Sells v. CSX Transp., Inc.

Citation170 So.3d 27
Decision Date04 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. 1D13–4775.,1D13–4775.
PartiesCrystal SELLS, as Personal Representative of The Estate of Larry Sells, deceased, Appellant, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

John S. Mills and Andrew D. Manko, The Mills Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Andrew J. Knight, II of Moseley Prichard Parrish Knight & Jones, Jacksonville, and Richard Caldarone, Pro Hac Vice, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Peter D. Webster of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tallahassee, Wendy F. Lumish of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Miami, and Daniel Saphire, Assistant General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Association of American Railroads.

Opinion

ROWE, J.

Appellant, Crystal Sells, as a personal representative of her husband's estate, challenges the trial court's order granting Appellee's, CSX Transportation, Inc.'s (CSX's), motion to set aside the jury's verdict and denying her motion to set aside the jury's finding of comparative negligence. We affirm the trial court's entry of directed verdict for three reasons. First, Appellant failed to establish that CSX had a duty to take preventative measures to guard against an employee suffering from cardiac arrest

. Second, Appellant failed to establish that CSX's failure to procure prompt medical assistance contributed in any way to the employee's death. Third, although CSX, through its employees, has a duty to render basic first aid to seriously ill or injured employees, this duty does not require CSX to compel its employees to administer medical care in the form of life-saving techniques that require training and/or certification.

I. Facts

In August 2006, Larry Sells was working as a conductor and Dick Wells was working as an engineer for CSX. They were conducting switch operations, which required Sells to exit the train and manually operate a switch to change tracks, in a rural area of Clay County, Florida. After he exited the train, Sells suffered cardiac arrest

. Wells discovered Sells about two minutes after the attack. Pursuant to company policy and in compliance with federal regulations prohibiting employees from using cell phones while operating a train, Wells contacted CSX's dispatcher via the train's radio system. Because of the dispatcher's inability to communicate Sells' exact location, the EMTs' arrival was delayed by thirteen to fifteen minutes. In total, it took the EMTs approximately thirty-five minutes to reach Sells, at which point there was nothing they could do to save his life.

Appellant sued CSX under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that CSX's negligence caused Sells' death. She alleged that CSX owed a duty to provide Sells with a reasonably safe workplace and that it breached that duty by failing to take reasonable measures to ensure that Sells received prompt, timely, and adequate medical attention; by failing to provide reasonably safe equipment, in that CSX failed to equip its trains with automated external defibrillators

(“AEDs”); by failing to train Sells' co-workers in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”); and by failing to timely call for emergency personnel after Sells collapsed.

The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellant, finding that CSX was negligent and that Sells was 45% comparatively negligent. Both parties filed post-trial motions. Appellant asked the trial court to set aside the jury's comparative negligence finding. CSX asked the trial court to set aside the verdict and enter judgment in accordance with its motion for directed verdict made at trial. The trial court granted CSX's motion and set aside the verdict. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that CSX had no duty to take actions in anticipation of the possibility that Sells might suffer cardiac arrest

and that Appellant failed to provide any evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that CSX's response to Sells' cardiac arrest caused or contributed to his death.1 This appeal follows.

II. Motion for Directed Verdict

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for two reasons.2 First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that CSX had no duty to take preventive actions in anticipation of one of its employees suffering cardiac arrest

. Second, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that CSX's response to the emergency caused or contributed to Sells' death. Both of these arguments flow from a railroad's duty to provide the employee with a reasonably safe workplace. See Lynch v. Ne. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 836 F.Supp.2d 620 (N.D.Ill.2011) ; Foerman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 279 So.2d 825, 827 (Fla.1973) ; Randall v. Reading Co., 344 F.Supp. 879 (M.D.Pa.1972).

With respect to providing compensation for workplace injuries, the obligations of railroads differ from those of the majority of other employers in the United States. The workers' compensation laws that cover virtually all other industries provide compensation to injured employees on a no-fault basis. However, under FELA, being injured on the job does not automatically entitle an employee of a railroad to compensation; instead, compensation is awarded only if the employer's negligence caused the injury, and compensation must be reduced to the extent of the employee's own negligence. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53. FELA provides, “Every common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agent, or employees of such carriers....” 45 U.S.C. § 51. In other words, under FELA, a railroad is responsible for its employees' injuries or death caused in whole or in part by the railroad's negligence. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 2634, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011). To establish a claim under FELA, the plaintiff must prove duty, breach of duty, foreseeability, and causation. Fulk v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 22 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir.1994) ; Moody v. Boston & Maine Corp., 921 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990). More specifically, to prove a claim that the railroad failed to provide an employee with a safe workplace, “the worker must establish that he became ill at work, that without prompt medical treatment he faced death or serious bodily harm, that the employer had notice of his illness, that the employer failed to furnish prompt medical attention, and that his death or injury resulted in whole or in part from the employer's delay in response.” Pulley v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., Inc., 821 So.2d 1008, 1014–15 (Ala.Civ.App.2001).

