Sellon v. City of Manitou Springs

• Citation: 745 P.2d 229
• Decision Date: 02 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85SA276,85SA276
• Parties: David R. SELLON, Kris J. Kovalik, and Crystal Hills Development Co., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MANITOU SPRINGS, a Colorado municipal corporation, and the City Council of Manitou Springs, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 229

745 P.2d 229

David R. SELLON, Kris J. Kovalik, and Crystal Hills Development Co., a Colorado corporation Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MANITOU SPRINGS, a Colorado municipal corporation and the City Council of Manitou Springs Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85SA276.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Nov. 2, 1987.

Susemihl, Lohman, Kent, Carlson & McDermott, Peter M. Susemihl, Catherine L. Haug, Colorado Springs, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Sparks, Dix, Enoch, Suthers & Winslow, P.C. John W. Suthers, Colorado Springs, for defendants-appellees.

KIRSHBAUM, Justice.

Landowners David R. Sellon, Kris J. Kovalik and Crystal Hills Development Co., plaintiffs-appellants, appeal an order of the El Paso County District Court upholding the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the hillside ordinance) adopted by the City of Manitou Springs (the City) and its City Council, defendants-appellees. The landowners assert that the hillside ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them, and also argue that the City Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion in adopting the hillside ordinance. We affirm.

I

In July of 1973, the City adopted a master plan for a parcel of property, referred to as "Crystal Hills," located adjacent to the City. That plan provided that 194 home sites could be developed on the property. On September 1, 1981, the City annexed Crystal Hills. The landowners purchased the property in March 1982.

The City contains many areas characterized by hills of varying degrees of slope. Consequently, problems of erosion, drainage and access are of particular concern to property owners, residents and city planners. On May 4, 1982, after much debate and discussion, the City Council adopted the hillside ordinance in an effort to deal in a meaningful fashion with some of these concerns. The ordinance created a special hillside low density residential zone and established an equation for calculating the minimal lot sizes necessary for development of property placed in that zone. ¹ When applied to steeply graded property, the equation requires in general that development plans be based on larger lot sizes than those required for properties not so steeply sloped. The equation also distinguishes between "platted" and "unplatted" land and requires larger lots for development of areas which are designated "unplatted" land at the time the property is zoned or rezoned hillside residential than in areas which are designated "platted" land.

On September 23, 1983, the City Council adopted a resolution placing Crystal Hills in a low density residential zone and authorizing the development of 108 residential units on the property. Many citizens disapproved of this decision, however, and the City Council decided to place the question of the rezoning of Crystal Hills before the voters of the City. ² In November of 1983, a majority of the City's voting electorate indicated approval for the rezoning of Crystal Hills as hillside low density residential property.

The City Council subsequently scheduled two public hearings to consider the question of the appropriate zoning for the Crystal Hills property. On November 18, 1983, the landowners were advised by City representatives that, based upon the hillside density equation, residential development of the Crystal Hills property would be limited to sixty units under hillside low density residential zoning.

Lengthy public hearings were held before the City Council on December 6, 1983, and January 3, 1984. Although one of the landowners attended the hearings and stated that he was opposed to the rezoning, the landowners offered no evidence at these hearings. At the conclusion of the January 1984 hearing, the City Council voted to rezone the Crystal Hills property as hillside low density residential.

The landowners appealed this decision to the El Paso County District Court. ³ Following a two-day hearing, the district court affirmed the City Council's action.

II

The landowners assert that the hillside ordinance is insufficiently related to public health, safety and welfare objectives of the City and that its terms are impermissibly vague. They suggest that because of these alleged deficiencies the hillside ordinance violates the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. ⁴ We disagree.

A

The principles applicable to a determination of whether a particular municipal legislative enactment violates constitutional due process standards are well settled. A presumption of validity attaches to zoning decisions of municipal zoning authorities. ⁵ Board of County Comm'rs v. Mountain Air Ranch, 192 Colo. 364, 563 P.2d 341 (1977); Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 483 P.2d 953 (1971); Baum v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961). Thus, a party challenging a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds assumes the burden of proving the asserted invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, 647 P.2d 670 (Colo.1982); Holcomb v. City & County of Denver, 199 Colo. 251, 606 P.2d 858 (1980); Ford Leasing Dev. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 Colo. 418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974); Baum v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688.

For purposes of the United States Constitution, an ordinance containing provisions that bear a rational relationship to legitimate state concerns satisfies due process requirements. ⁶ Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). The due process clause of article II, section 25, of Colorado's Constitution requires a reasonable relation between an ordinance and a valid interest, such as public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P.2d 344 (1972); Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 483 P.2d 953. The hillside ordinance must be evaluated pursuant to these standards.

The record reflects that prior to the adoption of the hillside ordinance great attention had been directed by the City Council to problems that had developed after improvements were made to property containing relatively steep slopes. For example, the city manager testified that the development of single-family units on steeply graded plots of land continually forced the City to deal with erosion, drainage, maintenance and emergency access issues. The record also contains evidence that residents of various areas of the City historically had experienced significant difficulties with some or all of these problems. The adoption of the hillside ordinance reflected a considered effort by the City Council to deal with these very real problems. Viewed in light of these facts, the ordinance addresses significant issues directly affecting the health and welfare of the City's residents.

At the review hearing conducted by the district court the landowners introduced evidence to the effect that the hillside ordinance was not the best means available to address problems of erosion, drainage or emergency access associated with development of residential housing units in steep slope areas of the City. However, the question is not whether other solutions to a governmental problem are feasible or superior to the program actually adopted; the question is whether the decision made is itself reasonably and rationally related to the problem being addressed. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176; Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P.2d 344; Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 483 P.2d 953. In this case, it is abundantly clear that the provisions of the hillside ordinance are rationally and reasonably related to problems of erosion, drainage, maintenance and emergency access occurring on sloping terrain that affect the health and safety of the City's residents.

B

The landowners next argue that the hillside ordinance is void for vagueness because it contains no definitions of the terms "platted" and "unplatted." ⁷ We disagree.

A legislative enactment violates due process requirements when it contains language so vague that it fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or fails to provide law enforcement authorities with sufficiently definite standards for nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory enforcement of the law. High Gear & Toke Shop v. Beacom, 689 P.2d 624 (Colo.1984); People ex rel. City of Arvada v. Nissen, 650 P.2d 547 (Colo.1982). Civil as well as penal enactments are subject to vagueness challenges. Weissman v. Board of Educ., 190 Colo. 414, 547 P.2d 1267 (1976). Due process of law requires neither scientific nor mathematical exactitude in legislative draftsmanship. People v. Aalbu, 696 P.2d 796 (Colo.1985); People v. Gross, 670 P.2d 799 (Colo.1983). In the absence of a specific definition by the governmental authority promulgating the challenged term, it will be given its commonly accepted definition. Gonzales v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 999 (Colo.1987); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986).

Relatively extensive testimony was presented at the review hearing on the definition of the term "plat." The landowners' expert witness testified that the term plat can refer to a number of different things, such as a sketch plat, an annexation plat, a utility plat and a street plat. He conceded, however, that the term "plat" is a term of art in the planning profession and that it generally is used with reference to a subdivision plat. The notion that the term "plat" commonly refers to a subdivision plat was endorsed by both of appellees' expert witnesses. The evidence fully supports the trial court's conclusion that the commonly understood meaning of the term refers to a subdivision map which has been prepared for approval by appropriate...