Sellman v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm.
Decision Date | 27 October 2021 |
Docket Number | C21-1105-JCC |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Parties | GREGORY SELLMAN and VINCENT NAVARRE, Plaintiffs, v. BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM PHARMACEUTICALS INC. and ROBERT KIME, Defendants. |
GREGORY SELLMAN and VINCENT NAVARRE, Plaintiffs,
v.
BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM PHARMACEUTICALS INC. and ROBERT KIME, Defendants.
No. C21-1105-JCC
United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
October 27, 2021
ORDER
JOHN C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismiss (Dkt. No. 16). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons explained below.
I.BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Gregory Sellman and Vincent Navarre are suing their former employer Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“BIPI”), and their former supervisor, Robert Kime (“Defendants”) for employment discrimination, wrongful discharge, and wage theft. (See Dkt. No. 1-1.) When Sellman accepted an offer of employment with BIPI in February 2014, he signed the offer letter twice-once to take the job and again to acknowledge as follows:
By signing below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand the Employment Arbitration Plan and Rules (the Plan); I understand that it is my
obligation to arbitrate covered disputes; and the Company provided me with a copy of the Plan and the Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedure of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The AAA rules are also available on line [sic] at http://www.adr.org
(Dkt. No. 17-1 at 4.) When Navarre accepted his employment offer in January 2018, he too signed an identically worded acknowledgment. (Dkt. No. 17-5 at 4.)
The 2013 arbitration plan (“2013 Plan”) in effect when Sellman signed his offer letter provides that arbitration is “the required and exclusive forum for the resolution of all disputes (other than disputes by which statute are not arbitrable) arising out of or in any way related to employment” between Plaintiffs and BIPI or any of BIPI's “current and former officers, directors, employees and agents.”[1] (Dkt. No. 17-2 at 2.) The 2013 Plan also forbids multi-party or class arbitration. (Id. at 3.) The arbitration plan in effect when Navarre signed his offer letter was BIPI's 2017 arbitration agreement (“2017 Agreement”). Though worded in slightly different terms, the relevant provisions of the 2017 Agreement are substantially similar to those in the 2013 Plan, likewise requiring arbitration of “all disputes . . . arising out of or in any way related to employment . . . that may arise between an employee . . . and the Company, its predecessors, successors, ” and so on. (Dkt. No. 17-6 at 2; see also Id. at 3 (forbidding multi-party arbitration).)
Defendants move to compel arbitration, citing the acknowledgments Plaintiffs signed. (Dkt. No. 16 at 3-4.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion, chiefly asserting that they never received the arbitration agreements referenced in the offer letters that they signed, and that the documents are generally unenforceable. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 4-12.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Strike
Despite previously acknowledging that they had read and understood BIPI's arbitration agreements, Plaintiffs initially asserted, in opposing the instant motion, that they had never even seen these documents. (Dkt. Nos. 20 at 1-2, 21 at 1-2.) However, BIPI's records of the new-hire
packets it sent to Plaintiffs include archived data from the original e-mails to Sellman and Navarre attaching copies of the arbitration documents, along with the AAA rules. (Dkt. Nos. 29 at 4, 29-1 at 2-46 (screenshot of e-mail to Sellman, with attachments), 38-92 (same for Navarre).) Faced with this evidence, Plaintiffs now assert that they do not recall receiving these documents and appear to suggest, without evidentiary support, that these e-mails were never sent or may have been doctored or fabricated to help bolster the case for arbitration. (See Dkt. Nos. 25 at 2, 26 at 2.)
Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike this evidence because Defendants filed it with their reply brief. (Dkt. No. 31.) Plaintiffs, however, responded to this evidence by filing a second round of declarations and a surreply. (Dkt. Nos. 24-26, 31). The Court has considered these filings in ruling on Defendants' motion. The evidence in question is not so much “new” as it is a rebuttal to Plaintiffs' insistence that they never received documents they had acknowledged receiving. The motion to strike is DENIED.
B. Motion to Compel - Legal Standard
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the Court's review is limited to deciding whether an arbitration clause (1) is valid and (2) covers the dispute at issue. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014). Federal courts determine validity using ordinary state law rules of contract formation. Id. Contract defenses like unconscionability can thus invalidate an arbitration clause. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)).
The party seeking to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” Norcia v. Samsung Telecomm. Am., 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017). If an agreement exists, the FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion . . ., but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 213 (1985) (emphasis original).
C. Enforceability of the Arbitration...
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