A. CSX's Duty to Take Preventative Measures

First, we address whether CSX had a duty to make AEDs3 available to its employees, to train its employees to use AEDs, and/or to train its employees in CPR. The existence of a duty is a question of law that must be decided by the trial court, not the jury. Fulk, 22 F.3d at 125. As recently acknowledged by our supreme court, there are four sources of duty: (1) statutes or regulations; (2) common law interpretations of those statutes or regulations; (3) other sources in the common law; and (4) the general facts of the case.” Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee County, 161 So.3d 384, 389 (Fla. Apr. 2, 2015). The duty in this case arises from the common law. Under FELA, an employer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing a reasonably safe workplace, reasonably safe conditions in which to work, and reasonably safe tools and equipment. Beeber v. Norfolk S. Corp., 754 F.Supp. 1364, 1368 (N.D.Ind.1990). As part of the duty to provide a safe workplace, the employer is required to procure medical aid and assistance for an employee when, to the employer's knowledge, the employee becomes seriously ill and unable to care for himself. S. Pac. Co. v. Hendricks, 85 Ariz. 373, 339 P.2d 731, 733 (1959) ; Szabo v. Penn. R.R. Co., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562, 563 (N.J.1945). [T]he duty arises out of strict necessity and urgent exigency. It arises with the emergency and expires with it.” Hendricks, 339 P.2d at 733 (citing Szabo, 40 A.2d at 563 ); Randall, 344 F.Supp. at 884 (holding that whether the railroad had a duty to render emergency medical aid turned on whether the railroad knew or should have known that the employee had been seriously injured). An employer is not required to take preventive actions in anticipation of an employee falling ill or becoming injured. Wilke v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 190 Minn. 89, 251 N.W. 11, 13 (1933) (holding that an employer is not required to anticipate that the physical health and ability of an employee to care for himself while performing his work duties would suddenly cease). Thus, long-standing case law establishes that while CSX had to procure prompt emergency medical treatment for Sells once it knew that he was seriously ill, it did not have a duty to take anticipatory measures to prevent such emergency situations. Szabo, 40 A.2d at 563 ; Wilke, 251 N.W. at 13. FELA “does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty.” Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572 (1947).

While there are no cases specifically addressing whether, pursuant to FELA, a railroad is required to provide AEDs or to train its employees to administer CPR or AEDs, Florida courts have previously addressed this issue in the context of the duty owed by a property owner to an invitee and the duty owed by a school to its student under the common law.4 See L.A. Fitness Intern., LLC v. Mayer, 980 So.2d 550, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ; Limones, 161 So.3d at 393. In L.A. Fitness, the Fourth District concluded that a business owner satisfied the legal duty to aid a patron experiencing a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Chaney v. Team Techs., Inc.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 31 Enero 2019
    ...not involving a workers' compensation claim under state no-fault law, the decision in Sells v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 170 So.3d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), is also instructive. In Sells , a railroad employee suffered cardiac arrest after getting off a train to operate a switch. A co-......
  • Sewell v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 27 Diciembre 2017
    ...could find that the school breached its duty of care by not providing student athletes with defibrillators ); Sells v. CSX Transp., Inc., 170 So.3d 27, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (finding that given the nature of the employer and employee relationship, the employer had no duty to provide defibr......
  • Espinoza v. The Kan. City S. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 23 Agosto 2023
    ..."The workers' compensation laws that cover virtually all other industries provide compensation to injured employees on a no-fault basis." Id. "However, under FELA, being injured on the job does automatically entitle an employee of a railroad to compensation; instead, compensation is awarded......
  • Sells v. CSX Transp., Inc., SC15–1639
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 13 Abril 2017
    ...initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Sells v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 170 So.3d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), based on express and direct conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, we conclude that jurisdi......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT