his files, to make other determinations adverse to him.

Therefore, even assuming that the Parole Commission's later decision concerning the North Carolina bank robbery affected Mr. Sellers's claims against the Commission concerning its parole decision, it in no way affected his remaining claims against the Commission. Nor did it affect his claims against the Bureau of Prisons. Because these claims remain viable despite the Parole Commission's later decision, this case is not moot.

B. The Privacy Act Claims

We now turn to appellant's argument that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Parole Commission and the Bureau of Prisons. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Nikoi v. Attorney General of the United States, 939 F.2d 1065, 1068 (D.C.Cir.1991). In reviewing such a decision, we must ensure that the district court did not overlook or improperly resolve any disputed issues of fact, and that it correctly applied the relevant law to the undisputed...