Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Fla.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-6756-CIV.,91-6756-CIV.
• Citation: 801 F. Supp. 655
• Parties: SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Lawton Chiles, Governor of the State of Florida, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

801 F. Supp. 655

SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Lawton Chiles, Governor of the State of Florida, Defendants.

No. 91-6756-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

June 18, 1992.

Bruce S. Rogow, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff.

Jonathan A. Glogau, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER

MARCUS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Eleventh Amendment Grounds, filed December 16, 1991. For the following reasons, the motion is Denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, the Seminole Tribe of Florida (the "Tribe") is a federally recognized Indian tribe whose headquarters are located in Broward County, Florida. The Tribe commenced this action pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. ("IGRA"), to remediate the alleged failure of the State of Florida to conduct good faith negotiations regarding certain gaming activities to be conducted on the Tribe's land, after State-Tribe compact negotiations failed to yield an agreement. According to the Tribe, "the State and its Governor have refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of such gaming in a tribal-state compact, and have accordingly violated IGRA's requirement of good faith negotiation." Compl. at ¶ 24. The Defendants assert that they have in fact entered into good faith negotiations with the Tribe, but maintain that those negotiations were unavailing since the gaming activities at issue are prohibited under Florida law. In addition, the Defendants have moved to dismiss the action pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, arguing that Congress does not have the power constitutionally to enforce the "good faith" requirement of the compact process by explicitly providing the Tribe a judicial remedy against the State.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was enacted by Congress primarily "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments...." 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). IGRA divides Indian gaming into three distinct classes. Class I gaming "means social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id. at § 2703(6). "Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes" and is not subject to the provisions of IGRA. Id. at § 2710(a)(1). Class II gaming includes bingo, pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars and other similar games, id. at § 2703(7)(A)(i), and certain non-banking card games (not including blackjack and baccarat), id. at §§ 2703(7)(A)(ii); 2703(7)(B)(i). "Class II gaming on Indian lands shall continue to be within the jurisdiction of the Indian tribes," but is subject to the provisions of IGRA, id. at § 2710(a)(2), including oversight by National Indian Gaming Commission, established within the Department of the Interior. Id. at § 2704(a).

Class III gaming is "all other forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming." Id. at § 2703(8). "Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are ... located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity...." Id. at § 2710(d)(1). IGRA further provides that

any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.

Id. at § 2710(d)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Finally, IGRA mandates that

the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith....

Id. at § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). Notwithstanding the express terms of Section 2710, Defendants argue that any such suits brought to remediate a State's alleged failure to negotiate in good faith are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

B. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. The scope of the Amendment has been extended beyond the literal text to also bar suits against a State brought by one of its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has recently observed:

Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; and that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty....

Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 2581, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991) (citation omitted). Three exceptions to the Amendment exist: (1) a State may consent to suit in federal court, or waive its immunity to such suits, either expressly or impliedly; see id.; (2) Congress may, when it possesses the power, abrogate the States' immunity; see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2280-86, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); and (3) state officials may under certain circumstances be sued, in their official capacities, to obtain prospective relief. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Against this framework, we proceed to evaluate Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Abrogation

The Tribe's central argument in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss is that Congress, in enacting IGRA, abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.¹ We hold that Congress did in fact abrogate the States' immunity when it enacted IGRA, and, despite case authority to the contrary,² further hold that, pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress plainly had the constitutional power to abrogate.³

1. Statutory Language

At the outset, the United States Supreme Court has held that

Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.

See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, ___, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); see also Blatchford, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2584; Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 226, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 2399, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989). In the instant case, the relevant portion of IGRA provides:

The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith....

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). It is beyond peradventure that, in expressly providing for federal jurisdiction over claims brought by Indian tribes against States to compel good faith negotiations under IGRA (or to remedy the lack of such negotiations), Congress made its intention to abrogate the States' immunity in this context "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 3147. Indeed, the State of Florida concedes as much. See Def.Mem. at 14 ("There is little doubt but that IGRA's attempted abrogation of state immunity is clear enough to do so if Congress has the power to abrogate in this situation."). Moreover, every court to squarely consider this precise issue has concluded that the language in Section 2710 is "unmistakably clear." See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, et al. v. State of Michigan, No. 90-611, 1992 WL 71384, at *4 (W.D.Mich. Mar. 27, 1992) ("IGRA demonstrates specific Congressional intent that states be subject to suit in federal courts based upon violations of IGRA. This Court finds that the Act is a clear statement of waiver of sovereign immunity." (emphasis in original)); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State of Alabama, 776 F.Supp. 550, 557 (S.D.Ala.1991) ("This Court has little doubt but that IGRA's attempted abrogation of state immunity is clear enough to do so if Congress has the power to abrogate in this situation.... It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of Congress' intent to subject states to lawsuits in the federal courts."). Accordingly, we find that IGRA, on its face, abrogates the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. That does not end the inquiry, however.

2. Congressional Power to Abrogate

A more difficult question is whether, notwithstanding its manifest intent to do so, Congress had the power to abrogate the States' immunity in the context at issue here. Given Congress' plenary authority over Indian relations, explicitly noted in the text of the Constitution at Article I, § 8, cl. 3, and the uniquely federal issues raised when such authority is exercised, considered in conjunction with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), we conclude that Congress, when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce...