Semasek v. Semasek

• Decision Date: 16 April 1985
• Citation: 509 Pa. 282,502 A.2d 109
• Parties: Joseph P. SEMASEK, Appellee, v. Theresa A. SEMASEK, Appellant. . Agued
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 109

502 A.2d 109

509 Pa. 282

Joseph P. SEMASEK, Appellee, v. Theresa A. SEMASEK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Agued April 16, 1985.

Decided Nov. 27, 1985.

Clayton T. Hyman, Peter S. Steinberger, Allentown, for appellant.

Anthony J. Urban, Ashland, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HUTCHINSON, Justice.

In this appeal we examine, inter alia, whether an absolute gift of tangible, personal property from one spouse to another remains within the pool of marital property for purposes of equitable distribution under section 401 of the Divorce Code of 1980, Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, 23 P.S. §§ 101-801, as amended. ¹ The Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, in arriving at an order of equitable distribution in the course of these divorce proceedings, held that three rings given by appellee husband to appellant wife were a part of the marital property and subject to equitable distribution. A divided Superior Court panel, 331 Pa.Super. 1, 479 A.2d 1047, affirmed. We now reverse that holding and remand the case to Common Pleas with instructions to modify its decree of equitable distribution, after also reexamining or explaining its ruling on the valuation of one parcel of real estate and otherwise revising its calculations in accord with this opinion.

I.

The parties in this case were married in September 1959. They have two children. The couple separated in October 1976 after several years of marital disharmony. On August 5, 1980, the husband instituted an action for divorce under Section 201(d) of the Divorce Code. The wife counterclaimed for equitable distribution of the marital property, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees. The case was referred to a Master. He recommended a divorce and then held separate hearings on the economic issues. The court considered his report and granted the divorce on May 4, 1981. However, a decision on the other matters did not occur until June 7, 1982, when Common Pleas entered various orders dealing with the financial aspects of this divorce. These latter orders are the subject of this appeal. In them, Common Pleas ordered that the marital property be split, with 56% awarded to the husband and 44% to the wife. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife rehabilitative alimony for a future period of three years for the specific purpose of covering educational expenses, not to exceed $2,750 per year. The court refused to award alimony pendente lite, but did award appellant wife counsel fees and costs of $3,910.00. On appeal, Superior Court affirmed. We granted the wife's petition for allocatur.

II.

As appellant, the wife first contends that Common Pleas abused its discretion when it treated three diamond rings given her by the husband as marital property. That court held § 401(e)(3) of the Divorce Code does not exclude these gifts from marital property. This section excepts property received by a party by "gift, bequest, devise or descent" from the concept of marital property except for its increase in value during the marriage.

The section nowhere expressly says that gifts between spouses nevertheless remain marital property, nor can we find any implication that the Legislature intended to specially treat inter-spousal gifts as marital property. Words must be given their plain meaning, unless doing so would create an ambiguity, and we must interpret statutes in accordance with the legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921.

Here, the language itself creates no ambiguity. The term "gift" has a definite meaning. Our law requires only donative intent, delivery and acceptance. Post's Estate v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., 500 Pa. 420, 456 A.2d 1360 (1983); In re Sipe's Estate, 492 Pa. 125, 422 A.2d 826 (1980). Nothing in the statutory definition excludes gifts between spouses, nor does their special nature require exclusion. The words "bequest, devise or descent" following the term "gift" in the phrase modifying and limiting this excluded property do not show us an intent to limit this exclusion to property received from a third person. They would do so only if we construed "gift" as a generic term further limited by the specific kinds of gifts which follow it, under the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. However, construction by that maxim is inconsistent with other sections of the Divorce Code. For example, § 401(e)(2) allows spouses to exclude specific properties from the pool of marital property by agreement. § 401(e)(3). A contrary interpretation including inter-spousal gifts as marital property would deprive § 401(e)(2) of much of its meaning.

