Sellers v. Knight

• Decision Date: 27 November 1913
• Citation: 185 Ala. 96,64 So. 329
• Parties: SELLERS v. KNIGHT et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

64 So. 329

185 Ala. 96

SELLERS v. KNIGHT et al.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 27, 1913

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1914

Appeal from Chancery Court, Jefferson County; A.H. Benners Chancellor.

Suit by J.T. Sellers against John F. Knight and others. From a decree for defendants, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

C.B Powell, of Birmingham, for appellant.

M.J Gregg and W.S. Burrow, both of Birmingham, for appellees.

McCLELLAN J.

In the year 1889 J.T. Sellers was the owner of the surface of the S.W. 1/4 of the S.E. 1/4 of section 13, township 18, range 3 west, in Jefferson county. During that year he executed a quitclaim to S.L. Weaver, for, it is averred, the purpose of securing said Weaver and Charles P. Jones their compensation for legal services to him. By the payment of $75 to Weaver he quitclaimed back to Sellers. But, in response to the claim of Jones, Sellers, in July, 1903, made to said Jones and his partner, Hume F. Jones, a quitclaim to an undivided half interest in said land, upon the recited consideration of $75. This conveyance we letter, for convenience, "a." Subsequently, and at the dates indicated, the following conveyances, touching this land, purport to have been executed by and to the parties named:

(b) J.T. and P.C. Sellers (his wife) to John F. Knight, May 9, 1904, quitclaim.

(c) John F. Knight and wife, mortgage to J.T. Sellers, May 9, 1904, to secure unpaid purchase money.

(d) H.F. Jones and C.P. Jones and wife to C.A. Knight, August 12, 1904, quitclaim.

(e) J.T. Sellers to P.C. Sellers and Mary Copeland, "foreclosure deed" under the Knight mortgage ante, August 12, 1905.

(f) P.C. Sellers and husband, J.T. and Mary Copeland and husband, W.B., to C.A. Knight, February 19, 1906, quitclaim.

(g) C.A. and J.F. Knight to J.H. Davis and B.C. Burkhart, by warranty deed, three-fourths undivided interest and one-fourth undivided interest, respectively, March 10, 1906.

(h) J.H. Davis to C.B. Patrick, July 2, 1906, warranty deed, three-fourths undivided interest.

(i) Burkhart and wife to C.B. Patrick, warranty deed, July 11, 1906, one-fourth undivided interest.

(j) Patrick and wife to P.S. Webber, warranty deed, August 9, 1906, 10 acres on east side.

The bill, several times amended, is filed by Sellers against the Knights, Webber, Patrick, Burkhart, and Davis. Its object is to avoid and have canceled these conveyances that stand as a barrier between his right and title to the land, to the end that the title be restored to him, J.T. Sellers.

To state them generally, and as we understand them, there are set forth in the amended bill three theories, much commingled in statement, upon which the stated cancellations are sought, viz.: (a) That Sellers' conveyances and those resulting in and from the mortgage foreclosure were induced by fraud on the part of John F. Knight, who was his attorney and his advisor in that relation, wherefrom John F. Knight secured the transmission of title to his brother, C.A. Knight, in every instance at a grossly inadequate value for the subject of each conveyance; (b) that Sellers was, when he conveyed, incapable of contracting, because of a mind impaired by the excessive use of intoxicants, or was, at the time, so completely intoxicated as that he could not afford legal assent to a contract, in consequence of which his interest in the land was sought to be secured at a grossly inadequate value, or that because of this state of his mind he became or was a favorable subject for the imposition of such fraud; (c) that the conveyances, lettered "a," "b," "f," token one transaction, and that the original agreement between complainant and John F. Knight was illegal, for that the engagement of Knight was to represent complainant in a then pending cause against Dallas et al. and pay the cost that might accrue, and to pay a definite sum for the subject of the litigation if Sellers' contention prevailed.

Webber and Patrick constituted their answer and pleas a cross-bill, and thereby sought the quieting of their respective titles in the premises. The chancellor denied relief sought by both the original and the cross complainants.

The view of the cause which prevails here renders it unnecessary to note or to discuss a number of questions elaborately argued in the briefs. The record is very voluminous. We confine the opinion to the decisive matters to be mentioned.

It is manifest that if the complainant has not shown himself to be entiled to have his first deed to Knight or the mortgage from Knight to him (lettered paragraph "c") canceled or the quitclaim from P.C. Sellers and others to C.A. Knight (lettered paragraph "f") canceled, he could not prevail in this cause, whatever was ruled with respect to other antecedent instruments purporting to affect the title to the land in question. The burden of proof was upon the complainant to sustain the impeachments of the conveyances he assailed; and this rule is not at all qualified in this cause by the mere disclaimer of John F. and C.A. Knight, without other answer, of any interest in the subject of the litigation, for that other respondents did interpose sufficient answers to put the complainant to proof of the affirmative allegations of the original and amended bills. Of course John F. Knight's competency as a witness to testify in refutation of the charges against the validity of the conveyances assailed was not reflected upon, or the credibility of his testimony impaired, by the fact that his response to the bill only disclaimed interest in the lands involved in the contest.

The amended bill does not aver that Sellers was non compos mentis or was permanently insane, at the time any of his acts about this property took place. The most that can be drawn from any of its unstable averments in this regard is that his mind had become or was impaired by the excessive use of intoxicants, and that he had suffered partial paralysis in consequence. This state of allegation did not make a case within the doctrine of Dougherty v. Powe, 127 Ala. 577, 30 So. 524, Galloway v. Hendon, 131 Ala. 280, 31 So. 603, and Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 129 Ala. 279, 30 So. 578, wherein it was ruled that a contract by one non compos or insane was absolutely void. The allegation stated conforms more nearly to the class described in B.R.L. & P. Co. v. Hinton, 158 Ala. 470, 48 So. 546, where it was ruled that contracts made by those otherwise than permanently mentally incapacitated were voidable, not void; and hence such contracts were subject to the rules of law pertaining to the seasonable disaffirmance, or to the affirmance of merely voidable contracts. The evidence, taken in its entirety, does not convince this court, as it did not the chancellor, that complainant was non compos or insane on or about any of the occasions involved in this contest. The distinct weight of the evidence, in connection with his pursuit of his vocation, and the impression a consideration of his testimony affords, leads to this conclusion: That when drunk he was incapable of judgment or legal assent to contracts, and when sober, which was by no means a rarity, he was as mentally capable as any entirely unlettered man, whose duties did not impose a practice of contractual dealing. He appears to have held, throughout many years, positions of responsibility and power, and to have received for his service a good wage. It is not conceivable that complainant could have had such authority committed to him, or the discharge of such duties expected of him, as the evidence shows, and yet have been of the imbecile type some of his witnesses assert he was.

In Oakley v. Shelley, 129 Ala. 467, 29 So. 385, it was said, Justice Sharpe writing: "Unlike general and permanent insanity and idiocy, drunkenness does not create such legal incapacity as will alone render a contract wholly void. Though it may furnish the party suffering from it ground for rescission, yet, being voidable only, the contract may be affirmed and made binding by him after he becomes sober."

In substance, phases of the allegations before summarily stated would invoke this doctrine, which we appropriate in effect from that set down in the concrete in Holland v Barnes, 53 Ala. page 88, 25 Am.Rep. 595, where a contract is executed on an insufficient consideration by one enfeebled in body and mind by disease and long-continued drunkenness, and who at the time of the execution of the contract is under the influence of intoxicants, a presumption of fraud...