In this case, the record itself indicates that the rings were given absolutely to the wife as her separate property. Diamond rings are not for joint use. They are solely for the use of the recipient. This is evidenced by the husband's statement that he bought the rings because he never gave the wife an engagement ring. Reproduced Record ("R.R.") at 57a. The Divorce Code states simply that gifts are not marital property. We see no reason to treat gifts from one spouse for the sole use of the other any differently. Accord Sorbello v. Sorbello, 21 D & C 3d 187 (1981).

III.

Appellant also contests Common Pleas' valuation of various items of property, including real property in Kline Township and the City of Pottsville, both in Schuylkill County. ²

A.

Appellant wife argues that Common Pleas abused its discretion when it ignored her expert witness's testimony that the Kline Township real estate had a fair market value of $52,800 in spite of a moratorium on sewerage connections in that area. The Common Pleas judge, as factfinder, assigned a value of $10,000 to it.

The record is inadequate for proper appellate review of this issue. Common Pleas does not tell us how it reached the value of $10,000 when the only record evidence was the appraiser's opinion, and therefore we cannot tell whether he properly exercised his discretion in this matter. Appellant's expert appraisal states that the value of $52,800 was already discounted because of a local moratorium on sewer hook-ups. She said that she based her valuation on the property's use as two separate residential parcels, although it would be better suited for a subdivision if sewer hook-ups were available. She went on to say, however, that continuing the property in its current use as two residences would allow immediate connection to the public sewer lines and was therefore the best current use of the property.

Common Pleas, without official view or recommendation from the Master, did not explain why it ignored this testimony. Although a factfinder need not accept even the uncontradicted opinion of a valuation expert, Common Pleas should offer some explanation of the basis on which it sets value where that value varies from the only value given in evidence to the extent it does here. See Appeal of F.W. Woolworth Co., 426 Pa. 583, 235 A.2d 793 (1967); Avins v. Commonwealth, 379 Pa. 202, 108 A.2d 788 (1954). Without such explanation, meaningful appellate review is not possible. On remand, Common Pleas will have an opportunity to appropriately support its conclusion or take additional evidence, if the taking of additional evidence is requested and the court thinks its receipt is necessary or appropriate.

B.

Similar problems surround the valuation of the office building in Pottsville. Appellant placed a $45,000 value on it. Appellee testified only that it was worth at least that much. No other evidence was produced on the question. The master recommended that the building be sold and the proceeds split. The trial court established a value of $35,000 and awarded the building to the husband at that value.

Owners of property are considered experts when testifying as to the property's value, Sgarlat Estate v. Commonwealth, 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 817, 81 S.Ct. 49, 5 L.Ed.2d 48 (1960). Although the court is not bound by such testimony, the record here is inadequate for our review of the court's valuation of this property since there is here, too, nothing on the record to support the court's finding of a lower value. Thus, it should, on remand, explain or modify its action with reference to the portion of this record or any supplemental record relied upon.

IV.

Appellant next claims that Common Pleas misapprehended the record evidence in two respects.

A.

She first says that findings 60 and 78 concerning the sale and deposit of the proceeds of the parties' interest in Delaware real estate are inconsistent. Finding 60 says:

60. During their marriage, the parties acquired an interest in real estate in the State of Delaware. Following their separation, this property was sold for $10,000.00 and the entire proceeds were retained by the [appellant], and were deposited by her in a bank account registered in her name only.

Finding 78 says:

78. On December 16, 1976, the proceeds from the sale of a property owned by the parties in Delaware in the amount of $10,406.75 was deposited in account # 20-021681-06.[ ³

Appellant claims that Finding 60 improperly credits her with assets that went into a joint account under Finding 78. This is facially contradictory. However, the figures in the final accounting properly credit the proceeds of this sale to the joint account. Compare Conclusion of Law 5.15 with Findings of Fact Nos. 70, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 85. Thus, the facial contradiction is washed out by the Conclusions of Law and this finding is affirmed.

B.

Appellant also says that the trial court improperly charged her with appropriating $3,550.00 in joint property. This money originally came from joint accounts with her husband, R.R. at 587a, and was deposited in accounts with her sons as co-owners. The later withdrawals from these accounts with her sons are offset by corresponding deposits into the parties' joint checking account. R.R....